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The Flaw in 'Human-in-the-Loop'

An HBR article argues that human supervisors quickly become unreliable as the AI becomes increasingly accurate.

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Insurance

The notion that there must always be a "human in the loop" has become de rigueur in any discussion of AI implementation in business. The cynical side of me suspects that part of the reason is to reassure everyone that AI won't lead to mass layoffs, but there are also plenty of practical reasons to have humans check the work of AIs.

Or maybe not. At least not for long.

A recent article in Harvard Business Review argues that human supervisors quickly become numb and simply approve the recommendations of the AI as it becomes increasingly accurate. And I think the author has a point, based on what I've seen of human/AI interactions in semi-autonomous cars. 

There needs to be a better way.

Let's have a look.

Early in the development of its driverless cars, Google gave demo models to employees. Google warned them that the AI wasn't perfect and instructed them to have their hands on the wheel, always ready to take control. That worked... for a little while. A very little while. 

As the AI proved to be reliable, the drivers began to relax their hold on the wheel, then started to take their eyes off the road, then began reading or looking at their phones. When the car signaled that the drivers had to take over, they needed perhaps 10 seconds to fully reengage. Given that a car going 60mph travels nearly 300 yards in 10 seconds, Google realized its hybrid approach wouldn't work and committed to producing only cars that could be fully autonomous. 

Other makers of autonomous vehicles, most notably Tesla, continue to offer cars that take a hybrid, human/AI approach, but I think that's irresponsible (as I wrote at length a year ago). 

Now, an article in Harvard Business Review offers a similar view about the dangers of having a "human in the loop" to supervise work done by AIs. The author, a senior fellow at Cal, writes:

"Decades of research on automation show that better automation systems lead to worse human safety layers; as automation grows more reliable, the people monitoring it grow complacent, their skills atrophy, and they become less attentive.... AI compounds the problem. Its failures sound as confident, fluent, and well-structured as its successes....

"Even when validation works and people catch errors, every correction is captured as training data. Each exception a person handles teaches the system to handle that exception; the better the data, the smaller the scope of human validation needed in the future."

The article says the lack of reliability of the humans in the loop is actually just the start of the problem. He writes:

"The larger problem with the human-in-the-loop organization, though, is that the entire blueprint reads the transformation backwards. It organizes the company around the shrinking frontier of what machines can’t yet do. But there’s a larger opportunity here. Because AI removes constraints, it enables new combinations of work, new decision rights, and new forms of value. Organizations, accordingly, have an opportunity to reorganize and 'rebundle' around those new decisions rather than the shrinking residue of the old work."

He goes on to lay out how to think about rebundling: "Instead of asking which tasks the machine can take over, leading organizations should ask which new roles the technology makes possible, and then redesign the organization around them." He lists several steps that can lead you to new approaches, which seem intriguing and which you may want to explore.

For now, though, I just want to make the point that "human in the loop" isn't a panacea, certainly not in the long term. The reviewers of AI work can quickly become as reliant on the AI as those Google employees who found themselves with their hands off the wheel, their eyes off the road and their minds far away from driving when a problem popped up in front of them.

Cheers,

Paul

Insurance Fraud Targets Seniors Online

Scammers increasingly impersonate insurers to steal identities and money during open enrollment.

Insurance

Last year, the Justice Department brought the largest healthcare fraud case in its history, which included charges that criminals stole the identities of more than 1 million Americans to submit $10.6 billion in fraudulent Medicare claims for urinary catheters. While Medicare blocked nearly all of it, private Medicare supplemental insurers paid out about $900 million.

Americans lost a record $20.9 billion to internet crime in 2025, up 26% in one year, according to the FBI. Insurance fraud, including healthcare fraud, costs Americans more than $300 billion a year, and health insurance scams pick up during open enrollment, the FTC says.

Seniors are the hardest-hit age group, losing $7.7 billion in 2025, up 59% in one year. In fact, Michigan officials warned on Oct. 12 of impostors claiming to be from Medicare to dupe older adults.

As co-founder of Spokeo, a people search company, and former co-chair of the W3C Credentials Community Group, I have witnessed firsthand how scammers have grown increasingly sophisticated over the last 20 years.

Insurance scams are evolving and costly

We are seeing many insurance-related scams in 2026. Fraudsters are buying sponsored search ads with web addresses and logos that look very similar to HealthCare.gov and Medicare.gov. When Americans click on the link, they end up buying a plan that is not real insurance and also fork over their personal information, which can lead to identity theft.

Even large health insurers are being duped, as the $900 million loss in the catheter case shows.

The Coalition Against Insurance Fraud calls insurance fraud "the crime we all pay for," because it comes back to honest policyholders as higher premiums, which can hurt retention.

In a September survey by BrandShield, 30% of U.S. adults said they would stop buying online from brands scammers had impersonated. For an insurer, that is a renewal lost to a scam it never ran.

Here are three tips for insurers to help prevent insurance fraud
  • Say what you will never do. Tell customers you will never ask for a one-time code or take payment by gift card, wire or crypto. Put the statement on the ID card, in the app, and on every renewal notice.
  • Explain what numbers to trust and verify. Scammers can spoof caller ID so your company's name appears on a customer's phone. In every fraud alert, encourage customers to use the number on their card and check the identity of incoming callers with a reverse phone search.
  • Report fake ads and websites and warn consumers. Search regularly for impostors using your name and report them to the FBI IC3, the FTC, and the online platform where they live. Send alerts to customers in real time.

Harrison Tang

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Harrison Tang

Harrison Tang is co-founder and chief operating officer of Spokeo, a search service that has helped 350 million users avoid scams since 2006. 

He spent three years as co-chair of the W3C Credentials Community Group, which develops open standards for verifiable digital credentials.

Why Can't We Fund Prevention?

Industrial organizations excel at financing recovery from asset failures but struggle to justify prevention spending with the same economic rigor.

