Tag Archives: policies

Zenefits’ Troubles Don’t Let Brokers Off

Zenefits is in trouble. Serious, existential trouble. Some community-based benefit brokers are watching the calamity at Zenefits unfold with a mixture of schadenfreude and relief. Given the scorn and ridicule Zenefits heaped on these brokers, taking pleasure from its misfortune is hard to resist. Feeling relief, however, misreads the situation and is dangerous to one’s career.

Zenefits’ Troubles 

Zenefits could go out of business, and several of its employees could be jailed as a result of the business practices reported by William Alden of BuzzFeed News and other journalists. While unlikely, this is a possibility because:

  • Zenefits created software enabling some California employees to lie to regulators concerning the time they spent on pre-licensing training. California law requires those applying for an insurance license to devote 52 hours to this curriculum. Zenefits employees signed a form, under penalty of perjury, that they had done so. Some may not have. Perjury is a felony in California, and conviction can result in as much as four years’ imprisonment. If Zenefits cheated in qualifying agents to sell in California, other regulators are no doubt looking into whether the company did this in their states, too.
  • If found guilty of violating consumer protection laws, state regulators could revoke Zenefits’ insurance licenses. Without the license, Zenefits could no longer sell new policies, and insurance companies would likely terminate, for cause, their Zenefits contracts. The insurers would then stop paying commissions to Zenefits even on previously sold policies. License revocation in one state could result in losing their licenses elsewhere. A cascade across the country of revoked licenses and terminated contracts could cost Zenefits tens of millions of dollars.
  • If Zenefits loses its licenses, commissions on current policies and ability to sell new ones, then some of its more recent investors may demand their money back. (Let me be clear: I am not accusing anyone at Zenefits of committing fraud or any other crimes. What follows is totally and only hypothetical and speculative.) In May 2015, Zenefits raised $500 million in a capital round led by Fidelity Investments and private equity firm TPG. If Zenefits management knowingly hid legal problems from them (and I’m not accusing anyone of doing so), then Fidelity and TPG could claim inducement by fraud, seek to rescind their contract and demand Zenefits return their investment. I’m not saying this happened or that investors were misled in any way. Nonetheless, I’d be surprised if Fidelity and TPG lawyers are not also speculating about this.

Zenefits’ worst case scenario, then, is that the company pays millions of dollars in fines, loses many millions more in revenue, sees employees jailed, can no longer sell insurance, irreparably damages its brand and must repay some investors.

Maintain Perspective

That’s a pretty scary worst-case scenario. Based on we know today, it is also highly unlikely to happen. No regulator has found Zenefits in violation of anything. Regulators are unlikely to impose the most severe penalties available to them if their investigations do not reveal consumer harm. The steps David Sacks, Zenefits’ new CEO, is taking will likely mitigate any penalties imposed on the company. Several employees, including former CEO Parker Conrad and sales VP Sam Blond have already left the company, and more may follow. Zenefits now has its first compliance officer. Mr. Sacks also seeks to change Zenefits values.

I’m skeptical, however, that Zenefits can or will quickly change its culture and core values. I respect Mr. Sacks’ intentions, experience and abilities. He deserves a chance to make his turnaround work. Yet changing a company’s culture usually takes considerable time, and Zenefits’ culture is deeply infused with the Silicon Valley ethos of speed, innovation, disruption and risk taking. To transform Zenefits requires a different world view. Yet in announcing Mr. Parker’s resignation, the company added three board members—all current investors with no domain expertise.

In fact, no current Zenefits board members or executives listed on the site appear to have any experience in running a human resources firm, payroll company or insurance agency—the services Zenefits delivers. What they share is deep experience in well-known tech companies. Zenefits may be a technology company, but that tech is supposed to accomplish something. Only in places like Silicon Valley would lack at the top of the company of this domain expertise be celebrated. Zenefits seems to exist in a Valley-sized bubble, and it’s tough to change what’s in a bubble from the inside.

The Real Lesson of Zenefits

Yet Zenefits is likely to survive. It reportedly has enough cash on hand and no need to seek more. The most probable outcome from the various investigations is that, absent findings of intentional and substantial criminal malfeasance, Zenefits will keep its licenses, carriers will continue paying commissions and investors will keep their money in the company.

We don’t yet know how Zenefits’ saga plays out. What we do know are some lessons this scandal teaches, especially to brokers:

Lesson one: Consumer protection laws matter. Violate them, and there’s a huge price to pay; as there should be.

