It is of course much easier to look back and second-guess regulatory actions. It is far more difficult to propose a way forward and to do so in light of the emerging hot-button issues, including data and the digitization of the industry, insurtech (and regtech), emerging and growing risks, cyber, the Internet of Things (IoT), natural catastrophes, longevity and growing protectionism. The way forward requires consideration of the primary goals of insurance regulation and raises critical questions regarding how regulators prioritize their work and how they interact with one another, with the global industry and with consumers.
We offer below some thoughts and suggestions on these important questions and on how regulation might best move forward over the next 10 years.
Establish a reasonable construct for regulatory relationships.
Relationships matter, and it is imperative for there to be careful consideration of how regulators organize their interactions and reliance on each other. We have some examples in the form of the Solvency II equivalence assessment process, the NAIC’s Qualified Jurisdiction assessment process (under the U.S. credit for reinsurance laws), the NAIC’s accreditation process for the states of the U.S., the U.S.-E.U. Covered Agreement, ComFrame, the IAIS and NAIC’s memorandum of ynderstanding and the IMF financial sector assessment program (FSAP). Each of these provide varying degrees of assessment and regulatory cooperation/reliance.
These processes and protocols, however, have largely emerged on an ad hoc, unilateral basis and in some cases have had a whiff of imperial judgment about them that may not be justified – and certainly is off-putting to counterparties. We would urge regulators to give careful consideration to the goals, guiding principles and the process for achieving greater levels of cooperation and reliance among global regulators.
We hope these efforts would include an appreciation that different approaches/systems can achieve similar results that no jurisdiction has a monopoly on good solvency regulation. There must also be respect for and recognition of local laws and a recognition that regulatory cooperation and accommodation will benefit regulators, the industry and consumers. Most importantly, regulators need to work together to develop confidence and trust in one another.
The IAIS first coined the phrase “supervisory recognition” in 2009. In March of that year, the IAIS released an “issues paper on group-wide solvency assessment and supervision.” That paper stated that:
“To the extent there is not convergence of supervisory standards and practices, supervisors can pursue processes of ‘supervisory recognition’ in an effort to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of supervision. Supervisory recognition refers to supervisors choosing to recognize and rely on the work of other supervisors, based on an assessment of the counterpart jurisdiction’s regulatory regime.”
See also: Global Trend Map No. 14: Regulation
The paper noted the tremendous benefits that can flow from choosing such a path:
“An effective system of supervisory recognition could reduce duplication of effort by the supervisors involved, thereby reducing compliance costs for the insurance industry and enhancing market efficiency. It would also facilitate information sharing and cooperation among those supervisors.”
This is powerful. We urge global insurance regulators to take a step back and consider how they can enhance regulatory effectiveness and efficiency by taking reasonable and prudential steps to recognize effective regulatory regimens − even where these systems are based on different (perhaps significantly different) rules and principles, but which have a demonstrated track record of effectiveness.
As noted above, we have seen some efforts at supervisory recognition. These include Solvency II’s equivalence assessment process, the NAIC’s accreditation process for other U.S. states, the NAIC “Qualified Jurisdictions” provisions for identifying jurisdictions that U.S. regulators will rely on for purposes of lowering collateral requirements on foreign reinsurers, the E.U.-U.S. Covered Agreement and the IAIS’s Memorandum on Mutual Understanding. Some of these processes are more prescriptive than others and have the danger of demanding that regulatory standards be virtually identical to be recognized. This should be avoided.
One size for all is not the way to go.
The alternative approach to recognition of different, but equally effective systems is the pursuit of a harmonized, single set of regulatory standards for global insurers. This approach is much in vogue among some regulators, who assert the “need for a common language” or for “a level playing field” or to avoid “regulatory arbitrage.” Some regulators also argue that common standards will lead to regulatory nirvana, where one set of rules will apply to all global insurers, which will then be able to trade seamlessly throughout all markets.
There are, however, a variety of solvency and capital systems that have proven their effectiveness. These systems are not identical, and indeed they have some profoundly different regulatory structures, accounting rules and other standards such as the systems deployed in the E.U. (even pre-Solvency II), the U.S., Canada, Japan, Bermuda, Australia, Switzerland and others. Attempting to assert a signal system or standard ignores commercial, regulatory, legal, cultural and political realities.
Moreover, we question some of the rationale for pursuing uniform standards, including the need for a common language. We suggest that what is really needed is for regulators to continue to work together, to discuss their respective regulatory regimes and to develop a deep, sophisticated knowledge of how their regimes work. From this, trust will develop, and from that a more effective and efficient system of regulation is possible. The engagement and trust building can happen within supervisory colleges. We have seen it emerge in the context of the E.U.-U.S. regulatory dialogue. We saw it in the context of the E.U.-U.S. Covered Agreement. No one, however, has made a compelling case for why one regulatory language is necessary to establish a close, effective working relationship among regulators.
Similarly, the call for a level playing field sounds good, but it is an amorphous, ambiguous term that is rarely, if ever, defined. Does the “playing field” include just regulatory capital requirements? If so, how about tax, employment rules, social charges? How about 50 subnational regulators versus one national regulator? Guarantee funds? Seeking a level playing field can also be code for, “My system of regulation is heavier, more expensive than yours, so I need to put a regulatory thumb on the scales to make sure you have equally burdensome regulations.” This argument was made for decades in the debate surrounding the U.S. reinsurance collateral rules. We hear it now regarding the burdens of Solvency II. It must be asked, however, whether it is the responsibility of prudential regulators to be leveling playing fields, or should their focus be solely on prudent regulatory standards for their markets.
