Tag Archives: temporary disability

How Many Pieces Go Into a Settlement?

Question: How many pieces are involved in a workers’ compensation settlement?

Answer: Probably more than you think.

The more issues there are in a negotiation, the greater the opportunity for give and take. This adds flexibility for parties to shape a settlement acceptable to all. Trading across issues in negotiation is called “logrolling.”

Every case has its own unique issues. Here is a partial list, some obvious, some I have seen people miss.

Income issues

Disability percentage, including whether the disability is caused by an industrial injury

Apportionment

Applicable date of injury

Past payments: When were permanent disability payments supposed to start? Was the right rate used? Were past payments properly characterized as permanent disability (PD), or should they have been temporary disability (TD)? Is there a TD overpayment?

If life pension payments will be due, when should they start?

Average weekly wage: Have you taken into account overtime and the value of non-cash compensation?

Ability to perform future work

Return-to-work issues: Will the employer provide modified work?

What about training? Check California law about computer purchases.

Liens

Penalties

Medical issues

What are the accepted body parts?

What expenses are reasonable and necessary? This can include issues about support services.

What is the appropriate medical specialty?

Is the treatment the applicant wants compensable?

Is the applicant’s overall medical condition likely to shorten life expectancy?

A Tale Of Two Broken Hearts

Imagine, if you will, twin boys born on some sunny day not too long ago. Neither one of the boys, nor their parents, nor even the delivering doctors knew that both boys were born with a heart condition. This congenital heart anomaly, a patent foramen ovale, left a small hole open in the walls of each brother’s heart, exposing them to higher risks of stroke.

These twin brothers, let’s call them Keven and Kenny, seemed to be joined at the hip. They enjoyed all the same activities, all the same food, went to the same school, and, when they decided it was time to purchase homes of their own, bought two adjacent houses. Being as close as they were, they tore down the fence between their properties and right in the middle built a small gazebo where they could enjoy breakfast with their families every weekend morning.

In choosing a profession, Keven wanted a job that would keep him physically fit while allowing him to serve the community and even save the lives of his fellow citizens. So he became a firefighter. The job kept him physically fit and allowed him to maintain a clean bill of health … except for that congenital heart anomaly, which no one knew about.

Kenny, on the other hand, decided to pursue the absolute highest calling — the profession which the bravest and noblest aspire to. He didn’t want to become a physician, or an engineer, or even a scientist. He decided to become a workers’ compensation defense attorney (not unlike your humble author).

Still, the two twin brothers were in every other respect exactly alike, and spent every Sunday morning having breakfast together in that shared gazebo, along with their wives and children.

Then, tragedy struck! One morning, as Kenny and Keven sat next to each other, enjoying the morning air, each with a newspaper in the left hand and a piece of toast in the right, they suddenly sat straight up, looked into each other’s eyes, and both collapsed to the ground with strokes.

Their families rushed them to seek medical treatment and, fortunately, each of the two brothers recovered. Before long, they were sitting next to each other in their shared gazebo, when Kenny had an idea. Why not file workers’ compensation claims for the strokes — surely, the stress of being a firefighter caused Keven’s stroke. And, if being a firefighter is stressful enough to cause a stroke, then being a workers’ compensation defense attorney is even more so!

As the cases progressed, each of the two brothers agreed to use an Agreed Medical Evaluator, and each AME came to the same conclusion: the AMEs both found that, in their respective cases, the “stroke … occurred in an individual whose only major risk factor for stroke in terms of this industrial analysis appears to be his congenital heart defect … all of his conditions apportion 100% to non-industrial causation.”

Kenny was crushed — his case was effectively at an end as the workers’ compensation Judge ordered him to take nothing. After all, the Agreed Medical Evaluator had found that there was only one cause for his stroke — a non-industrial condition acquired at birth. How could any legal system, short of denying a defendant-employer due process, require workers’ compensation payment for something so patently and obviously unrelated to any work causes? Keven’s case, on the other hand, was just warming up.

Keven’s attorney argued that, under Labor Code section 3212, “any heart trouble that develops or manifests itself during a period while [the firefighter] is in the service of the office, staff, department, or unit … shall be presumed to arise out of and in the course of the employment.”

Now, isn’t that presumption rebutted? After all, as in both the case of Kenny and Keven, the Agreed Medical Evaluators have found that the sole reason for both strokes was the congenital heart condition — exactly 0% of the causation had anything to do with work as a firefighter or as a workers’ compensation defense attorney.

Well, as Kenny feels once again misused and ignored by the system he so gallantly serves, Keven has another line of defense: “The … heart trouble … so developing or manifesting itself … shall in no case be attributed to any disease existing prior to that development or manifestation.”

Keven’s attorney would have to prove that Keven is a firefighter — something he could establish without much difficulty (showing up at the Board with a fire axe is not recommended, even if you believe you’ve got “an axe to grind”). Then, he would have to prove that Keven’s injury could be considered “heart trouble.” This should be no problem, considering the fact that case-law has established that there are very few non-orthopedic injuries that might be considered not heart trouble (Muznik v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1975)).

But what about that pesky requirement of “in the service of the office …” as required by Labor Code Section 3212? If the firefighter is sitting in his and his brother’s gazebo, drinking coffee on a beautiful Sunday morning and indulging in that antique of an information-delivery device that people so often read, is he really in the service of the fire department?

For example, the Court of Appeal in Geoghegan v. Retirement Board (1990) upheld a retirement board’s denial of benefits for a firefighter who sustained a heart attack while skiing.

Now, before the applicants’ attorneys out there start mumbling something about a ski-lodge burning and a San Francisco firefighter being called in to ski down the slopes and shovel ice onto the flames, your humble author assures you, this was a vacation. The treating physician found that the heart attack was caused by the altitude and Mr. Geoghegan had recently passed the fire department’s physical exams with skiing flying colors.

The Board of Retirement had rejected Geoghegan’s application for retirement benefits, and he appealed. There, the Court of Appeal rejected Geoghegan’s argument that Labor Code section 3212 applied and that he should be, at that very moment, counting his money instead of appealing his case, because the trial court had found that “the conclusion is inescapable that plaintiff’s disability was due to the myocardial infarction caused by the cold and altitude encountered while skiing.”

Previous decisions, as cited by the Geoghegan Court, included Turner v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1968) and Bussa v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1968). In Turner, a police officer’s heart attack sustained while on duty after a day off spent abalone fishing was found non-industrial, and the presumption of Labor Code Section 3212.5 was rebutted. In Bussa, a firefighter’s exertions on a second job were used to rebut the presumption of industrial causation for his heart attack.

Well, Keven’s attorney could easily fire back that those three cases can be distinguished because they don’t touch on the anti-attribution clause (“[t]he … heart trouble … so developing or manifesting itself … shall in no case be attributed to any disease existing prior to that development or manifestation.”) And, as the Agreed Medical Evaluator in Keven’s case had found that 100% of the disability was caused by a congenital heart defect, that leaves (let me get my calculator here …) 0% available for causes not “attributed to any disease existing prior to that development or manifestation.”