Lesson two: Arrogance is unbecoming and unhealthy. Zenefits is a company whose leaders proclaimed that community-based brokers were dead meat, promised to drink brokers’ milkshakes, claimed brokers barely knew how to use email, described their profession as a dead beast lying in the desert and, well, you get the idea. The danger is that arrogance of this magnitude easily morphs into hubris. Zenefits’ hubris was the apparent belief that it could ignore rules if they get in the way of achieving the growth promised investors.

Lesson three: Even broken companies get some things right. Zenefits identified a latent customer demand. Clients want more from brokers than help with benefit plans. They want to focus on their businesses and not be distracted by HR and benefit administration. Zenefits success makes clear there’s a disadvantage to only selling and servicing insurance plans. Clients want more from their brokers. Even in the unlikely event Zenefits goes away, this client need will not.

Lesson four: There’s more where they came from. Zenefits’ demise would not mean the end of well-funded tech companies challenging community-based benefit brokers. If Zenefits falls to the wayside, others are ready to take its place using the same tactic of giving away software to employers in exchange for being named the employers’ broker of record on benefit policies.

Seeing a bully humbled is always fun, and there’s no harm in brokers enjoying the sight of Zenefits in disarray. Those brokers who believe Zenefits predicament means they no longer need to step up the services and value they deliver their clients, however, are making a costly mistake.

opt-out

Debunking ‘Opt-Out’ Myths (Part 6)

“Transparency” demonstrates whether a product or service has real value to society. It also promotes collaboration and process improvement. So, what does transparency mean, and how can the same standards be applied, in the context of workers’ compensation and the Texas and Oklahoma “options” to workers’ compensation? There are lessons all can learn on a path of progress.

Transparency in Workers’ Compensation

Transparency within the workers’ compensation industry has dramatically improved over the past 20 years, but some aspects remain translucent, at best.

From an insurance agent and employer perspective, workers’ compensation is too often viewed as a complex government mandate to be complied with in the easiest manner possible. Most employers do not have the wherewithal to affect significant claims, dissect an experience modifier or otherwise engage with workers’ compensation systems beyond the review of insurance quotes, the payment of premium and the initial filing of a claim. Who can blame them with so little information readily at hand?

For both employers and injured workers, most states provide little clear information on system rights and responsibilities. When was the last time you got on the Internet and reviewed all of an unfamiliar state’s workers’ compensation laws? Or attempted to find or build your own summary of benefits or claim procedures for an unfamiliar state workers’ compensation system? We go to the “For Employers” or “For Injured Workers” tab on the state system website but see only a high-level review of system benefit requirements and information on how to file a claim. But how is each form of benefit computed? When do they start and stop? What are the other exclusions and limitations on benefits? It is no wonder that employers and injured workers with concerns about their rights and responsibilities on a particular claim often engage legal counsel to navigate.

At a workers’ compensation regulatory level, a few states excel at providing meaningful information that is readily accessible. For example, the Texas Department of Insurance has a research and evaluation group that continually generates good information on system performance. But most states provide little (if any) data on actual workers’ compensation system performance. There is no universal standard or consistency in what scant workers’ compensation information on regulatory costs, injury claim costs, employee satisfaction or other outcomes is available from government agencies at no charge to the general public.

Many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) do great work to fill this information void. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI), Workers’ Compensation Research Institute (WCRI) and other high-quality organizations provide helpful summaries of legal differences between state systems, as well as insightful claim data analyses. This information can be very useful to legislators, regulators and large employers, as well as insurance company executives and claim adjusters. It is rarely accessed by small business to affect their cost of workers’ compensation or by injured workers to advance their claim.

The largest workers’ compensation NGO is the National Council on Compensation Insurance. NCCI privatizes the collection and analysis of claims and other statistical data for nearly 40 states and hundreds of insurance companies. NCCI tackles the enormous challenge of making sense of data flowing in disparate fields across different technology platforms, with a talented staff of more than 900 employees. In 2014, NCCI generated $152 million in net sales, with assets of $151 million and total equity of $42 million, for its insurance company members.

Most NCCI data is proprietary and only available at significant expense to member insurance companies and certain state regulators. Only high-level summaries are provided to the general public, and most of that information is macro-focused on premium rate setting and insurance company profitability.