Insurance

We've built an extraordinarily sophisticated financial system around industrial failure. We can price it, insure it, reserve capital for it, and finance recovery when it happens, but preventing that same failure often requires an entirely different standard of proof.

Insurance is exceptionally good at mobilizing money after something goes wrong. Natural catastrophes caused an estimated $100 billion in economic losses in the first half of 2026. Insurance covered approximately 42%, leaving nearly $60 billion to be absorbed elsewhere. Insurance's ability to fund recovery is indispensable. The shortfall also exposes a contradiction in how risk is funded.

Premiums, deductibles, and recovery costs have established places in corporate budgets. A proposal to prevent an asset failure faces a tougher test. Someone must prove the threat is serious, determine what intervention it warrants, and defend spending money on an event that might never happen. Failure has a funding mechanism. Prevention has a business case to make.

Insurance can transfer part of a financial loss. It cannot restore missed production, repair damaged customer relationships, or undo the wider consequences of an industrial disruption. The challenge is making prevention as intelligible and investable as recovery.

Knowing the risk isn't the same as managing it

Industrial organizations rarely lack information. They receive risk-engineering reports, inspection findings, maintenance records and alerts from connected equipment. Yet information doesn't guarantee action.

A temperature change, unusual vibration, or a deteriorating component has little meaning in isolation. Its significance depends on the asset's role in the operation. Is there redundancy? What production depends on it? What would a shutdown cost? Could a failure disrupt customers, supply chains or other facilities?

These questions turn technical observations into business consequences. Without that translation, recommendations can remain in reports while maintenance teams address more immediate demands and capital committees fund projects with clearer returns.

Industry has invested heavily in detecting changing conditions and predicting potential failures. Those capabilities matter. Still, knowing what might fail doesn't tell an organization which emerging risks deserve attention first.

A relatively minor condition on a critical asset may represent far greater exposure than a severe condition on equipment with sufficient redundancy. The challenge is understanding what matters most, what the consequences could be, and where intervention will create the greatest value.

Prevention needs to compete for capital

Consider a manufacturer that identifies deterioration in a critical component on its main production line. Although the component hasn't failed, its condition is changing. The organization must compare the cost of replacing it during a planned shutdown with the lost output, repair time, and disruption that could follow an unplanned failure.

The consequences, however, may extend well beyond that production line. A shutdown could affect customer deliveries, contractual commitments, supply-chain continuity and financial performance. What appears to be a maintenance decision may represent a much larger business risk.

The appropriate response might be immediate repair, closer monitoring, a change in operating parameters or acceptance of the exposure. Someone must have the authority to make that decision and commit the necessary resources before the opportunity to intervene passes.

Now multiply that challenge across hundreds of assets and facilities, each presenting different levels of exposure. The question is no longer simply whether an individual intervention is justified. It's which interventions deserve priority when resources are limited, and the consequences extend across the enterprise.

For decades, industry has developed sophisticated ways to measure losses after they occur. We need comparable discipline in understanding the economic value of preventing those losses before they happen.

Capital should not only be deployed to absorb loss. It should be possible to direct it intelligently toward preventing loss.

The standard for resilience must rise

Risk assessments, inspections and engineering recommendations are essential. Completing those processes, however, doesn't necessarily mean an organization has addressed its most consequential exposures. An inspection can establish that a process was followed. A risk assessment can document a vulnerability. Neither, by itself, demonstrates that the organization is becoming more resilient.

Industrial risk isn't static. Asset conditions change, operational dependencies evolve, and an exposure that appeared manageable during a periodic assessment may become significantly more consequential.

A recommendation without a named decision-maker and deadline is information, not control. Someone must have the authority to accept the exposure, fund the response or explain why another course is justified. Following the process is important, although it's not the same as preventing the loss.

Insurance can help change the economics of prevention

Insurers can make recommendations easier to act on by explaining the severity and urgency of an exposure, not simply recording that it exists. Brokers can connect risk-engineering findings with an organization's insurance and resilience priorities. Operators must determine whether to intervene or accept the exposure and take responsibility for the outcome. There is also a bigger opportunity here.

Insurers and brokers possess extraordinary expertise in understanding, quantifying, and pricing risk. Much of that expertise has historically helped organizations prepare financially for potential losses. What if more of it could be applied to making prevention economically compelling before those losses occur?

Imagine insurers, brokers, and industrial operators working from a more continuous, consequence-based understanding of emerging physical risk. Rather than relying primarily on historical losses and periodic assessments, they could better understand where exposure is developing, which conditions present the greatest business consequences, and where intervention could materially reduce risk.

This wouldn't eliminate uncertainty or diminish the need for insurance. It could, however, create a stronger economic foundation for prevention and a more productive relationship between risk financing and operational decision-making.

For decades, the insurance industry has helped businesses understand the financial consequences of what can go wrong. That expertise will remain indispensable, but the next opportunity is to help make the economics of what doesn't have to go wrong equally visible.

We've become extraordinarily good at financing industrial failure. It's time to become just as disciplined about investing in its prevention.


Andy Pruett

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Andy Pruett

Andy Pruett is founder and CEO of Lumicent.

He began his career in the US oil and gas industry, working across upstream, midstream and downstream operations, before moving into mining and helping build the Pogo gold mine in Alaska. Today, his work centers on decision intelligence for physical operations: connecting changing asset conditions with their operational and financial consequences so organizations can prioritize risk, direct resources effectively and act before preventable exposure becomes a loss.

November 2026 ITL FOCUS: Pricing & Rating

ITL FOCUS is a monthly initiative featuring topics related to innovation in risk management and insurance.

 
 
 
 
 
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FROM THE EDITOR

Pricing is one of the most consequential functions in insurance — and one of the least visible. Claims get the headlines. Underwriting gets the scrutiny. But pricing sits quietly underneath both, shaping profitability across millions of policies through assumptions that can go stale faster than anyone realizes.