Geoghegan was already a firefighter when he sustained his heart attack; Turner was already a police officer when he sustained his heart attack; and Bussa was already a firefighter when he had his heart attack. On the other hand, each of these cases showed an injury attributed to something other than a condition in existence prior to the start of the applicant’s career with the fire or police department.

Keven, on the other hand, was not exerting himself at all — he was having coffee with his twin brother and their respective families over a relaxing Sunday breakfast.

But doesn’t something seem strange about sticking the fire department with the bill for a condition which existed at birth? After all, we’re talking about medical care and temporary disability and permanent disability and maybe even a pension. That’s not to mention the litigation costs. The city in which Keven is a firefighter could be deprived of a firetruck or several firefighters’ salaries if it is liable for Keven’s stroke.

Your humble author directs you to the recent case of Kevin Kennedy v. City of Oakland. Mr. Kennedy, a firefighter, had sustained a stroke while he was off work and filed a workers’ compensation claim against the City of Oakland, reasonably arguing that the stroke was “heart trouble” as contemplated by Labor Code section 3212. After an Agreed Medical Evaluator found that Mr. Kennedy’s stroke was entirely caused by a congenital heart anomaly, and had nothing to do at all with any work-related activities or trauma, the workers’ compensation judge found that the City of Oakland was not liable for the injury.

Mr. Kennedy’s attorney made a fairly logical argument: Labor Code Section 3212 prohibits the attribution of heart trouble to “any disease existing prior to that development or manifestation” of heart trouble. Additionally, the same Labor Code section requires heart trouble in firefighters to be presumed industrial, although this presumption may be rebutted by other evidence. Here, there is no evidence available with which to rebut this presumption, because the AME found that 100% of the causation should be attributed to the congenital heart condition.

The workers’ compensation Judge, however, found that Mr. Kennedy could not recover — based on the opinions of the AME, the stroke had absolutely nothing to do with Mr. Kennedy’s employment.

Applicant petitioned for reconsideration, and the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board granted reconsideration, reasoning that Mr. Kennedy’s patent foramen ovule was a condition existing prior to the development or manifestation of the stroke, and that Labor Code Section 3212 necessitated a finding of compensability. The Court of Appeal denied defendant’s petition for a writ of review.

In issuing its opinion, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board was consistent, echoing a similar decision in the matter of Karges v. Siskiyou County Sheriff, finding a deputy sheriff’s congenital heart condition compensable under Labor Code section 3212.5.

So … what’s to be done? Common sense and a basic inclination for fairness militate against this outcome. We’re not talking about a weak heart being aggravated by work conditions, but rather a firefighter at peak physical fitness succumbing to a condition with which he was born and an illness in which his work played no part. It’s entirely possible that if Mr. Kennedy had spent his life behind a desk, much like his imaginary twin brother Kenny, his heart would have been strained by office junk food and a sedentary lifestyle, much like your humble author’s.

As promised, here are a few crackpot arguments to be used only by the most desperate in such cases. Your humble author doesn’t know if these will work, but if they are the only alternative to writing a big check, perhaps they are worth exploring.

  1. As with the Karges decision, the argument should be raised that Labor Code Section 4663 is the more recent law, and therefore reflects the more current legislative intent. In litigated matters, judicial authority should be used to further this Legislative intent and not find impairment caused entirely by non-industrial factors to be compensable.
  2. In the writ denied case of Michael Yubeta v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, a corrections officer’s claim for heart disease was ruled non-compensable when the Agreed Medical Evaluator found cardiovascular disease manifested prior to the start of his tenure with the Department of Corrections. In the Kennedy, matter, the defense might argue that the patent foramen ovule is the “heart trouble” contemplated by section 3212, and it manifested itself at birth, before the term of service with the fire department. Mr. Kennedy’s stroke, being directly and exclusively caused by this manifestation, should not be presumed compensable.

    After all, the poor guy had a hole in his heart — not in the sense that he couldn’t love or open up to other people, but the wall to his heart had an actual hole. Studies had shown that this practically guaranteed that he would sustain a stroke at some point in his life. (Understandably, this one is a stretch).

  3. Webster’s dictionary defines “attribute” as “to regard as resulting from a specified cause.” However, as the Labor Code does not use the words “apportionment” and “attributed” interchangeably, we can only suppose that they mean two different things. So, while section 3212 prohibits us from attributing heart trouble for purposes of AOE/COE (Arising Out Of Employment/In The Course Of Employment), perhaps we are still permitted to “apportion” the heart trouble to non-industrial causes. If such is the case, the Kennedy matter should have found the stroke compensable, and yet apportioned 100% to non-industrial causes.

    In other words, Mr. Kennedy should get the medical treatment but not the permanent disability indemnity.

Implementing International Medical Providers Into The U.S. Workers’ Compensation System, Part 5

This is Part 5 of a five-part series on legal barriers to implementing international providers into Medical Provider Networks for workers’ compensation. Previous articles in the series can be found here: Part 1Part 2Part 3, and Part 4.

Medical Malpractice And Liability Laws
One major criticism of medical tourism is the lack of legal remedy for patients claiming injury from medical malpractice.91 Medical malpractice and liability laws in foreign countries are not as strict as laws in the U.S.92 Awards for malpractice are generally not as generous either as those in the U.S.93 Physicians overseas do not typically have the same amount of malpractice insurance as their American counterparts.94 And the threshold for determining malpractice is higher outside the U.S.95 Limited recourse through the court systems of many countries is a problem, and the right to sue may not exist for injured patients.96 In India, even though the court system is similar to that in the U.S., medical malpractice awards are rare and never reach the multi-million dollar amount common in U.S. court systems.97

Before recognizing a suit, an American court must have personal jurisdiction over a foreign provider.98 The issue of personal jurisdiction over the foreign provider is a difficult burden for anyone initiating a suit.99 U.S. courts are reluctant to assert personal jurisdiction over physicians who are not residents of the U.S. and do not practice in the forum state.100 Minimum contacts sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction could be difficult to establish over a physician who performed a harmful procedure outside of the forum state.101 If a U.S. court does find evidence to support personal jurisdiction, the case could be dismissed on the grounds of forum no conveniens (not suitable to the forum).102 If the case is not dismissed, then choice of law conflicts arises.103 104 If a court recognizes a valid claim against a defendant, it is likely the defendant will be successful challenging the location of the suit.105 Most jurisdictions would apply the laws of the country where the malpractice occurred, decreasing the likelihood of a finding of malpractice, and a reduction of damages.106

Patient Privacy And Medical Record Laws (Including HIPAA)
In recent years, the U.S. health care industry has outsourced the processing and interpretation of x-rays and other medical records to countries such as India,107 where the data entry costs are less than half of those in the U.S.108 Half of the $20 billion medical transcription industry is outsourced.109 This is due to the fact that information technology is not a core competency of the health care industry and has proven itself to be a prime candidate for outsourcing. Other tasks such as billing, coding, data-clearing, claims processing, and electronic records data processing and storage also are outsourced.110

One example of a task that is outsourced to India, and that pertains to the workers’ compensation industry is the outsourcing of the initial processing of medical bills for health care claims that are later determined to be workers compensation claims. A company this author had contact with in 2008 conducts subrogation recovery on those medical bills paid by their health care clients when injured workers present their employer’s health care insurance card at time of treatment, and does not inform staff that he was injured on the job. The provider bills the health insurer, rather than his employer’s workers’ compensation carrier. The subrogation company, working on a pilot project for the NYS Workers’ Compensation Board under the Health Insurers’ Match Program (HIMP), outsources the initial processing of the medical bills for health care claims to an office they have contracted with in Gurgaon, India.