State regulators use NCCI loss-cost projections to help set insurance premium rates. Projected loss-cost reductions are commonly viewed as a direct monetization of recent workers’ compensation law reforms. However, insurance companies are allowed to substantially deviate from those expectations when setting premiums for individual employer policies. Some insurance companies may reduce actual premium rates just enough to maintain credibility in view of recent reforms but maintain premium rates at the highest possible level for the benefit of their shareholders. Workers’ compensation is a highly risky business to underwrite, and shareholders reasonably expect profits. But we should understand that NCCI’s projected loss-cost reductions and premium rate projections may or may not translate to the lower costs employers have been told to expect from reforms.

Transparency in Options to Workers’ Compensation

In comparison to workers’ compensation systems, the option industry is relatively new and does not have a similar, robust infrastructure of NGOs to fill the information voids. But interest in and movement toward option programs is growing daily, and option proponents are committed to transparency.

The states of Texas and Oklahoma begin the process by maintaining employer coverage lists. Texas maintains a searchable database of employers that carry workers’ compensation insurance and a list of employers that do not. Coverage is entirely voluntary in Texas, and employers on this latter list have self-reported (and most likely sponsor) an injury benefit plan.  The Texas Department of Insurance indicates that 95% of all Texas workers have either workers’ compensation or injury benefit coverage. Employers on neither Texas list are out of compliance with current legal reporting requirements and may have no workers’ compensation or injury benefit coverage for employees. Those are the companies that truly fit the derisive term “opt-out,” which is unique to Texas. The Oklahoma model and what other states are considering is a more highly regulated “option” to workers’ compensation. For the state of Oklahoma, every employer must have workers’ compensation or be approved as a “qualified employer” (https://www.ok.gov/oid/workerscompreform.html) that sponsors a legally compliant injury benefit plan and satisfies financial security requirements.

From an insurance agent or employer perspective, insurance companies writing option policies have long insisted on a higher level of engagement than is common in workers’ compensation. Such agent and employer engagement requires transparency and understanding. Transparency is emphasized through simple requirements for active, pre- and post-injury communication between employers and employees, particularly on the need for immediate injury reporting, use of approved medical providers and following doctor’s orders. Safety program integrity is also commonly verified, particularly in the Texas Option environment, where both injury benefit and simple negligence liability exposures are insured.

Option injury benefit plan documents and claim procedures have been widely available in the public domain since the early 1990s. These benefit plans are the functional equivalent of a state workers’ compensation statute, describing the plan’s funding, benefit payment and administration processes.

Insurance companies have brought transparency to, exercise substantial control over and bring consistency across a large number of option programs by requiring most employers to use standardized injury benefit plan documents. In Texas and Oklahoma, option insurance companies freely distribute to independent agents their template plan documents and policy forms that vary because of competition on the breadth of coverage. Insurance agents then review these documents (often on a checklist), along with claim procedures and safety requirements with employers interested in implementing or renewing an option program. Employer implementation of the standardized program, including communication to all covered workers, is a condition of the insurance coverage. All injury claims must then be managed by the insurance company’s owned or contracted claims unit.  Only large employers are allowed more flexibility to unbundle claims administration and make pre-approved customizations to their benefit plan.

Hundreds of papers, articles, interviews and presentations that provide good information on options to workers’ compensation have been available over the past two decades. For example, http://www.partnersource.com/media/35242/partnersource_media_compilation_for_publication_1-21-2016.pdf. An abundance of information is available now, and this library is growing.

For injured workers, Option plans provide substantially greater transparency than workers’ compensation. Every employee covered by an option plan sponsored by a private employer must be provided a detailed summary plan description (SPD) in accordance with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. In plain language, the SPD must explain how the plan works, what benefits are available, how those benefits are provided, any exclusions and limitations applying to those benefits and the employee’s rights and obligations under the plan. A highlights section is commonly included at the front of the SPD.

The SPD must be provided within 90 days of an employee becoming covered by an option plan but is routinely provided at the time of hire. Any material change to the plan must also be communicated. All of this information must be provided to each employee in a hard copy or electronically in a manner that satisfies regulatory standards. Another copy of the SPD is also available at any time upon request. Interpretive assistance is required for non-English reading employees.

This transparency fosters employee appreciation for the program, as well as compliance with the accountability requirements found in option benefit plans. Open communication from employers promotes faster accident reporting, earlier medical diagnosis and treatment, a reduction in the number of disputes and less dependence on regulators and lawyers for basic information and claims support.