For most carriers, the mechanics of pricing haven’t kept pace with how quickly the world is changing. A rate change approved today might not be live in the market for weeks or months, trapped behind policy administration release cycles that were never designed for the kind of volatility the industry is now dealing with — social inflation, rising repair costs, tariff pressure, and catastrophe losses that keep defying historical patterns.

Kumarappan Sundaram has spent years working through these problems with P&C carriers as a Managing Director at PwC. He brings a technology practitioner’s perspective to a function that often gets treated as a back-office infrastructure problem rather than a strategic capability. He’s measured about where AI fits — distinguishing what is already delivering clear value from what remains genuinely unproven — and direct about the sequencing mistakes carriers make when they try to modernize pricing before the foundation is in place.

His practical advice is worth taking seriously: Before reaching for advanced analytics or AI, measure how long it actually takes to get an approved rate change into the market. Most carriers have never done that math. The number, he suggests, tends to be illuminating.

Read the full interview to find out why decoupling rating logic from the core policy system is the starting point most carriers skip, how modern pricing platforms are beginning to close the long-standing gap between pricing and underwriting, and where AI can genuinely change the work.

 

 

 
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Pricing at the Speed of the Market

Paul Carroll, Editor-in-chief of Insurance Thought Leadership.

Pricing gets far less attention than claims or underwriting, yet it is important. How is the pricing function being modernized in insurance? And how should it be?


Kumarappan Sundaram, Managing Director, PwC US

Pricing gets less attention partly because a lot of the work is infrastructure: platforms, data flows and deployment processes. It is not a front-office workflow that a new tool can visibly transform.

Modernization can be uneven. Personal lines are well on their way. Commercial lines are earlier in the journey and still rely heavily on underwriter judgment and rating engines embedded in policy administration systems.

How pricing should be modernized can largely be a question of sequence. The foundation comes first: decoupling rating from the policy admin system. At the moment, actuaries produce pricing logic, which they hand to IT, which embeds the logic in a rating engine that sits within a policy admin system. So, making a change to the pricing logic means waiting for a new release of the policy admin system. If you decouple, you can make changes to ratings as and when you want.

Once you’ve decoupled, you should build reliable data flows and establish clear governance.

You can then go to the next level of capabilities, like advanced analytics and AI. Let’s say you have a $10 billion book. You’re considering changing a particular rate factor from X to Y, maybe related to driver age. Advanced analytics can help you understand the impact of the rate change on the whole book. The actuaries can then decide whether to make that rate change. Carriers can help deploy and monitor pricing changes quickly and safely.


Paul Carroll

From a technology standpoint, what are the most important shifts in P&C pricing and rating?
 

Read the full interview >

 

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Insurance Thought Leadership

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Insurance Thought Leadership

Insurance Thought Leadership (ITL) delivers engaging, informative articles from our global network of thought leaders and decision makers. Their insights are transforming the insurance and risk management marketplace through knowledge sharing, big ideas on a wide variety of topics, and lessons learned through real-life applications of innovative technology.

We also connect our network of authors and readers in ways that help them uncover opportunities and that lead to innovation and strategic advantage.

Smarter Approach to Prior Authorization

Healthcare plans are slashing prior authorization requirements, but smarter technology and mutual accountability may improve care more than blanket reductions.

Insurance

Prior authorization has been a healthcare sticking point for years.

Patients and providers criticize prior authorization (PA) for denying care and coverage. State and federal lawmakers target it, setting standards and policies for how health plans must operate, often without a deep understanding of the complexities of the issue. In response to the public and legislative pressure, many plans are reducing their reliance on PA.

UnitedHealthcare announced that it will cut PA requirements by 30% by the end of 2026, including some outpatient surgeries and diagnostic tests, as well as certain outpatient therapies and chiropractic care.

UnitedHealthcare's announcement is just the latest in a series of moves by plans to reduce their reliance on PA. In June 2025, industry organization AHIP committed to six PA reforms across commercial, Medicare Advantage and Medicaid managed care coverage, including reduced requirements and faster response times. Individual plans also have acted. AHIP reported earlier this year that major insurers had cut 11% of PAs (6.5 million).

While reducing PA will certainly eliminate some friction, and please patients and providers, blanket policies are seldom the solution to an issue this complex. Rather, this is an opportunity to take a smarter approach to PA, one that improves care and makes it smarter, fairer, and more efficient for all involved. One that treats PA as a tool for better care rather than a barrier.

The cost of poor prior authorization

There is no doubt that PA needs to improve. A process that started in the 1960s with the launch of Medicare has become far too cumbersome. Providers say it delays or prevents treatment, adds administrative costs, and overrides their clinical judgment. A 2026 AMA survey found an average of 40 requests per physician per week, taking 13 hours of physician and staff time.

Members become frustrated with their plans when approval isn't granted, often without explanation.

Plans counter that PA helps ensure appropriate care, block unnecessary or unsafe care, and control costs.

Despite all the heat surrounding this issue, there is room – and need – for compromise. Technology has made it possible for PA to be handled far more quickly than in the days of fax machines and phone calls. Both plans and providers also have access to science-backed policies that can better inform their decisions.

Rethinking prior authorization

It's important to understand that the problems with PA are not the fault of any single party. There needs to be improvement and mutual accountability on both sides in order to improve the process.

Plans owe providers and their members transparency in their policies and decision-making, consistent turnaround on claims, and fast, clear decisions. Providers owe plans accurate, evidence-based ordering and complete documentation. This is a precondition for any PA reform to actually work. Without mutual accountability, reducing mandatory PA checks just shifts risk around instead of removing it.

It's time to reset our idea of PA from a barrier to care or an indiscriminate way to control spending, to a tool for ensuring patients receive the right care at the right time for the right reason. It should guide and clear the way for timely, effective care.