Since much of the current business of medical tourism is conducted through facilitators, or medical tourism brokers, as mentioned in Part 1 of this series, they must conform to national or state legislation that governs the privacy and confidentiality of medical records and patient information. The locations in which they are located should bind them to the laws of that jurisdiction, and therefore, they would have to conform to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regarding privacy of medical records.111

HIPAA privacy applies to a limited subset of health care entities.112 Those “covered entities” include health plans, health care providers, and health care clearinghouses that process nonstandard information. “Business associates” of covered entities are organizations that perform certain functions or activities on behalf of, or provide certain services to, a covered entity. Examples of functions or activities include claims processing, data analysis, utilization review, and billing. Their services are limited to legal, actuarial, accounting, consulting, data aggregation, management, administrative, accreditation, or financial services.113

HIPAA rules are strict, and health plans in the U.S. must follow them even for services provided abroad. However, they are not applicable to foreign hospitals and doctors. Business Associate agreements under HIPAA should be placed with offshore vendors, and vendors should have their contracts with hospitals and other providers conform to HIPAA standards.114

ERISA
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), enacted in 1974, is a federal law that imposes a set of minimum standards on employee benefit plans, including health insurance plans, and is intended to protect employees by ensuring basic fairness and financial stability to such plans.115 In considering integrating medical outsourcing, i.e., medical tourism, into employee benefit plans, a variety of factors motivates HMO and employee welfare plan administrators.116 Cost savings are one factor, as we have already seen. In determining to use medical outsourcing, HMO and plan administrators must remember their fiduciary duty under ERISA “to discharge their duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to plan participants … and to defray reasonable expenses of administering the plan.”117

Medical tourism has come under challenge that it violates the fiduciary duty imposed by ERISA. It is argued that ERISA is inconsistent with the concept of medical tourism because health insurance plans, employers, and health maintenance organizations (“HMO’s”) cannot authorize and pay for participants to engage in medical tourism without violating the ERISA fiduciary duty of loyalty.118Authorization of medical tourism does not result in a de jure violation of ERISA requirements; it is argued that the benefits are so great that they overwhelm the sponsor’s ability to evaluate the dangers inherent in medical tourism.119 Yet, the very act of authorizing medical tourism produces a de facto violation of ERISA’s fiduciary duties some have argued.120 Further it is argued, that medical tourism defeats ERISA’s public policy justification of ensuring equity in the distribution of employee health benefits.121 Medical tourism may actually promote ERISA’s goal of providing health care benefits more equitably, proponents counter.122 123

This presents an inherent conflict between medical tourism and ERISA’s fiduciary duty because the question arises as to whether the cost saving element qualifies the decision to implement medical tourism as “defraying reasonable expenses,” or does the risk and potential profit to the plan, preclude the decision to outsource from being in the interest of the plan participants.124

There are three arguments that proponents of medical outsourcing use in light of the fiduciary duty imposed by ERISA. The first argument is that the cost savings associated with medical tourism falls within the scope of ERISA’s fiduciary duty because plan administrators are obligated to discharge their duties for “the exclusive purpose of … defraying reasonable expense of administering the plan.” Second, the decision by the Supreme Court in Pegram v Herdrich bolsters the argument that medical tourism does not violate ERISA’s fiduciary duty because it is characterized as a mixed medical and eligibility decision made by a physician, and is exempt from ERISA’s coverage. Finally, proponents argue that the availability of medical tourism does not violate ERISA, it only imposes a fiduciary duty on those who exercise control over the management of a plan or its assets.125

Before medical tourism can be implemented in workers’ compensation, the conflict between the fiduciary duty imposed by ERISA and the benefits of medical tourism must be addressed so as to not prevent the cost savings from medical tourism to be lost to the workers’ compensation industry.

Impact Of PPACA On Medical Tourism
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) signed by President Obama in March 2010 will affect individuals, health care providers, insurers, and employers.126 It represents a dramatic shift in U.S. health policy, and is designed to expand access to health insurance, reduce health care spending, expand federal fraud enforcement and transparency requirements, and impose new taxes and fees on health industry sectors.127 The political argument for PPACA equates coverage with access, and access to health care is dependent on the capacity of the health care system to absorb increased demand. Many of these changes will not take place until 2014, and there are hints that the “squeeze” on capacity may mean longer wait times for elective surgery. The new health care reform is seen by some as a push for insurers to include plans with medical travel options.128

It is too early to tell what the impact of PPACA will be on the health care system of the U.S.; yet the effects of PPACA on the international health care community will be far-reaching and economically substantial. For the U.S., the influence of health reform will serve as an impetus towards accelerated globalization of the U.S. health care industry, and will encompass the export of patients abroad. Medical tourism is likely to experience explosive growth over the next three to five years due to the changes in the U.S. health care industry brought about by reform.129 PPACA has already planted seeds for comparison shopping in health care, which will benefit both domestic and outbound medical tourism.130

Much of the discussion so far has been focused on medical tourism from the standpoint of the health care side, which is understandable given the state of the health care system in this country. The laws and regulations imposed upon the health care system are equally incumbent on the workers’ compensation system and present a formidable obstacle to implementing medical tourism. The laws in Oregon and Washington State would suggest that at least as far as these states are concerned, medical tourism in workers’ compensation does not present a problem, However, in order for medical tourism to become a part of the workers’ compensation system in the US, the laws previously mentioned and many other laws may need to be amended or repealed.

Workers’ Compensation Case Law And Medical Tourism
An exhaustive case law search resulted in identifying three cases that support or refute the implementing of medical tourism into the workers’ compensation arena. However, these three cases do offer some insight into how courts might rule regarding the implementation of medical tourism in workers’ compensation.

In State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board131, a Mexican resident, working in California as a laborer, fell from a ladder in January 1975. He was treated by the Fund until February 1975. He received treatment from a Mexican provider in his hometown of Tijuana. The medical reports were prepared by both the treating physician and another doctor. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board made an award ordering reimbursement for treatment, as well as for medical-legal costs. The State Fund petitioned for reconsideration to disallow reimbursement on the grounds that both physicians were not licensed under California law. The petition was denied, and the case was appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Board’s award, citing that the definition of physician in the CA Labor Code132 does not exclude physicians licensed to practice in another country, and when medical treatment and reports are procured from physicians in accordance with Labor Code, § 4600133, employers are responsible for reasonable expense of treatment and medical-legal costs. The court held that the definition of physicians in the statute was unreasonable in light of clear jurisdiction of the Board over extraterritorial injuries when the contract of hire was made in California.