Every covered employee and beneficiary also has access to the official injury benefit plan document and their claims information. Employers that fail to provide requested information face monetary penalties. Plan participants can include information in and otherwise affect their claim file, and have access to state and federal courts for benefit disputes.

Though available to plan participants, publication of option benefit plans for review by the general public is not required by law. Oklahoma Option benefit plans were publicly available until the 2015 Oklahoma legislature decided to provide broad confidentiality of qualified employer application files in an effort to mirror the application file confidentiality of self-insured employers under workers’ compensation. The idea of establishing a public database of SPDs has also historically proven impractical. For decades, the federal government required employers to file a copy of the SPD for every employee benefit plan. That filing requirement was eliminated in 1997 because the government could not efficiently store the documents, such documents were rarely requested by the public and the related employer and taxpayer expense was deemed wasteful. Perhaps this subject should be revisited in the electronic age.

At a system performance level, most option employers are small companies, with owners relying on their independent insurance agent for periodic updates on their own program performance. But there are also thousands of other workers’ compensation industry professionals who understand and support option programs. Many sophisticated, Fortune 500 risk managers, who are very aware of their brand value and most important asset manage option programs that cover billions of dollars in payroll. Many “A”-rated insurance companies support the option insurance marketplace and write approximately $150 million in annual premiums. Employers, insurance companies and many nationally recognized third party administrators and brokers successfully support resolution of tens of thousands of option injury claims every year. And several nationally respected actuarial firms have confirmed option program success for their clients.

Self-interested opponents of option programs like to theorize about bad things that might happen under an option program, and falsely proclaim that option program savings only occur at the expense of injured workers. But what option industry professionals know from actual experience is that savings come from fewer employees being taken off work, faster return to work for employees who have been disabled and fewer disputes. This all speaks to better outcomes for injured workers and less cost-shifting to state or federal government programs. Those are the facts that truly deserve more transparency and study by policymakers. These facts are already reflected in many studies and reports recently summarized and released as Part 2 of a “Resource Guide” from the Association for Responsible Alternatives to Workers’ Compensation.

Data on tens of thousands of Texas option claims is now in the hands of many insurance companies, third-party administrators and others. For example, PartnerSource prepares statistically credible claim analyses for many individual employers annually and conducts biennial benchmarking studies of Texas option claims across six different industries, covering billions of payroll and hundreds of thousands of workers. These benchmarking studies include sub-industry segmentation and data on the types of benefits, dollar/duration/percentage limits and other injury benefit plan terms most commonly used among option employers, as well as the insurance types, limits and retention levels.

Consider this good-faith snapshot of Texas option industry aggregate data: [http://www.partnersource.com/media/34154/texas_option_data_review_for_publication_1-22-16.pdf]. Similar, expanded data reports, reviewed by independent actuaries, are expected in 2016.

Better-established processes within private industry for aggregating claims data and collective insurance premium price setting seen in the workers’ compensation environment are simply not present today and have not been urgently needed in the option environment. For example, employers that sponsor option programs have focused on the results of their own individual programs. Option insurance companies individually set their own premium rates in a competitive environment, unsupported by the exemptions to antitrust laws and other protections enjoyed by the workers’ compensation insurance industry. Unlike in days of old, insurance companies and individual employers are able to collect and analyze a significant volume of data from their own experience, as well as other publicly available information, to chart their own destiny – something some option opponents fear most.

Undoubtedly, more option industry aggregate data would be instructive and helpful to employers, insurance companies, legislators, regulators and other policymakers. But there is nothing nefarious in the lack of publicly available option data today, and option programs should not be held to a standard higher than workers’ compensation. All of the above-named NGOs that generate workers’ compensation system data have had decades to organize, refine, obtain many millions of dollars in funding for and publish industry aggregate and state-specific information. Data collection and reporting efforts in the option environment are in an early stage of development but can be expected to steadily advance.

This process of gaining additional option industry transparency must be about more than satisfying voyeuristic curiosity. We must also distinguish between what is needed “for the public good” and the self-interest of certain option opponents. Even with approximately 50,000 injuries occurring outside of the Texas and Oklahoma workers’ compensation systems every year, we’ve seen no credible evidence to indicate that workers’ compensation systems generally perform better than option programs in any respect, and option opponents remain unable to muster more than a few anecdotes about option claims that have gone awry. Perhaps this will change as more option claims data becomes publicly available, but it will require independent verification through access to workers’ compensation system data that should also become more publicly available.