Lab Benefit Management

An example of this can be found in lab benefit management (LBM), the governance of lab testing. Clinical testing is the most common medical procedure. Approximately 14 billion lab tests are performed annually, and the results inform 70% of healthcare decisions. However, because individual tests are generally inexpensive, they are not as scrutinized as other procedures. The result is that as much as 30% of testing is unnecessary or redundant, wasting billions of dollars and hindering care.

LBM tackles this problem by creating a science-backed set of policies for individual plans. It identifies the tests that offer clinical utility and validity and uses those findings to inform coverage decisions from plans and guide clinicians toward the most effective treatments.

However, creating accurate, science-based policies is only the first part of a comprehensive LBM program; the other half is implementing it. Much of the problem with PA is that it is reactive: a clinician submits a request; the plan may reject it for any number of reasons, and it comes back to a frustrated clinician and member, who must try to resolve the issue.

Here's a better way: An automated solution trained in plan-specific policies and coverage is integrated into providers' EHRs. It spots inaccurate or missing information in a PA request and flags it for the provider to correct before submission. Once the request is in order and meets the necessary criteria, the solution automatically approves it, removing uncertainty. It also lets the provider know whether the test or treatment is not covered for that patient or if the plan prefers an alternative. A provider can then decide whether to choose another, more appropriate test or proceed with further review by the health plan. In essence, the new process moves the appropriateness review farther upstream to the moment the provider enters an order for a test or procedure, saving time and resources.

There are other examples of innovation that link outcomes and PA. The new CMS Cell and Gene Therapy (CGT) Access Model, built around sickle cell disease gene therapies, involves government and drug manufacturers as well as plans and providers. CMS negotiates outcomes-based agreements directly with gene therapy manufacturers on behalf of states. The manufacturers provide guaranteed discounts and pay rebates back if the therapy doesn't deliver the promised clinical benefit. This shifts some of the financial risk from states to manufacturers.

This model works because of a safeguard baked into its design: strict upfront criteria to confirm which patients are truly eligible for the therapy. For a one-time, irreversible treatment costing millions of dollars, that kind of appropriateness review isn't a barrier to access — it's what makes access sustainable. The outcome-based rebates manufacturers and states are counting on only hold up if the therapy reaches the patients it's meant for. In that sense, the CGT model and smarter prior authorization share the same logic: verify appropriateness upfront, and both access and affordability take care of themselves.

The case for smarter prior authorization

The need for a better process to ensure high-quality, appropriate, and affordable care is made more urgent by the explosive growth of precision diagnostics and genetic medicine. These breakthroughs are transforming medicine, offering unprecedented accuracy in diagnostics and new treatments for diseases once thought incurable, but they are expensive and complex.

A process like the one described above will remove providers' doubt about which tests are appropriate, streamline the approval process, and enable patients to receive treatment faster.

As healthcare organizations and legislators consider PA reform, they should ask themselves if their plans only reduce risk and friction, or whether they truly improve the quality of the care that is being delivered to patients while insisting on accountability from all parties.

How Gen AI Can Help Shape Strategy

At any level of setting strategy, from the boardroom to the one-person agency, generative AI can bring assumptions to the surface, helping you see what NOT to do. 

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Insurance

Bill Gates recently said he is using generative AI as part of the annual, two-week strategy session that determines how the Gates Foundation spends its next $10 billion. He'll be "taking the strategy notes and actually engaging in a dialogue with ChatGPT, Claude, Copilot, and even having them talk with each other," he said.

I don't have $10 billion that I'm considering how to spend, and you may not, either, but genAI has now improved to the point where it can at least be an aid in setting strategy at almost any level. 

An old boss, Mel Bergstein, used to say: "Strategy is what you don't do." The idea worked for Mel, who founded a consulting firm, Diamond Management & Technology Partners, that pioneered the notion of digital strategy in the mid-1990s. Chunka Mui and I took Mel's adage further in our book, "Billion Dollar Lessons," for which we had 20 researchers spend two years looking at 2,500 major failures to identify the warning signs.

Our recommended solution boiled down to having a "devil's advocate" identify all the underlying assumptions for a strategy, to keep problems from being glossed over as an executive team rushed to realize the CEO's plan. GenAI, used right, can now do a pretty good job of filling that role for anyone.

Let's have a look. 

Gates told the New York Times that, "in a few of the reviews, we’ll actually have the A.I. sit in. In a few cases, we’ll tell it: Hey, only speak if we ask you. And then in a few other cases, we’ll say: Hey, if you hear something you think is wrong or you hear us thinking about, for example, what are these statistics? Please engage. So we’ve gone from it being a joke [when someone suggested using genAI a year ago] to it will be a peer — not making any final decisions, but it will be a peer in deep, complex strategic discussions, making a significant contribution."

I'm not willing to go that far just yet, partly because I'd need to test the domain knowledge that the large language models have about a subtle, heavily regulated business like insurance and partly because genAI has shown itself to be a sycophant. The biggest, overarching pattern of failure that Chunka and I found in the research for "Billion Dollar Lessons" was that people were reluctant to point out obvious problems that could derail initiatives that had the imprimatur of the CEO, and we don't want to replace human sycophants with AI ones. 

But you can describe your strategy to an AI, then pepper it with questions, going deeper each time while demanding evidence for its thinking and insisting it be blunt.

Let's say you're thinking of buying a company. You could start with a general question: What could go wrong? Then you probe. How will our competitors react? What if interest rates increase? The economy goes into recession? The war in Iran escalates? Will we actually be able to cross-sell to our customers? Will the efficiencies from scale be as great as we expect? Who's done something similar and had problems? What were the problems? And on and on and on. 

You can do the same exercise if you're thinking of a new line of business, a software overhaul, adopting AI chatbots — or if you want to explore the dangers of standing pat, of not undertaking a major initiative that is under consideration. 