The next case, also in California, was a case of domestic medical tourism, and has some relevance on implementing medical tourism for workers’ compensation abroad because it involves the matter of distance. In Braewood Convalescence Hospital et al. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board134, the applicant, Eugene Bolton, worked as a cook for the employer, Braewood Convalescent Hospital. He slipped and sustained injuries to his back and right elbow. He was overweight at the time of the accident, having weighed 422 pounds. His treating physician and two of the employer’s physicians recommended he lose weight to facilitate his recovery from his injuries. On the recommendation of a friend, he enrolled in the Duke University obesity clinic in Durham, North Carolina in February 1979. He participated at the clinic for ten months and lost 175 pounds.

In November 1979, he returned to California because he could no longer afford to continue the program. He filed for reimbursement of his expenses at the clinic, which included medical, lodging, special diet and transportation costs. The Workers’ Compensation Judge awarded him temporary disability prior to his enrollment at the clinic, the cost of the clinic, and his future participation in the program. Braewood sought reconsideration and challenged the award for past and future self-procured medical treatment. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board granted reconsideration of the judge’s failure to award temporary disability benefits during the time of his treatment at the clinic. After reconsideration, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board affirmed the judge’s award. On appeal, the employer contended that the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board erred in awarding reimbursement, temporary benefits and compensation for future treatment.

The Supreme Court of California affirmed the award of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board by holding that, although the employer had a right to direct applicant to a specific weight-reduction program135, such a right was lost as a result of employer’s failure to act by identifying and offering an alternative program, thus the applicant acquired the right to choose for himself which program to undertake, and that the right of reimbursement was part and parcel of his proper exercise of the right to choose.136 The evidence supported the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board’s conclusion of reasonableness of location 3,000 miles from applicant’s home, and thus the costs of attending were reimbursable. The applicant was entitled to the award of temporary disability for the period he participated in the program, and the recommendations of two physicians to lose weight were sufficient to support award for cost of future medical treatment.137

The last case, AMS Staff Leasing, Inc. v. Arreola138, involved an undocumented Mexican worker in Florida who was injured in January of 2005, when a vehicle struck him in the right leg as he was unloading trash from the back of a truck. He was hospitalized for a long period of time, and had twelve surgeries to repair the fracture. In August 2005, he was seen by an orthopedist in Dallas, who recommended additional surgery. Arreola never got the surgery in the US, as he returned to Mexico in November, and did not have legal documents to return to the US.

In February 2006, Arreola’s lawyer sent a letter to the counsel for the employer/carrier requesting authorization of one of three orthopedic doctors in Arreola’s hometown of Jalisco. The employer/carrier did not offer him any medical care in Mexico and refused to authorize any Mexican physicians to treat him. In March 2006, the claimant went to a hospital in Jalisco and was assigned to an orthopedic surgeon. The surgeon’s diagnosis was the same as the orthopedist in Dallas, and it was his opinion that Arreola’s chances to return to work were poor. Arreola filed a Petition for Benefits seeking authorization for continued medical care in Mexico and for costs and attorney’s fees. The employer/carrier defended the petition on the grounds there were no known orthopedic doctors in Mexico who qualified as a “physician” according to the workers’ compensation statutes.

The Judge of Compensation Claims entered an order directing the employer/carrier to provide written authorization to the orthopedic surgeon in Mexico to provide Arreola “with ongoing care that is reasonable, and medically necessary, and related to the industrial accident.” The judge also ordered the employer/carrier to pay for that care. In August 2006, the claimant filed another Petition of Benefits for Temporary Partial Disability (TPD) Benefits. He was awarded the benefits after a second hearing.

The employer/carrier challenged the two orders of the Judge for the TPD benefits and the continuing medical care in Mexico. The Court of Appeal ruled that state law did not preclude the foreign physician’s treatment of the claimant in Mexico. They stated that Florida workers’ compensation law contemplates coverage for non-citizens, and they cited an earlier case in which the court held that undocumented workers were entitled to workers’ compensation coverage in Florida139, and two later cases140 141 that held that “to construe the section 440.13(2)(a) in a manner that would limit authorized treatment for a claimant injured in Florida to a physician licensed in the State, or anywhere else in the US, would preclude workers (including illegal aliens) who return to their home country from receiving authorized remedial care for clearly compensable injuries.”

The Court of Appeal in the Arreola case also stated that Florida law indicates that an injured worker is not prohibited from moving from his pre-injury residence in the state, and receiving treatment outside of the state. As the claimant was no longer living in Florida, the court held that this case was different from the Decker v. City of West Palm Beach142, United Records & Tapes v. Deall143 144 and Layne-Western Co. v. Coxcases that the defendants cited, in that Arreola was already living in Mexico when he requested medical treatment. Therefore, the trial court did not err in directing the employer/carrier to authorize treatment by a Mexican physician, and the trial court’s decision was affirmed by the court.

Conclusion
Research into the legal barriers to implementing medical tourism into workers’ compensation found nothing of any real substance that would prevent workers’ compensation cases from benefiting from medical tourism. We have seen that there still remain several legal barriers to the implementation of medical tourism into workers’ compensation. Various federal and state laws need to be changed, and the issues of medical malpractice and liability laws, patient privacy and medical record laws and HIPAA, as well as ERISA and the impact of PPACA must all be addressed. But it is my opinion that these barriers can and will be overcome, especially in light of case law that has broken down some of those barriers already for foreign workers. The cost savings that can be achieved and the quality of care that matches, and even surpasses that found in the U.S., is sufficient reason why medical tourism should be implemented.

However, those opposed to implementing medical tourism into workers’ compensation would make the point that we cannot be certain of the quality of care and outcomes of medical procedures performed, especially in third world countries where the living conditions might not be ideal for recovery and healing. They may also add that the technology and skill level of the physicians are not on the same level as that found in the U.S. And finally they may be reluctant to spend money to fly a claimant and a companion to another country for what may seem to be a “medical vacation.”

Yet, the creation of the Joint Commission International to assess the quality of foreign hospitals has brought about a higher standard of care. There are more physicians trained in the U.S. or in the U.K. in many of the countries catering to medical tourists, utilizing the latest technology and medical training available, as well as many of them being board-certified in various medical specialties. The costs for three of the most common procedures in India, Thailand and Singapore includes the cost of airfare, hospital and hotel, and is considerably cheaper than having the injured worker treated in the U.S.

Legal Criticisms Of Medical Tourism And Workers’ Compensation
There will still be objections to implementing medical tourism from the defendant community, (i.e., employers and their insurance carriers); however, the courts in both of the cases presented here ruled against the defendants in those cases. The defendants argued on the grounds that the physicians treating the plaintiffs in Mexico were not licensed in the states where the cases occurred, or in any other U.S. state. The court in State Comp Ins. Fund denied the defendant’s petition to reconsider the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board award on the grounds that the definition of a physician did not exclude physicians licensed to practice in another country. The court in AMS Staff Leasing, Inc. ruled that state law did not preclude treatment by a foreign physician.

Defendants also stated that there were no known orthopedic doctors in Mexico who qualified as a “physician” as the term is used in the statutes. This argument about there not being any known orthopedic doctors is specious at best, given the fact that many doctors are being trained in the U.S. and are board-certified here as well.