Lastly, this process of gaining more option industry transparency must be about more than collecting data at unnecessary taxpayer expense for the sake of saying it has been collected. Note that substantial reporting of option program information has been reported to the state of Texas (on Forms DWC-5 and DWC-7) and the federal government (on Form 5500) at significant employer and taxpayer expense for decades but has not been used for any purpose. So, it should come as no surprise when employers, insurance companies and service providers are unable to support new data reporting mandates without a clear articulation of both the need and value, including regulatory commitment and funding to collect, sort, analyze and report such data.

The Texas Alliance of Nonsubscribers took a neutral position on bills that would have added new option program claims reporting requirements in the 2015 Texas Legislative Session. The alliance is actively working with the Texas Division of Workers’ Compensation to improve employer compliance with and the usefulness of current reporting requirements and to extend workers’ compensation or injury benefit plan coverage to more Texas workers.

Accepting the Call for Option Program Improvements and More Transparency 

Employers and industry supporters of options to workers’ compensation support more public disclosure of program terms, claims data and other information and are actively working to achieve it. For example, option program improvements will likely be seen in 2016 as both Texas and Oklahoma employers and insurance companies positively respond to the past year’s dialogue and claims experience by broadening injury benefits coverage for hundreds of thousands of injured workers. Option programs are able to respond to important needs much faster than hyper-regulated systems that only change after protracted legislative and rulemaking processes. New option legislation introduced in other states will also reflect significant enhancements over prior proposals.

Industry conferences are also responding to the need for more information on options to workers’ compensation. This topic has been featured at many professional and regulatory conferences in the past year, and more are scheduled in 2016. In view of widespread interest and the fact that option programs today cover more workers than 23 individual state workers’ compensation systems, these and other national workers’ compensation events should consider going beyond the one-hour session overview or debate. They can include an entire educational track that allows attendees to become truly knowledgeable about option program design, implementation, administration and regulatory requirements.

Investigations of options to workers ‘compensation by the National Conference of Insurance Legislators, International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions and the U.S. Department of Labor will also be welcomed.

More transparency and transformative change can result when option opponents and supporters simply sit down to work together. Whether discussing injury reporting requirements, compensability, medical expense coverage, financial security or other important public policy issues, civil dialogue matters. Those who are willing to have a reasoned discussion and information exchange will find ready partners on the current path of progress. Because sooner or later, all industries tend to change for the better, and we should be prepared to lead that change or adapt.

It’s Time to Rethink Flood Coverage

“The boat is safer anchored at the port; but that’s not the aim of boats.” — Paulo Coelho

The scenes are now all too familiar. Waters rising, dams breached, cars drifting away, homes and properties inundated with water. As of this writing, 13 people have died in the Carolinas as the “one in a 1,000 years” flood continues to ravage the area. Losses should easily exceed $1 billion.

If all of that was not bad enough, what’s worse is that you and I will be paying for this.

Unfortunately, the song remains the same after all these years:

  1. Property insurance policies exclude flood coverage
  2. Property owners either believe they have coverage or choose not to purchase it
  3. The biblical rains arrive, causing damage, and property owners seek help from the largest wallet available and willing to help…the U.S. government
  4. (Alternatively, and unfortunately, property owners may buy flood coverage, but, because the coverage was mispriced, the National Flood Program will not have the funds to pay the claims and will need to borrow from us taxpayers).

The system is a mess, and my criticism lies directly with the insurance industry. We can solve this problem. These floods are insurable events. We are flush with capital, and each week it seems another technology firm is releasing a flood model to help us manage this risk.

But that sound you hear is crickets. We are not making much progress at all.

The solution cannot be separate, private, flood coverage. That is a nice start but is not the solution, because it’s more of the same, just with a different wallet writing the check.

What we need is to “loosen the exclusion.” Flood needs to become a standard component in the homeowners policy. Just as fire, wind, lightning, theft, vandalism and liability are all standard components of a homeowners insurance package, flood needs to be included as that form of standard coverage.

The advantage to homeowners is true peace of mind.

  • Every homeowner has some ground water risk, and we can eliminate this coverage concern once and for all.
  • We can eliminate policy juggling, with one single policy.
  • A single claims adjuster can determine any losses without needing superhuman insights to know whether water or wind caused the damage.

The enterprising insurer gets to differentiate its personal lines business with a non-correlated premium source. The insurer eliminates the headache of defending flood exclusions and the bad publicity and court judgments around those issues.