Major corporations have staff do extensive analysis along the lines I'm suggesting and, in the case of a possible acquisition, draw on their investment banks for advice — but the bias is always toward acting. If the perception is that the CEO backs an idea, the staff strives to make it work, not to kill it. Investment banks only collect their hefty fees if the deal happens, so why would they recommend against it? 

When Chunka and I did a consulting project with a major company that was considering launching autonomous vehicles, we saw elaborate studies it had commissioned from consulting firms that said the robotaxi business was a slam dunk and that the first to enter would win big. That was more than eight years ago. 

It turned out, however, that the executives working on the AV project internally were aware of all the sorts of operational and safety issues that we've all seen play out and that have slowed the robotaxi rollout. Those concerns were brought to the surface in the interviews for our devil's advocate review. 

Warren Buffett used to set aside two, equal pots of money when asking investment banks for advice on possible acquisitions — one for a bank that argued in favor of a deal and one for a bank that argued against it. Whichever carried the day collected its fees, while the other got nothing. You can be sure the "anti" bank worked as hard as possible on its arguments and evidence. 

In my experience, many big ideas should fall apart at the slightest scrutiny. As we wrote in "Billion Dollar Lessons," we thought 47% of the failures we investigated were based on strategies that never should have made it out of the strategy room — and not because those involved were stupid or inexperienced. 

The fifth-biggest cement maker in the world reasoned that it was really in the home products business because so much of its cement was used there. It began also making furnaces and lawn mowers... then went bankrupt and was bought by a competitor. Avon decided that its core competency was its culture of caring — not, you know, its line of cosmetics and its devoted salesforce — so it bought a maker of medical equipment and an operator of retirement homes. It had no idea how to operate the new businesses and quickly sold them at a major loss. In the early days of fax machines, FedEx spent hundreds of millions of dollars to set up a business that would collect a document from you, drive it to the nearest office, fax it to the office nearest your destination, then drive the fax to the recipient. The company somehow missed that Moore's law would soon make the devices so inexpensive that every company would have its own.

It may take time to learn how to use genAI to avoid costly strategic mistakes — and that's even before we start using it as broadly as Gates is planning to. You'll likely also need to introduce to the LLM information specific to your market, including regulatory issues that it likely doesn't have even as these models try to Hoover up everything available on the internet. Insurance is a complicated market.

But I think we're now at the point where genAI can, if managed correctly, start to catch strategic errors. We won't get that 47% figure for obviously bad ideas down to zero, but even heading toward 40%, maybe even 33%, would mark real progress.

Cheers,

Paul

 


 

 

 

Protect Customers, Not Payment Processes

Insurance payment flows fail when friction protects internal processes rather than helping customers avoid fraud and costly mistakes.

Insurance

Almost every premium payment flow I review has the same problem. It isn't too much friction. It's the wrong friction.

Our industry talks about "frictionless" payments as if friction were the enemy. It isn't. Some friction is the reason a customer trusts you with their bank account. The problem is friction that protects a process instead of a person.

So I don't start by asking how to remove friction. I ask one question of every step: Does this protect the customer, or the process?

Both kinds of friction have a price

Get friction wrong in one direction, and you invite fraud. Get it wrong in the other, and you lose the customer at the finish line.

  • Fraud targets money in motion. Business email compromise, where criminals hijack or imitate a trusted email account to redirect payments, drove about $3 billion in reported losses in the FBI's 2025 Internet Crime Report. Agencies, MGAs, and commercial policyholders moving large premiums by wire are prime targets.
  • Impersonation leads the fraud rankings. Of the $15.9 billion in fraud losses reported to the FTC for 2025, scammers posing as someone else accounted for roughly $3.5 billion. The figures aren't insurance-specific, but any insurer with a payment page is exposed.
  • Login walls cost completions. Nearly half of adults in a 2025 FIDO Alliance survey said a forgotten password would make them abandon a purchase. FIDO promotes passwordless sign-in, so weigh the number accordingly, but the pattern is familiar.
Friction that earns its place

Some pauses protect the person paying. These are worth keeping:

  • Verifying changes to payment details. A new bank account, card or payment instruction is exactly what fraudsters target. A quick check here is protection, not an obstacle.
  • Confirming large or unusual payments. One extra screen can prevent an expensive mistake.
  • Making autopay cancellation deliberate. One sentence about when coverage lapses can save a policy.
  • Confirming who's paying. A parent, employer or agent paying for someone else needs a clear record.

Good friction is rare, explained, and visibly protects the customer.

Friction that doesn't

Other steps protect a process, and customers can feel it:

  • Requiring a login to make a one-time payment.
  • Asking for a policy number when the customer could be matched another way.
  • Accepting a payment method without showing it.
  • Sending someone to a call center to change a due date.
  • Asking for the same card details every month.

Each exists for a system's convenience, not the customer's.

Running the test

This takes an afternoon and a whiteboard, not a project plan:

  1. Map the whole journey. Every screen, field and message, from bill to receipt.
  2. Label each step in one sentence. Who does it protect: the customer, the carrier or a system?
  3. Keep what protects the customer, and explain why on screen.
  4. Move carrier checks behind the scenes. Most need nothing from the customer.
  5. Send system needs to IT. They belong on a backlog, not in front of a policyholder.

Then ask of whatever's left: what would actually break if we removed it? Usually, nothing.

Explain the friction you keep

A verification code with no explanation feels like a hassle. Add "We confirm changes to where your payments come from, so no one else can make them," and it feels like care.

That sentence costs nothing. Leaving it out makes your best safeguards look like bureaucracy.

Every step is a decision

Every step in a payment flow was someone's decision, even if no one remembers why. The goal isn't zero friction. It's friction you could defend to a customer in one sentence.

What's one step in your payment flow you couldn't defend in a sentence? Tell me in the comments.

Sources

Jonathan Darling

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Jonathan Darling

Jonathan Darling is director of product strategy at Input 1. 