It would appear that at least for the moment, the courts are willing to allow some measure of medical tourism in workers’ compensation. How future courts will decide is unclear, but there is at least some precedent for ruling in favor of medical tourism. Another way in which medical tourism will be implemented is if workers’ compensation carriers, realizing the benefits of medical tourism, push for it at the state and federal level. The evidence presented here has indicated that employers and insurance companies may not have a choice in the matter as the cost of health care rises and the process of reform taking place makes it obvious that the increased competition will offer medical tourism as a viable option to lower costs.

The globalization of health care will necessitate the removal of all barriers to providing the best care possible at the lowest cost. The cost savings that are being realized by medical tourism as a part of the health care industry can be just as beneficial in workers’ compensation. Therefore, medical tourism should be implemented into workers’ compensation and the legal barriers should be modified.

91 Williams, 641.

92 Longe, 14.

93 Boyle, 46.

94 Longe, 14.

95 Ibid, 14.

96 Ibid, 14.

97 Boyle, 46.

98 Williams, 643.

99 Ibid, 643.

100 Ibid, 643.

101 Ibid, 643.

102 Boyle, 46.

103 Ibid, 46.

104 Williams, 644.

105 Ibid, 644.

106 Ibid, 644-645.

107 Herrick, 19-20.

108 Terry, 441.

109 David Lazarus, “Outsourced UCSF Notes Highlight Privacy Risk: How one offshore worker sent tremor through medical system,” San Francisco Chronicle, (San Francisco, CA), March 28, 2004. Accessed from http://www.mindlully.org.

110 Terry, 441.

111 Leigh G. Turner, “Quality in health care and globalization of health services: accreditation and regulatory oversight of medical tourism companies,” International Journal for Quality in Health Care 2011, 23, 1 (2010): 4. doi:10.1093/intqhc/mzq078 accessed from http://www.hhs.gov.

114 Joseph Marlowe and Paul Sullivan, “Medical Tourism: The Ultimate Outsourcing,” Aon Consulting Forum, March, (2007), 4. Retrieved from https://infolinx.aon.com.

115 Williams, 612 and 650.

116 Christopher J. Brady, “Offshore Gambling: Medical Outsourcing Versus ERISA’s Fiduciary Duty Requirements,” Washington and Lee Law Review 64, no. 3 (2007): 1105.

117 Ibid, 1106.

118 Williams, 650.

119 Ibid, 650.

120 Ibid, 651.

121 Ibid, 651.

122 Brady, 1105.

123 Williams, 652.

124 Brady, 1106.

125 Ibid, 1106.

126 Corinne M. Karuppan and Muthu Karuppan, “Changing Trends in Health Care Tourism,” The Health Care Manager 29, no. 4 (2010): 351.

127 Brad Beauvais, Matt Brooks and Suzanne Woods, “Gazing through the Looking Glass … Analysis of the Impact of the US Health Care Reform Bill on the International Health & Business Landscape,” (paper presented at the Seventeenth Annual South Dakota International Business Conference, Rapid City, SD, October 1, 2010). 51.

128 Karuppan and Kauppan, 351.

129 Beauvais, et al., 61.

130 Karuppan and Karuppan, 357.

131 State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 69 Cal. App.3d 884 (1977).

132 CA Lab Code, § 3209.3.

133 CA Labor Code, § 4600.

134 Braewood Convalescence Hospital et al. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 34 Cal.3d 159 (1983).

135 Cal Civ. Prac. Workers’ Compensation, §2:29.

136 CA. Labor Code, §4600.

137 Braewood Convalescence Hospital et al. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 34 Cal.3d 159 (1983).

138 AMS Staff Leasing, Inc. v. Arreola, 976 So.2d 612 (2008).

139 Cenvill Dev. Corp. v. Candelo, 478 So.2d 1168 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

140 Safeharbor Employer Servs., Inc v. Velazquez, 860 So.2d 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

141 Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriquez, 421 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

142 Decker v. City of West Palm Beach, 379 So.2d 955 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).

143 United Records & Tapes v. Deall, 378 So.2d 99 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979.

144 Layne-Western Co. v. Cox, 497 So.2d 955 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

Implementing International Medical Providers Into The U.S. Workers' Compensation System, Part 5

This is Part 5 of a five-part series on legal barriers to implementing international providers into Medical Provider Networks for workers’ compensation. Previous articles in the series can be found here: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, and Part 4.

Medical Malpractice And Liability Laws
One major criticism of medical tourism is the lack of legal remedy for patients claiming injury from medical malpractice.91 Medical malpractice and liability laws in foreign countries are not as strict as laws in the U.S.92 Awards for malpractice are generally not as generous either as those in the U.S.93 Physicians overseas do not typically have the same amount of malpractice insurance as their American counterparts.94 And the threshold for determining malpractice is higher outside the U.S.95 Limited recourse through the court systems of many countries is a problem, and the right to sue may not exist for injured patients.96 In India, even though the court system is similar to that in the U.S., medical malpractice awards are rare and never reach the multi-million dollar amount common in U.S. court systems.97

Before recognizing a suit, an American court must have personal jurisdiction over a foreign provider.98 The issue of personal jurisdiction over the foreign provider is a difficult burden for anyone initiating a suit.99 U.S. courts are reluctant to assert personal jurisdiction over physicians who are not residents of the U.S. and do not practice in the forum state.100 Minimum contacts sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction could be difficult to establish over a physician who performed a harmful procedure outside of the forum state.101 If a U.S. court does find evidence to support personal jurisdiction, the case could be dismissed on the grounds of forum no conveniens (not suitable to the forum).102 If the case is not dismissed, then choice of law conflicts arises.103 104 If a court recognizes a valid claim against a defendant, it is likely the defendant will be successful challenging the location of the suit.105 Most jurisdictions would apply the laws of the country where the malpractice occurred, decreasing the likelihood of a finding of malpractice, and a reduction of damages.106

Patient Privacy And Medical Record Laws (Including HIPAA)
In recent years, the U.S. health care industry has outsourced the processing and interpretation of x-rays and other medical records to countries such as India,107 where the data entry costs are less than half of those in the U.S.108 Half of the $20 billion medical transcription industry is outsourced.109 This is due to the fact that information technology is not a core competency of the health care industry and has proven itself to be a prime candidate for outsourcing. Other tasks such as billing, coding, data-clearing, claims processing, and electronic records data processing and storage also are outsourced.110

One example of a task that is outsourced to India, and that pertains to the workers’ compensation industry is the outsourcing of the initial processing of medical bills for health care claims that are later determined to be workers compensation claims. A company this author had contact with in 2008 conducts subrogation recovery on those medical bills paid by their health care clients when injured workers present their employer’s health care insurance card at time of treatment, and does not inform staff that he was injured on the job. The provider bills the health insurer, rather than his employer’s workers’ compensation carrier. The subrogation company, working on a pilot project for the NYS Workers’ Compensation Board under the Health Insurers’ Match Program (HIMP), outsources the initial processing of the medical bills for health care claims to an office they have contracted with in Gurgaon, India.