Some insurers will be rightly concerned about the increased risks. But isn’t this the business we are in? It may feel safe to exclude coverage, but our role in society is not to exclude coverage. Our role is to find a way to profitably make our capital available for these type of events.

We have all the tools and capital we need to make this happen. Do we have the will?

Breaking Through The Barrier Of Hardnosed Workers, Part 4

Winning Them Over
In Part 3 of this series, safety officer Ken Malcolm talked about the importance of building trust between hardnosers and those who try to change them. To this, Malcolm adds respect.

“Give them [hardnosers] respect,” he says, “and problems go away. They might not like you, but when you handle people accordingly, someone is always watching, and that tough but fair method gets you respect.”

Trust and respect form the pivot point that directs difficult employees away from dysfunction, toward responsibility. Hardnosed workers will never trust or respect you more than when you demonstrate to them that you have their best interest at heart.

You do this when you create intentionally interpersonal safety training to meet the intensely interpersonal weaknesses of workers.

Intentionally Interpersonal Safety Training
Not all worker resistance is of the severe magnitude experienced by the desperate general manager described in Part 1. But to any manager who suddenly realizes that “good employees” in his organization are on the verge of spinning into the Cycle of Rejection (see Part 2), the situation can seem as serious.

Such was the panicky attitude of a global manufacturing company's operations excellence director when he realized that his plants' safety representatives, were, for no apparent reason, beginning to resist his carefully crafted 5-year safety excellence plan. Midway through the plan, he found that the ability of his safety representatives to engage employees — younger employees in particular — was less than he initially believed.

The harder he pushed them to engage employees, the more they resisted. Sound familiar? The interpersonal skills of his representatives required improving in a manner that did not risk further alienating them, so he called the author for help.

Since hazard recognition was the next focus of the 5-year plan, it was decided to integrate relational skill development into the safety representative's hazard recognition training program. An emphasis on reaching younger workers was included. One of the company's values, integrity, served as the drumbeat.

The human development goal was to help the representatives understand the difference between the preferred behavioral tendencies of older workers, such as themselves, and the preference of the plants' predominately younger workers. An easy four-part behavior profile was incorporated to help the participants understand the difference. From earlier articles in this series, you may recognize this goal as helping the hardnoser understand why people do what they do.

The safety management goal was to teach the representatives a simple 1-2-3 hazard recognition process that could be persuasively communicated to employees.

The resulting outline for the 8-hour training course delivered by this author is as follows.

Course Achieving Safety Integrity through Hazard Recognition
Length 8 hours
Format Live presentation; interactive workshop
Section 1 Hazard Recognition: A Matter Of Integrity
Participants are asked to think of hazard recognition as a matter of integrity, as a way of “doing the right thing.”
Section 2 Clearing the Value Path to Hazard Recognition
Participants learn about a “perfect storm” of negative social influences that hinder employee “buy-in” to hazard recognition. How to turn these negatives into positives is taught.
Section 3 Capitalizing On Communication Desires to Jump-Start Haz Rec
Participants learn a behavioral approach to hazard communication — capitalizing on the communication craving of Generations X and Y — in order to achieve employee engagement in hazard recognition.
Section 4 Making Haz Rec Work Simply
Participants learn a simple 3-step process for Haz Rec — observe, interpret, apply — that engages everyone in the routine practice of hazard recognition. A 3-question mechanism for gaining accountability is taught.
Section 5 Using Behavior Recognition Skills to Build Haz Rec Effectiveness
Participants learn the strengths and weaknesses of each behavior type so that they may better recognize how employees allow hazards development and loss to occur. Correcting unacceptable behaviors before an incident happens is taught.

Learning Objectives

  1. A review of the company value of integrity in relation to hazard recognition
  2. A simple effective 3-step method of hazard recognition
  3. A knowledge of the participant's own core behavior tendencies
  4. A method to accurately recognize (read) the behavior tendencies of others
  5. An understanding of how to 'sell' hazard recognition to others via persuasive communication skills targeted to the behavior tendencies of others
  6. A strategy for maximizing hazard recognition through the networking behavior of Gen X and Y

The effectiveness of the intentionally interpersonal approach to safety training was immediately evident in the participants' feedback. Hardnosed safety representatives are not easily fooled. Most have seen a dozen lackluster varieties of the “safety flavor” of the month.