He has more than a decade of experience specializing in digital billing, payments, and premium finance for the property and casualty insurance industry. His expertise spans insurance payment infrastructure, financial operations, and the complexities of premium management across carriers, MGAs, and insurance agencies. 

Audits Expose Cash Reconciliation Gaps

Carriers reconcile delegated claims accounts regularly, but gaps between checkpoints quietly compound until year-end audits force a costly reckoning.

Insurance

Year-end audits don't create cash problems. They expose the ones that were already there.

Every year, a carrier's finance team enters audit season relying on the cash position assembled during the last reconciliation cycle. Then, it starts reconciling current account activity, and the numbers do not line up. The hours that should go toward supporting the audit go toward confirming where the money is and understanding what changed.

Insurers already reconcile regularly due to expected controls and audit standards. The trouble is that even a well-run reconciliation process cannot close the gap between checkpoints. Discrepancies can build quietly for weeks. By the time audit season arrives, the deadline forces a reckoning with a gap that has been growing all along.

The real cost of not knowing your cash position

For carriers working with even a handful of delegated partners, cash reconciliation means comparing records held in separate systems and checking them against each other. Add MGAs, third-party administrators (TPAs), and claims administrators, and each brings its own claim and payment feeds as well as fund accounts to reconcile with the carrier's books. The process works as designed. The systems on each side were never designed to communicate automatically.

The reconciliation burden grows with the number of delegated relationships a carrier maintains. A carrier working with three or four TPAs faces a manageable set of comparisons. A carrier working with 20 or 30+ faces the same problem across more formats, timelines, and reporting styles.

The underlying issue is scale, and it grows with the network.

Better process helps at the margins, but as a carrier's delegated network grows, the reconciliation work grows with it. Periodic checks struggle to keep up. The number a CFO reports to the board, and the number an auditor verifies, depends on seeing activity across those accounts in one place.

Why this hits harder at year-end

Delegated claims accounts can be a blind spot. Money held by an MGA or TPA may not be visible until the reconciliation process begins. Differences in format between carrier statements, bank feeds, and internal ledgers take time to resolve before anyone can analyze the transactions that do not match.

Most transactions reconcile without trouble. The hours go to chasing the exceptions, and that work lands when time is shortest, with the calendar leaving little room. Auditors typically start in January, and findings reach the audit committee and board in late Q1 or Q2 for those on a calendar year close.

In banking, finance leaders are expected to know where cash sits and how it moves. Insurance should expect the same clarity, even when claims funds pass through delegated partners.

Accountability without visibility

A less discussed part of the problem is that accountability and control have separated. The carrier holds financial and regulatory responsibility for claims paid on its paper. The day-to-day work of paying claims, holding funds, and reporting on both has been delegated to TPAs, MGAs, and claims administrators.

That arrangement can make operational sense, and many delegated partners run it well. A carrier relies on others to do that work, but it remains responsible for the outcome. That means a CFO may be signing off on numbers assembled from someone else's systems, on someone else's schedule.

The consequences reach beyond audit preparation. When bordereaux arrive late, or in formats that do not consolidate cleanly with bank data and the carrier's ledger, finance teams work with information that may already be weeks old. Without a single view, loss reserves can run too low on some programs and too high on others, without a clear view of which is which.

A carrier should also know where its claims funds are held, and whether they sit in segregated accounts or are pooled with other money at the administrator. Risk committees ask the same question after recent bank failures: where is the cash, and is it safe?

Consider a carrier with $10 million held by a TPA that fails. If that money sits in a segregated titled account, it is generally identifiable and better protected. If it has been pooled with the administrator's own money, the carrier may have to file a claim against a failed business alongside it and other creditors. This is a hypothetical, but the question it raises is real, and CFOs need the answer before a partner runs into trouble.

That visibility matters most if a delegated partner runs into financial distress. The longer it takes the carrier to understand where its funds are, the harder it is to respond. Board and risk committees also watch whether claims are paid on time, because late payment can trigger penalties under many state prompt payout rules. Claimants waiting for payment feel the consequences, too.

What CFOs should do before, not during
  • Shorten the reconciliation cycle. Surface discrepancies between scheduled closes so they can be investigated and resolved earlier.
  • Build one view across delegated accounts. Bring account activity together with claims, payment and ledger data in real time.
  • Standardize data formats and reporting expectations. Agree on the information carriers need from partners while there is time to address gaps.
  • Clarify where funds are held. Confirm account structure, segregation, how quickly the carrier would learn of a partner in financial distress, and who is responsible for reporting changes.

Auditors will keep asking whether the year-end number is right. The better test for a CFO is whether the carrier could produce that number with the same confidence in any month of the year with much more efficiency and fewer headaches. The carrier's accountability does not wait for audit season.


Curt Hess

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Curt Hess

Curt Hess is the U.S. executive president at Vitesse.

He has over 25 years of experience across fintech and global banking, most recently as chief operating officer at 10x Banking. Prior to that, Hess held multiple C-level roles during a 12-year tenure at Barclays, including chief executive officer of the U.S. consumer bank and chief executive officer of Europe retail and business banking.  Earlier in his career, Hess held senior finance leadership positions at Citi, as well as with Bank of America in the U.S. 

 

 

What 2026's Wildfires Are Teaching Insurers  

Insurers relying on post-fire damage counts face delays that hinder claims response. Pre-ignition wildfire intelligence could accelerate policyholder recovery.

Insurance

The Aspen Acres Fire started at 6 a.m. on June 29 in the hills between Pueblo and Custer counties, Colo. Driven by extreme winds, with gusts reported at up to 100 mph, it grew to more than 100,000 acres and became the seventh-largest wildfire in Colorado history. But acreage only tells insurers how much land burned. More important questions are what the fire reached, what it destroyed, and which policyholders now need help.