Since much of the current business of medical tourism is conducted through facilitators, or medical tourism brokers, as mentioned in Part 1 of this series, they must conform to national or state legislation that governs the privacy and confidentiality of medical records and patient information. The locations in which they are located should bind them to the laws of that jurisdiction, and therefore, they would have to conform to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regarding privacy of medical records.111

HIPAA privacy applies to a limited subset of health care entities.112 Those “covered entities” include health plans, health care providers, and health care clearinghouses that process nonstandard information. “Business associates” of covered entities are organizations that perform certain functions or activities on behalf of, or provide certain services to, a covered entity. Examples of functions or activities include claims processing, data analysis, utilization review, and billing. Their services are limited to legal, actuarial, accounting, consulting, data aggregation, management, administrative, accreditation, or financial services.113

HIPAA rules are strict, and health plans in the U.S. must follow them even for services provided abroad. However, they are not applicable to foreign hospitals and doctors. Business Associate agreements under HIPAA should be placed with offshore vendors, and vendors should have their contracts with hospitals and other providers conform to HIPAA standards.114

ERISA
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), enacted in 1974, is a federal law that imposes a set of minimum standards on employee benefit plans, including health insurance plans, and is intended to protect employees by ensuring basic fairness and financial stability to such plans.115 In considering integrating medical outsourcing, i.e., medical tourism, into employee benefit plans, a variety of factors motivates HMO and employee welfare plan administrators.116 Cost savings are one factor, as we have already seen. In determining to use medical outsourcing, HMO and plan administrators must remember their fiduciary duty under ERISA “to discharge their duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to plan participants … and to defray reasonable expenses of administering the plan.”117

Medical tourism has come under challenge that it violates the fiduciary duty imposed by ERISA. It is argued that ERISA is inconsistent with the concept of medical tourism because health insurance plans, employers, and health maintenance organizations (“HMO’s”) cannot authorize and pay for participants to engage in medical tourism without violating the ERISA fiduciary duty of loyalty.118 Authorization of medical tourism does not result in a de jure violation of ERISA requirements; it is argued that the benefits are so great that they overwhelm the sponsor’s ability to evaluate the dangers inherent in medical tourism.119 Yet, the very act of authorizing medical tourism produces a de facto violation of ERISA’s fiduciary duties some have argued.120 Further it is argued, that medical tourism defeats ERISA’s public policy justification of ensuring equity in the distribution of employee health benefits.121 Medical tourism may actually promote ERISA’s goal of providing health care benefits more equitably, proponents counter.122 123

This presents an inherent conflict between medical tourism and ERISA’s fiduciary duty because the question arises as to whether the cost saving element qualifies the decision to implement medical tourism as “defraying reasonable expenses,” or does the risk and potential profit to the plan, preclude the decision to outsource from being in the interest of the plan participants.124

There are three arguments that proponents of medical outsourcing use in light of the fiduciary duty imposed by ERISA. The first argument is that the cost savings associated with medical tourism falls within the scope of ERISA’s fiduciary duty because plan administrators are obligated to discharge their duties for “the exclusive purpose of … defraying reasonable expense of administering the plan.” Second, the decision by the Supreme Court in Pegram v Herdrich bolsters the argument that medical tourism does not violate ERISA’s fiduciary duty because it is characterized as a mixed medical and eligibility decision made by a physician, and is exempt from ERISA’s coverage. Finally, proponents argue that the availability of medical tourism does not violate ERISA, it only imposes a fiduciary duty on those who exercise control over the management of a plan or its assets.125

Before medical tourism can be implemented in workers’ compensation, the conflict between the fiduciary duty imposed by ERISA and the benefits of medical tourism must be addressed so as to not prevent the cost savings from medical tourism to be lost to the workers’ compensation industry.

Impact Of PPACA On Medical Tourism
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) signed by President Obama in March 2010 will affect individuals, health care providers, insurers, and employers.126 It represents a dramatic shift in U.S. health policy, and is designed to expand access to health insurance, reduce health care spending, expand federal fraud enforcement and transparency requirements, and impose new taxes and fees on health industry sectors.127 The political argument for PPACA equates coverage with access, and access to health care is dependent on the capacity of the health care system to absorb increased demand. Many of these changes will not take place until 2014, and there are hints that the “squeeze” on capacity may mean longer wait times for elective surgery. The new health care reform is seen by some as a push for insurers to include plans with medical travel options.128

It is too early to tell what the impact of PPACA will be on the health care system of the U.S.; yet the effects of PPACA on the international health care community will be far-reaching and economically substantial. For the U.S., the influence of health reform will serve as an impetus towards accelerated globalization of the U.S. health care industry, and will encompass the export of patients abroad. Medical tourism is likely to experience explosive growth over the next three to five years due to the changes in the U.S. health care industry brought about by reform.129 PPACA has already planted seeds for comparison shopping in health care, which will benefit both domestic and outbound medical tourism.130

Much of the discussion so far has been focused on medical tourism from the standpoint of the health care side, which is understandable given the state of the health care system in this country. The laws and regulations imposed upon the health care system are equally incumbent on the workers’ compensation system and present a formidable obstacle to implementing medical tourism. The laws in Oregon and Washington State would suggest that at least as far as these states are concerned, medical tourism in workers’ compensation does not present a problem, However, in order for medical tourism to become a part of the workers’ compensation system in the US, the laws previously mentioned and many other laws may need to be amended or repealed.

Workers’ Compensation Case Law And Medical Tourism
An exhaustive case law search resulted in identifying three cases that support or refute the implementing of medical tourism into the workers’ compensation arena. However, these three cases do offer some insight into how courts might rule regarding the implementation of medical tourism in workers’ compensation.

In State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board131, a Mexican resident, working in California as a laborer, fell from a ladder in January 1975. He was treated by the Fund until February 1975. He received treatment from a Mexican provider in his hometown of Tijuana. The medical reports were prepared by both the treating physician and another doctor. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board made an award ordering reimbursement for treatment, as well as for medical-legal costs. The State Fund petitioned for reconsideration to disallow reimbursement on the grounds that both physicians were not licensed under California law. The petition was denied, and the case was appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Board’s award, citing that the definition of physician in the CA Labor Code132 does not exclude physicians licensed to practice in another country, and when medical treatment and reports are procured from physicians in accordance with Labor Code, § 4600133, employers are responsible for reasonable expense of treatment and medical-legal costs. The court held that the definition of physicians in the statute was unreasonable in light of clear jurisdiction of the Board over extraterritorial injuries when the contract of hire was made in California.

The next case, also in California, was a case of domestic medical tourism, and has some relevance on implementing medical tourism for workers’ compensation abroad because it involves the matter of distance. In Braewood Convalescence Hospital et al. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board134, the applicant, Eugene Bolton, worked as a cook for the employer, Braewood Convalescent Hospital. He slipped and sustained injuries to his back and right elbow. He was overweight at the time of the accident, having weighed 422 pounds. His treating physician and two of the employer’s physicians recommended he lose weight to facilitate his recovery from his injuries. On the recommendation of a friend, he enrolled in the Duke University obesity clinic in Durham, North Carolina in February 1979. He participated at the clinic for ten months and lost 175 pounds.