“He left no stone unturned,” said one. Grasping the dual nature of the training, another said, “Not only did I learn about safety recognition but I also learned more about my own personality and the personality of coworkers.” [The course emphasized behavior, but the common use of “personality” is close enough.]

Still another of the 75 participants said, “It wasn't what I expected.” No, it isn't, which is the point. It met felt needs, unlike other safety training. Added the participant, “I liked the straight talk.”

Most telling is the participant who stated that she will “use these ideas at work and at home.” It is a reminder that the greatest needs are life skills. Another participant said that he would use the course material to “make personal changes.”

Intentional Results
Success is never guaranteed. But the intentionally interpersonal safety training advocated in this article has proved successful in every work environment from which the T-JTA data that defines a hardnosed worker was extracted.

In addition to improving the measures of traditional safety management — recordables, lost times, observations — several measures of human resource management effectiveness were improved, including personnel turnover rate, workers' compensation claim rate and various measures of employee engagement or attachment.

One large maritime company saved over $20 million during a 2-year period as the author and his colleagues worked with them to conduct a company-wide interpersonal safety training program.

An organization committed to breaking down the barrier presented by hardnosers may reap the unimaginable “better results” spoken about by John Bennett in Part 3. But to do so requires a shift in management perspective — from a reactive posture in which the hardnoser is viewed as an object to be conquered to a proactive policy of ministering to the hardnoser's needs.

Below is the story of one company that made this commitment. It's the company whose desperate general manager initially called the author in Part 1. Remember him? He is the one who thought that his supervisors were acting like troubled kids. And he was right. So was his inclination to react in the right way.

Enabling A Safe And Profitable Transition
One beneficiary of the blended safety training approach was Chotin Carriers, Inc., now a part of the Kirby Corporation. Kirby's impending buy-out of Chotin, a small company of 120 employees, only added to the human resource and safety management challenges faced by Chotin's general operations manager, Arnie Rothstein.

Chotin's overall personnel turnover rates for the years previous to the buy-out were respectively 47%, 40%, 44%, 35% and 41%. Rothstein conservatively estimated that each employee turnover cost Chotin a minimum of $4,300, or an average annual turnover cost of $349,760.

Starting in Chotin's buy-out year, the author administered a series of training programs that addressed both the safety need of Chotin and its human resource development challenges. The result was that Chotin's turnover rates dropped to 20.3% and 2% respectively over a two-year period, saving Chotin thousands of dollars in personnel turnover costs.

During the same period of time, Chotin's safety performance was also improved. The company's total injury index rate (per 200,000 man-hours) dropped from 8.0 to 4.32, a 46% reduction. With an estimated cost of over $30,000 per lost time back injury, special emphasis was placed on reducing lost time injuries. The result was a 64% reduction in Chotin's lost time injury frequency rate.

Better than these results to Rothstein was the sweet aroma of employee cooperation, evidenced by one of the company's reformed hardnosers, who said, “I've learned more from this training than I've learned in all the other training put together.”

Why Bother?
It is convenient to be like the skeptical Cleveland-area businessman in Part 3 who views everything in this presentation as silly “social work.” But the evidence presented here suggests that you can not pretend that a sub-culture of hardnosed workers does not exist.

Take it from an expert in destructive behaviors. If there is one thing that delights a hardnoser — that encourages his resistance — it is knowing that management will ignore him, allowing him to run amok. Such tolerance provides him with a complete sense of control. It justifies his retreat into emotional isolationism, disengagement, and dysfunction.

Ignorance by management is not bliss. There is a price to pay for such folly.

Massive amounts of money are spent on strategies that, at best, merely limit the ongoing damage done by change-resistant employees.

No amount of pre-employment screening can solve the problem. No human resource policy, employee management strategy, or performance evaluation criteria can deter it.

Nothing short of a purposeful, committed effort to provide hardnosers a path to healthy personal development will decrease their resistant nature. Safety is the open door to that end.

Bibliography

“Focus On Teamwork, Attitude Improves Quality And Safety.” The Waterways Journal. April 25, 1994: 41-44

Newton, Ron. No Jerks On The Job. Irving, TX. PenlandScott Publishers, 2010.

Riddle, Glenden P. An Evaluation Of The Effectiveness Of Stress Camping Through The Use Of The Taylor-Johnson Temperament Analysis Exam. Research Project. Dallas Theological Seminary, December 1978.

Taylor, Robert. Taylor-Johnson Temperament Analysis Manual. Thousand Oaks: Psychological Publications, Inc., 1992.