Those answers were much harder to pin down. Vexcel's post-fire aerial analysis identified 780 destroyed structures across Pueblo and Custer counties. That count included homes as well as garages, barns, sheds, and other buildings. A later assessment from county officials confirmed 319 homes destroyed. Meanwhile, incident officials reported approximately 850 structures lost. These figures can all be credible because they are measuring the damage differently. A county assessment focused on homes is answering a different question from an aerial survey counting every building on a property, and both can differ from information collected during an incident. The numbers also evolve as crews gain access to affected areas and assessments become more complete.

For insurers, that uncertainty creates a practical problem. Reserving, accumulation management, and claims decisions begin long before a final damage assessment exists. More importantly, the people behind those policies cannot wait weeks for every dataset to agree. They need to know when an adjuster is coming, whether temporary housing is available, when payments can begin, and how soon they can start rebuilding.

That is the clearest lesson from the 2026 wildfire season so far: Insurers need a strong view of wildfire risk before ignition because the information available after a fire will always take time to settle.

Understanding where exposure sits, how vulnerable individual properties are, and how fire is likely to move through a community helps insurers manage their portfolios. That same information can help them anticipate where claims are likely to emerge and get people on the ground faster when a fire occurs.

Colorado has already applied a similar principle to parts of the claims process. Following lessons from the Marshall Fire, insurers handling qualifying total wildfire losses must offer policyholders at least 65% of their contents coverage without requiring a detailed itemized inventory. Policyholders are also entitled to at least 24 months of additional living expense coverage. The reasoning is practical: families that have lost their homes should be able to begin recovering even when complete documentation is not immediately available.

Insurers should bring that same thinking to catastrophe preparedness. Perfect post-event information will take time. The better prepared an insurer is before ignition, the less dependent its initial response becomes on damage counts that are still changing.

Acres are a poor proxy for loss

The 2026 season has also reinforced how poorly burned acreage alone describes the severity of a wildfire from an insurance perspective. A fire can consume enormous areas of undeveloped land and produce relatively modest insured losses. Another can travel a much shorter distance through a populated community and destroy hundreds of properties.

The Spokane-area fires in August showed how quickly that can happen. Early in the event, more than 600 structures had already been reported destroyed while the fires had burned only a fraction of the land consumed by Aspen Acres. The numbers continued to develop as assessments progressed, but the contrast was already clear.

What determines loss is the relationship between the fire and the built environment: where the fire travels, how quickly it reaches exposed communities, how densely properties are situated, how individual structures are built, and what happens once fire enters a neighborhood. That is why two fires with dramatically different footprints can produce very different outcomes for insurers and the families they cover.

This matters for claims response as much as it does for underwriting. If an insurer has a detailed understanding of where its policyholders sit relative to an active fire and which properties are most exposed, it has a better chance of anticipating where claims will come from. Adjusters can be positioned closer to affected communities, outreach can begin sooner, and resources such as temporary housing and advance payments can be prepared before a complete structure count arrives.

For a homeowner who has just watched a neighborhood burn, those hours and days matter. The value of better catastrophe intelligence is ultimately measured not only in how accurately an insurer understands its accumulation, but also in how quickly that understanding can turn into help.

The loss picture lags the underwriting calendar

Timing creates another challenge. By early August, the National Interagency Fire Center had reported 44,722 fires burning more than 5.1 million acres across the United States. The country had reached National Preparedness Level 5, the highest level of wildfire response activity, as resources were concentrated across the West.

Yet the industry's first-half catastrophe reports offered little indication of what the wildfire season would ultimately cost. That is understandable. Aspen Acres started on June 29, only two days before the first half ended, and damage assessments continued well into July. The Spokane fires had not happened yet. Insurance reporting necessarily looks backward, while underwriting, accumulation management, and catastrophe preparedness have to look forward.

That gap matters because risk decisions do not stop while insurers wait for a season's losses to develop. Policies remain in force, renewals continue, capital is deployed, and insurers have to decide where they are comfortable taking additional exposure. The industry's view of wildfire therefore cannot depend primarily on what the previous fire season looked like or on loss numbers that become clear only after an event.

The better starting point is the information that can be understood in advance: where insured properties sit relative to vegetation and neighboring structures, the condition of defensible space, construction and roof characteristics, local weather and terrain, and how quickly a fire could move from wildland fuels into a community.

Better wildfire intelligence starts before the fire

There is no single dataset that can answer every wildfire question. But there are several areas where insurers can be more disciplined about the information they use.

The first is understanding what each damage number actually represents. Every structure-loss figure entering a model, reserve discussion, or board presentation should carry its definition, source, and method with it. An aerial assessment, an incident report, and a county count can each provide valuable information, but they should not be treated as interchangeable simply because they all contain a number labeled "structures."

The second is modeling wildfire at the resolution where property loss actually occurs. The wildland-urban interface is particularly important because fire behavior can change once flames and embers reach developed communities. Structure spacing, building characteristics, surrounding vegetation, and structure-to-structure ignition can all influence whether a wildfire remains primarily a vegetation event or becomes a major property catastrophe.

This is one area where wildfire science has advanced significantly. KatRisk's U.S. Wildfire Model, powered by Technosylva's operational fire science, models wildfire spread at 30-meter resolution across the continental United States and explicitly incorporates urban conflagration. The urban conflagration capability was developed in conjunction with CAL FIRE and PG&E and validated against recent major wildfire events, including the Palisades and Eaton fires.

For insurers, that level of detail can inform underwriting and accumulation management before an event. During a fire, the same understanding of hazard and exposure can help identify where policyholders may be affected and where claims resources are likely to be needed. The connection between those two uses is important: the information used to understand risk before ignition should also make the insurer better prepared to respond once the event begins.

Mitigation should be treated with the same level of rigor. A 2026 analysis highlighted by the California Department of Insurance found that rebuilding to the Insurance Institute for Business & Home Safety Wildfire Prepared Home Base standard could reduce modeled average annual loss by 31%. The Plus standard increased the reduction to 35%.