In November 1979, he returned to California because he could no longer afford to continue the program. He filed for reimbursement of his expenses at the clinic, which included medical, lodging, special diet and transportation costs. The Workers’ Compensation Judge awarded him temporary disability prior to his enrollment at the clinic, the cost of the clinic, and his future participation in the program. Braewood sought reconsideration and challenged the award for past and future self-procured medical treatment. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board granted reconsideration of the judge’s failure to award temporary disability benefits during the time of his treatment at the clinic. After reconsideration, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board affirmed the judge’s award. On appeal, the employer contended that the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board erred in awarding reimbursement, temporary benefits and compensation for future treatment.

The Supreme Court of California affirmed the award of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board by holding that, although the employer had a right to direct applicant to a specific weight-reduction program135, such a right was lost as a result of employer’s failure to act by identifying and offering an alternative program, thus the applicant acquired the right to choose for himself which program to undertake, and that the right of reimbursement was part and parcel of his proper exercise of the right to choose.136 The evidence supported the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board’s conclusion of reasonableness of location 3,000 miles from applicant’s home, and thus the costs of attending were reimbursable. The applicant was entitled to the award of temporary disability for the period he participated in the program, and the recommendations of two physicians to lose weight were sufficient to support award for cost of future medical treatment.137

The last case, AMS Staff Leasing, Inc. v. Arreola138, involved an undocumented Mexican worker in Florida who was injured in January of 2005, when a vehicle struck him in the right leg as he was unloading trash from the back of a truck. He was hospitalized for a long period of time, and had twelve surgeries to repair the fracture. In August 2005, he was seen by an orthopedist in Dallas, who recommended additional surgery. Arreola never got the surgery in the US, as he returned to Mexico in November, and did not have legal documents to return to the US.

In February 2006, Arreola’s lawyer sent a letter to the counsel for the employer/carrier requesting authorization of one of three orthopedic doctors in Arreola’s hometown of Jalisco. The employer/carrier did not offer him any medical care in Mexico and refused to authorize any Mexican physicians to treat him. In March 2006, the claimant went to a hospital in Jalisco and was assigned to an orthopedic surgeon. The surgeon’s diagnosis was the same as the orthopedist in Dallas, and it was his opinion that Arreola’s chances to return to work were poor. Arreola filed a Petition for Benefits seeking authorization for continued medical care in Mexico and for costs and attorney’s fees. The employer/carrier defended the petition on the grounds there were no known orthopedic doctors in Mexico who qualified as a “physician” according to the workers’ compensation statutes.

The Judge of Compensation Claims entered an order directing the employer/carrier to provide written authorization to the orthopedic surgeon in Mexico to provide Arreola “with ongoing care that is reasonable, and medically necessary, and related to the industrial accident.” The judge also ordered the employer/carrier to pay for that care. In August 2006, the claimant filed another Petition of Benefits for Temporary Partial Disability (TPD) Benefits. He was awarded the benefits after a second hearing.

The employer/carrier challenged the two orders of the Judge for the TPD benefits and the continuing medical care in Mexico. The Court of Appeal ruled that state law did not preclude the foreign physician’s treatment of the claimant in Mexico. They stated that Florida workers’ compensation law contemplates coverage for non-citizens, and they cited an earlier case in which the court held that undocumented workers were entitled to workers’ compensation coverage in Florida139, and two later cases140 141 that held that “to construe the section 440.13(2)(a) in a manner that would limit authorized treatment for a claimant injured in Florida to a physician licensed in the State, or anywhere else in the US, would preclude workers (including illegal aliens) who return to their home country from receiving authorized remedial care for clearly compensable injuries.”

The Court of Appeal in the Arreola case also stated that Florida law indicates that an injured worker is not prohibited from moving from his pre-injury residence in the state, and receiving treatment outside of the state. As the claimant was no longer living in Florida, the court held that this case was different from the Decker v. City of West Palm Beach142, United Records & Tapes v. Deall143 144 and Layne-Western Co. v. Coxcases that the defendants cited, in that Arreola was already living in Mexico when he requested medical treatment. Therefore, the trial court did not err in directing the employer/carrier to authorize treatment by a Mexican physician, and the trial court’s decision was affirmed by the court.

Conclusion
Research into the legal barriers to implementing medical tourism into workers’ compensation found nothing of any real substance that would prevent workers’ compensation cases from benefiting from medical tourism. We have seen that there still remain several legal barriers to the implementation of medical tourism into workers’ compensation. Various federal and state laws need to be changed, and the issues of medical malpractice and liability laws, patient privacy and medical record laws and HIPAA, as well as ERISA and the impact of PPACA must all be addressed. But it is my opinion that these barriers can and will be overcome, especially in light of case law that has broken down some of those barriers already for foreign workers. The cost savings that can be achieved and the quality of care that matches, and even surpasses that found in the U.S., is sufficient reason why medical tourism should be implemented.

However, those opposed to implementing medical tourism into workers’ compensation would make the point that we cannot be certain of the quality of care and outcomes of medical procedures performed, especially in third world countries where the living conditions might not be ideal for recovery and healing. They may also add that the technology and skill level of the physicians are not on the same level as that found in the U.S. And finally they may be reluctant to spend money to fly a claimant and a companion to another country for what may seem to be a “medical vacation.”

Yet, the creation of the Joint Commission International to assess the quality of foreign hospitals has brought about a higher standard of care. There are more physicians trained in the U.S. or in the U.K. in many of the countries catering to medical tourists, utilizing the latest technology and medical training available, as well as many of them being board-certified in various medical specialties. The costs for three of the most common procedures in India, Thailand and Singapore includes the cost of airfare, hospital and hotel, and is considerably cheaper than having the injured worker treated in the U.S.

Legal Criticisms Of Medical Tourism And Workers’ Compensation
There will still be objections to implementing medical tourism from the defendant community, (i.e., employers and their insurance carriers); however, the courts in both of the cases presented here ruled against the defendants in those cases. The defendants argued on the grounds that the physicians treating the plaintiffs in Mexico were not licensed in the states where the cases occurred, or in any other U.S. state. The court in State Comp Ins. Fund denied the defendant’s petition to reconsider the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board award on the grounds that the definition of a physician did not exclude physicians licensed to practice in another country. The court in AMS Staff Leasing, Inc. ruled that state law did not preclude treatment by a foreign physician.

Defendants also stated that there were no known orthopedic doctors in Mexico who qualified as a “physician” as the term is used in the statutes. This argument about there not being any known orthopedic doctors is specious at best, given the fact that many doctors are being trained in the U.S. and are board-certified here as well.

It would appear that at least for the moment, the courts are willing to allow some measure of medical tourism in workers’ compensation. How future courts will decide is unclear, but there is at least some precedent for ruling in favor of medical tourism. Another way in which medical tourism will be implemented is if workers’ compensation carriers, realizing the benefits of medical tourism, push for it at the state and federal level. The evidence presented here has indicated that employers and insurance companies may not have a choice in the matter as the cost of health care rises and the process of reform taking place makes it obvious that the increased competition will offer medical tourism as a viable option to lower costs.

The globalization of health care will necessitate the removal of all barriers to providing the best care possible at the lowest cost. The cost savings that are being realized by medical tourism as a part of the health care industry can be just as beneficial in workers’ compensation. Therefore, medical tourism should be implemented into workers’ compensation and the legal barriers should be modified.