Finally, the dark specter of regulatory arbitrage is often asserted as a reason to pursue a single regulatory standard, such as the development of the ICS by the IAIS. But one must ask if there is really a danger of regulatory arbitrage today among global, internationally active insures? Yes, a vigilant eye needs to kept for a weak link in the regulatory system, something the IMF FSAP system has sought to do, supervisory colleges can do and the IAIS is well-equipped to do. But using regulatory arbitrage as an argument to drive the establishment of the same standards for all insurers does not seem compelling.
Proportionality is required.
Often, regulators roll out new regulatory initiatives with the phrase that the new rules will be “proportionate” to the targeted insurers. Too often, it seems there is just lip service to this principle. Rarely is it defined – but it is tossed out in an attempt to say, “Do not worry, the new rules will not be excessive.” Greater debate and greater commitment to this principle is needed. Clearly a key component of it must be a careful cost/benefit analysis of any proposed new standard, with a clear articulation of the perceived danger to be addressed – including the likelihoods and severity of impact and then a credible calculation of the attendant costs – economic and otherwise to industry and to regulators. In October 2017, the U.K. Treasury Select Committee published a report criticizing the PRA for its excessively strict interpretation of Solvency II and its negative effect on the competitiveness of U.K. insurers. The report concluded that the PRA had enhanced policyholder protection at the expense of increasing the cost of capital for U.K. insurers, which hurt their ability to provide long-term investments and annuities. Although the PRA emphasized its mandate of prudential regulation and policy holder protection, the Treasury Committee reiterated its concern with how the PRA interpreted the principle of proportionality.
Simplicity rather than complexity.
Over the past 10 years, there has been a staggering increase in proposed and enacted regulatory requirements, many of which are catalogued above. There is a danger, however, that increasingly complex regulatory tools can create their own regulatory blind spots and that overly complex regulations can create a regulatory “fog of war.”
Andrew Haldane, executive director at the Bank of England, in August 2012 delivered a paper at a Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s economic policy symposium, titled “The Dog and the Frisbee.” He graphically laid out when less is really more by talking about two ways of catching a Frisbee: One can “weigh a complex array of physical and atmospheric factors, among them wind speed and Frisbee rotation” − or one can simply catch the Frisbee, the way a dog does. Complex rules, Haldane said, may cause people to manage to the rules for fear of falling in conflict with them. The complexity of the rules may induce people to act defensively and focus on the small print at the expense of the bigger picture.
Focusing on the complexity of the banking world, Haldane compared the 20 pages of the Glass-Steagall Act to the 848 pages of Dodd-Frank together with its 30,000 pages of rulemaking, and compared the 18 pages of Basel 1 to the more than 1,000 pages of Basel III. The fundamental question is whether that additional detail and complexity really adds greater safety to the financial system or has just the opposite effect and significantly increases the cost. Haldane’s analysis provides compelling evidence that increasing the complexity of financial regulation is a recipe for continuing crisis. Accordingly, Haldane calls for a different direction for supervisors with “…fewer (perhaps far fewer), and more (ideally much more) experienced supervisors, operating to a smaller, less detailed rule book.”
Although Haldane’s analysis and discussion focuses on the banking system, his assessment and recommendations should be considered carefully by global insurance regulators. The sheer volume and complexity of rules, models and reports that flood into regulatory bodies raise the real question of who reviews this information, who really understands it and, worst of all, does a mountain of detailed information create a false confidence that regulators have good visibility into the risks – particular the emerging risks – that insurers are facing? A real danger exists of not seeing the forest for the trees.
See also: To Predict the Future, Try Creating It
Regulation should promote competitiveness rather than protectionism.
At a time when competition has been growing not only from within the established companies but also more importantly from outside the traditional companies, protectionism will only inhibit growth and stifle better understanding of risk in a rapidly changing business environment. The goal must be to make the industry more competitive and to encourage transfer of innovation and create better ways to address risk, distribution of products and climate changes. Protectionism will only limit the potential of growth of the industry and is both short-sighted and self-defeating.
Recognition of the importance of positive disruption through insurtech, fintech and innovation.
The consensus is that the insurance industry is ripe for disruption because it has been slow (but is now working hard) to modernize in view of an array of innovative and technological advancements. Equally, regulators are trying to catch up with the rapid changes and are trying to understand the impacts through sandbox experiments and running separate regulatory models. The pace is fast and presents challenges for the regulators. Solvency and policyholder protection remain paramount, but cybersecurity, data protection, artificial intelligence and the digital revolution make advancements every day. Where this will lead is not clear. But changes are happening and regulators must work to understand the impact and need to calibrate regulatory rules to keep up with the industry and encourage innovation.
Regulation must be transparent.
Too often, regulation is drafted in times of crisis or behind closed doors by regulators believing they know better how to protect policy holders and how to prevent abuse of the system. As we have said, getting it right matters. A strong and healthy industry is the best way to protect consumers and policy holders. Industry engagement is essential and acknowledging and actually incorporating industry’s views is critical. This is particularly true given the dramatic changes in the insurance sector and the need to adopt regulation to new economics, business practices and consumer needs and expectations
This is an excerpt from a report, the full text of which is available here.
What Should Future of Regulation Be?
Global insurance regulators should take a step back and look for others' regimens that they can use effectively.