Those findings matter because mitigation affects both sides of the insurance equation. Lower expected losses can improve the economics of providing coverage in wildfire-exposed communities. For homeowners, effective mitigation increases the likelihood that the home survives the next fire and that a family never has to go through the claims and rebuilding process in the first place.

Better risk intelligence should lead to faster recovery

The 2026 wildfire season has not produced a U.S. wildfire catastrophe on the scale of the January 2025 Los Angeles fires. It has nevertheless exposed an important weakness in how wildfire severity is understood in real time. Acreage can tell us how large a fire became, but not what it destroyed. Structure counts provide a clearer picture of damage, but those counts can take weeks to stabilize and can mean different things depending on who collected them.

Insurers will always need post-event information, and that information will continue to improve as imagery, claims, and ground assessments come in. But the first hours and days after a catastrophe are precisely when insurers and policyholders have the least time to wait.

A stronger pre-ignition understanding of wildfire risk gives insurers a better foundation for underwriting, accumulation management, capital planning and catastrophe response. It can show where fires are most likely to start and spread, what they can reach, how individual structures are likely to perform, and where losses could concentrate.

For the insured, the benefit is much more immediate. It means an insurer that has a better idea of where help will be needed before the final damage count arrives. It means claims teams that can be deployed earlier, policyholders who can be contacted sooner, and families who can start the recovery process faster.

That is where better wildfire modeling ultimately proves its value. The industry needs to understand wildfire risk well enough before ignition that when a fire does happen, insurers are ready to make better decisions, and the people they insure are able to begin rebuilding their lives sooner.


Brandon Katz

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Brandon Katz

Brandon Katz is executive vice president, product & strategy at KatRisk, a global catastrophe risk modeling and risk intelligence company helping organizations understand and quantify their exposure to floods, wildfire, severe storms, earthquakes and other natural hazards.

He previously worked in catastrophe model development at RMS and led flood-focused research and development at JLT Re before joining KatRisk in 2016.

Health Insurers Must Adapt as Employers Adopt CHOICE

When a carrier loses a company from their group plan, the insurer often doesn't see the opportunity to recover employees on the individual market.

Insurance

Americans are changing how they purchase health insurance.

As the cost of cover increases dramatically, recent data from KFF show 64% of U.S. adults are either "very worried" or "somewhat worried" about affording healthcare costs for their families. The increased cost of health insurance also puts pressure on employers, with the cost of a group plan often increasing by double digits, year after year. As a result, employers are looking for new ways to support their employees while keeping costs under control.

When an employer switches from group coverage to a CHOICE arrangement (formerly known as ICHRA), it provides its employees with an allowance to purchase coverage on the individual market. Recent data from the HRA Council shows that adoption of CHOICE arrangements is increasing across the board, but most quickly among large employers. From 2025 to 2026, the number of large employers (companies with 1,000 or more employees) offering an ICHRA plan to their employees grew by 178%.

I spent more than 15 years supporting both fully insured and self-funded insurance plans, and I now support companies as they adopt and scale CHOICE arrangements for their employees. Insurance companies are misreading the moment, and their misaligned incentives could lead to serious business losses.

Fragmented carriers and misaligned incentives

When an average American thinks about health insurance, they probably think about it as one big market: all of the people who need coverage and all the carriers that provide it.

In reality, the group market and individual market operate separately. For many insurance carriers, the group business and individual market business are completely different entities. This leads to unnecessary competition: when an insurance carrier loses someone from their group plan, they often don't connect that loss with an opportunity to recover them on the individual market. Cooperation between the group entity and the individual entity is frequently nonexistent.

That lack of cooperation can have real unintended consequences for a carrier. Think about the sequence of events that leads someone to switch from group coverage to the individual market:

  • A customer, or group of customers, has high usage during the previous year. They're expensive to the carrier, which leads to a double-digit increase in the cost of coverage.
  • The customer can't afford that increased rate, so they choose not to renew the group plan. They switch over to a CHOICE arrangement where they're able to better control their costs.
  • If the original carrier isn't able to retain that customer on an individual plan, they lose them entirely. A customer relationship is about more than just the current year of insurance; it's about the entire future value of that relationship over years of support.

Carriers organize around products and markets, but employers and employees don't. An employer moving from group coverage to a CHOICE arrangement can move hundreds or thousands of people across a carrier's internal P&L boundary. If the group and individual businesses are optimizing independently, the carrier can treat that as group attrition when it could actually be an enterprise-level member-retention opportunity.

Given the state of the current market, insurance carriers should expect this trend to accelerate. Costs of coverage are going up, and Americans are at their breaking point with affordability and the cost of living. More U.S. employers are considering the viability of switching from group plans to CHOICE arrangements, and carriers need to find a way to continue serving those customers.

Breaking down barriers between group and individual coverage

As the insurance market continues to evolve, carriers should take steps to break down the walls between their group and individual businesses. When a carrier loses a customer on a group plan but reacquires them with a CHOICE arrangement, that should be viewed as retention rather than pure attrition. Particularly at the enterprise level, a carrier's priority should be retention regardless of the product.

At the same time, carriers should also look for opportunities to build individual market network capacity in areas of the country where CHOICE arrangements are growing. According to the HRA Council, Ohio, Minnesota and Texas have the largest number of employees eligible for a CHOICE arrangement through their employer; Georgia, Maryland, Colorado and Virginia all offer favorable conditions for CHOICE expansion. Investing in these areas now increases the odds that carriers can recover or acquire members whose employers are making the switch from group insurance to the individual market.

The status quo for the U.S. health insurance market can't survive much longer: costs are too high for Americans and their employers, and insurance carriers risk hemorrhaging customers with each double-digit renewal. Insurers that align their group and individual market efforts will be better positioned as employer-sponsored healthcare evolves.