91 Williams, 641.

92 Longe, 14.

93 Boyle, 46.

94 Longe, 14.

95 Ibid, 14.

96 Ibid, 14.

97 Boyle, 46.

98 Williams, 643.

99 Ibid, 643.

100 Ibid, 643.

101 Ibid, 643.

102 Boyle, 46.

103 Ibid, 46.

104 Williams, 644.

105 Ibid, 644.

106 Ibid, 644-645.

107 Herrick, 19-20.

108 Terry, 441.

109 David Lazarus, “Outsourced UCSF Notes Highlight Privacy Risk: How one offshore worker sent tremor through medical system,” San Francisco Chronicle, (San Francisco, CA), March 28, 2004. Accessed from http://www.mindlully.org.

110 Terry, 441.

111 Leigh G. Turner, “Quality in health care and globalization of health services: accreditation and regulatory oversight of medical tourism companies,” International Journal for Quality in Health Care 2011, 23, 1 (2010): 4. doi:10.1093/intqhc/mzq078 accessed from http://www.hhs.gov.

114 Joseph Marlowe and Paul Sullivan, “Medical Tourism: The Ultimate Outsourcing,” Aon Consulting Forum, March, (2007), 4. Retrieved from https://infolinx.aon.com.

115 Williams, 612 and 650.

116 Christopher J. Brady, “Offshore Gambling: Medical Outsourcing Versus ERISA’s Fiduciary Duty Requirements,” Washington and Lee Law Review 64, no. 3 (2007): 1105.

117 Ibid, 1106.

118 Williams, 650.

119 Ibid, 650.

120 Ibid, 651.

121 Ibid, 651.

122 Brady, 1105.

123 Williams, 652.

124 Brady, 1106.

125 Ibid, 1106.

126 Corinne M. Karuppan and Muthu Karuppan, “Changing Trends in Health Care Tourism,” The Health Care Manager 29, no. 4 (2010): 351.

127 Brad Beauvais, Matt Brooks and Suzanne Woods, “Gazing through the Looking Glass … Analysis of the Impact of the US Health Care Reform Bill on the International Health & Business Landscape,” (paper presented at the Seventeenth Annual South Dakota International Business Conference, Rapid City, SD, October 1, 2010). 51.

128 Karuppan and Kauppan, 351.

129 Beauvais, et al., 61.

130 Karuppan and Karuppan, 357.

131 State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 69 Cal. App.3d 884 (1977).

132 CA Lab Code, § 3209.3.

133 CA Labor Code, § 4600.

134 Braewood Convalescence Hospital et al. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 34 Cal.3d 159 (1983).

135 Cal Civ. Prac. Workers’ Compensation, §2:29.

136 CA. Labor Code, §4600.

137 Braewood Convalescence Hospital et al. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 34 Cal.3d 159 (1983).

138 AMS Staff Leasing, Inc. v. Arreola, 976 So.2d 612 (2008).

139 Cenvill Dev. Corp. v. Candelo, 478 So.2d 1168 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

140 Safeharbor Employer Servs., Inc v. Velazquez, 860 So.2d 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

141 Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriquez, 421 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

142 Decker v. City of West Palm Beach, 379 So.2d 955 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).

143 United Records & Tapes v. Deall, 378 So.2d 99 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979.

144 Layne-Western Co. v. Cox, 497 So.2d 955 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

Workers' Compensation In California: No Longer Just Permanent And Stationary

Senate Bill 863 was passed on August 31, 2012 and signed into law by Governor Brown on September 1 for a January 1, 2013 effective date. This bill not only affects the workers’ compensation system in California but also has far reaching effects for employers under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). With lengthy delays for treatment and outcomes, the old system wasn’t working.

In this author’s opinion, the most significant issues that employers face with the changes in SB 863 are with the supplemental job displacement vouchers, increases in permanent disability, and the independent review process.

The bill increases permanent disability and an independent medical review process (IMR), which may be problematic for an employer because claims that are not causally related or where there is no injury accepted can have a significant impact on the employer. In fact, an independent medical review can only be requested by an injured worker following a denial, modification, or delay of a treatment request through the utilization review (UR) process. The catch is that employers and insurance carriers cannot request review of treatment authorizations.

There is a right to appeal an independent medical review determination to the trial level Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board on the basis of fraud, conflict of interest, or mistake of fact. The reviewer’s underlying medical decision-making, however, cannot be overturned by a judge. The remedy, if an appeal is granted, is a referral to a different reviewer for another evaluation. In short order, the employer is stuck with the decision. Please note that this does not apply if the injury is in question!

What does this mean in terms of federal law for California?

To best answer this question one must understand the basis of these federal laws. Numerous states have anti-discrimination laws which can differ from federal law but are designed to encompass the spirit of the federal laws. These laws are provided in addition to the federal law in order to offer more desirable avenues for victims of harassment and discrimination. California is one state that has enacted such laws.

For the purpose of SB 863, we need to explore the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. This law prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, physical or mental disability, medical or related medical condition, marital status or sexual orientation. The act applies to all employers, labor organizations, employment agencies and any other entity or person who engages in or compels an act of discrimination. It also allows for the imposition of punitive damages when a corporate defendant’s officers, directors or managing agents engage in harassment or discrimination. In fact, the definition of disability under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act is more broad than Federal law as something that “limits” a major activity where the federal law states that it must “substantially limit” a major activity.

The enactment of SB 863 will pose an important question for employers; “where does workers’ compensation end and discrimination start?” As of January 1, 2013, California employers need to have the answer to that question because newly added Labor Code Sec. 4658.7 addresses that problem and ties into SB 863.

Under the current system, injured workers may be offered supplemental job displacement vouchers that can be used to pay for job retraining. Currently, the vouchers range from $4,000 to $10,000 and the permanent disability award is often determined a long time after the last date of temporary disability payable, so the use of the vouchers has been low. The amount is based on the permanent disability rating for the injured worker and does not have to be paid until a final determination of the permanent disability rating has been determined.

For injuries after January 1, 2013, under SB 863 the voucher amount will be fixed at $6,000 for all qualifying injured workers, and it is to be offered when the injured worker reaches permanent and stationary status and the treating doctor reports on work abilities and limitations resulting from the injury.

With Labor Code 4658.7, the trigger for a voucher will be when an employer does not offer regular, modified or alternative work within 60 days of receipt of a P&S report finding that the injury has caused permanent partial disability. Under state and federal law, employers must provide “reasonable accommodations” for disabled workers. This obligation includes a requirement to engage in a good faith “interactive process,” in which the parties discuss the employee’s limitations and explore possible accommodations.

A good case in point is the $1,571,500 lesson learned in Cuiellette v. City of Los Angeles (California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, 4/22/11). The significant point from this case is that if an employee seeks reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, the employer must consider if the employee can perform the essential duties of the position sought, rather than those of his current or prior position.

The only way for an employer to level the playing field and avoid potential landmines is with objective baseline testing such as the Electrodiagnostic Functional Assessment Soft Tissue Management baseline program, which provides employers the data necessary to only accept claims that arise out of the course and scope of employment.