Tag Archives: npr

An Open Letter on the Oklahoma Option

I’m the founder and CEO of WorkersCompensationOptions.com (WCO), a company dedicated to workers’ compensation (WC) and its legal alternatives. This letter is intended to quell the concerns of employees in our client companies—employees who may have been distressed by the recent (mostly negative) publicity from ProPublica and NPR regarding options to WC in Texas and Oklahoma.

In case you only saw one installment from the Insult to Injury series, I’ll provide a quick summary. In 2014, the project’s authors started to assimilate massive amounts of data from their research concerning each state’s (and the federal government’s) WC system. In March 2015, the authors began releasing articles with an indisputable premise: Collectively, these systems need improvement.

That commendable beginning eventually gave way, however, to a hypothesis that is supported neither by reality nor by the overwhelming quantity of data the authors provide. Their conclusion (that employers are in cahoots with insurers to pressure attorneys, anonymous doctors and legislators into discarding the lives of an unfortunate few for the sake of bolstering corporate profits) completely misses the mark in pinpointing why so many WC systems are broken beyond repair. In fact, attorneys and doctors put at least as much pressure on WC systems as insurers, and any attempt to depict the medical and legal communities as innocent bystanders in the WC feud is simply too naive to be taken seriously.[1] I do not doubt the authors’ sincerity in addressing a serious societal problem, but I also do not believe they are equipped to understand the problem they sought—however earnestly—to demystify for their readers. Worse yet, I fear they have positioned themselves in the WC space in a manner that is only likely to retard the implementation of practical solutions.

This letter is prompted by the article on Oct. 14, 2015, which painted an inaccurate—even an irresponsible—picture of both Texas nonsubscription (TXNS) and the Oklahoma option (OKO). As that article’s title (“Inside Corporate America’s Campaign to Ditch Workers’ Comp”) is lengthy, I’ll shorten it to CDWC going forward.

Texas Nonsubscribing Employees: What Can We Learn?

Texas is exceptional in the WC world because it has, for more than a century, offered employers a viable alternative to WC. Of approximately 380,000 employers in Texas, roughly two-thirds subscribe to a traditional WC system; the other third are nonsubscribers who develop their own models. That’s about 120,000 different systems, and there is plenty to be learned. We’ve seen various organically grown components develop from these disparate systems, many of which superficially resemble WC. Despite those similarities, however, industry experts understand how counterproductive it is to make unilateral comparisons between TXNS and WC.

The authors of CDWC didn’t get that memo.

Of all the various lessons learned from diverse TXNS models, one runs counter to conventional WC dogma: Employers can protect themselves while delivering superior care for employees at a fraction of the cost of WC. Eliminating the inflated costs associated with abusive practices that run rampant in WC is a critical component of that particular lesson.

Because the CDWC authors insist on judging TXNS through the lens of WC, TXNS looks to them like a system that would appeal to skinflint employers who simply do not care whether their employees get hurt. However, because employees of nonsubscribing companies can sue their employers for tort, the decision to opt out of WC is likely to be penny-wise and pound-foolish for employers who do not take measures to ensure the safety of employees. The CDWC authors’ failure to unpack the importance of tort negligence means many readers will come away from the article without understanding that a typical $50,000 payout in WC could easily be either $0 or $5 million in TXNS—depending on who is at fault for the accident. Even more disappointing is CDWC’s attempt, in a one-sentence paragraph, to gloss over one of WC’s most dangerous shortcomings: the extent to which the no-fault arrangement between employers and employees has removed incentives for safety in the workplace throughout the country.

If you are an employee of one of our Texas nonsubscribers, rest assured that your employer has every reason to minimize workplace accidents and to take very good care of you if an occupational injury occurs.

In a nutshell, your interests are aligned with your employer’s—another critical lesson we’ve learned from TXNS.

Oklahoma Option Employees: A Whack-a-Mole WC System Led You Here

ProPublica and NPR harp on a consistent theme throughout the Insult to Injury series: WC is broken. We at WCO agree, and Oklahoma may provide the single best example of how and why a state’s WC system becomes unsustainable.

The WC ecosystem is made up of five major communities: insurance, medical, legal, employer and employee. Abuse within the system by any of these communities leads to adjustments to the boundaries of the system. Throughout the Insult to Injury series, the authors go out of their way to sidestep the discussion of systemic abuse. They even attempt to dismiss fraud by citing a study that minimizes its role. Abuse and fraud in WC are, in some ways, analogous to speeding on the highway: Almost all drivers abuse the speed limit, but very few are issued citations. Similarly, the cases of clear-cut fraud in WC only reflect a small portion of the amount of abuse going on. But even if we allow the authors to exclude all instances of clear-cut fraud from the WC conversation, we are still left with rampant abuse driven by insidious systemic incentives.

For decades, abuses and inefficiencies within the WC system have led to each of the five communities touting the need for major reforms—at the others’ expense. Real reform threatens each community, which leads to stalemates in negotiations. Major upheaval has been avoided via the compromise of pushing and pulling the system’s boundaries, resulting in a decades-long game of whack-a-mole being played across the nation. If one voice cries, “Data shows an alarming trend in opioid abuse,” that mole gets swatted by requiring more medical credentials for prescribing pain killers. When another shrieks, “Overutilization is surging,” that mole is whacked through costly and time-consuming independent medical examinations. When someone else observes, “Our disability payouts are higher than neighboring jurisdictions,” that mole prompts us to lower disability payouts. Immediately, a fourth voice shouts, “Pharmaceutical abuses make up 8.4% of total costs,” and that mole persuades us to introduce drug formularies. But there isn’t even a moment of silence before another voice remarks, “Our analysis shows dismemberment payouts in this jurisdiction are lower than those of our neighboring jurisdiction.” That mole gets whacked by proposing legislation to increase dismemberment payouts—legislation that is dead on arrival.[2] At some point, we have to realize the moles are multiplying faster than we can whack them. (If my commentary doesn’t apply to other jurisdictions, I’m happy to restrict it to Oklahoma and Texas because writers can best serve their readers by acknowledging the limitations of their own expertise.)

Even if we concede that the changes detailed in the paragraph above aren’t necessarily bad (which I’m not conceding; I’m just trying to be polite and move the argument along), they demonstrate a persistent pattern of outcomes, inclusive of abuse, inherent in any hierarchical bureaucratic system. Regulators are busy reacting to entrenched abuses while market participants find new and exciting ways to game the system. This futile game of whack-a-mole is endless.

The Sooner State had a front row seat to witness what TXNS accomplished—both the good and the bad.[3] With that first-hand knowledge, the Oklahoma legislature has finally provided the state—and the country—with an opportunity to see whether real change can restore function to a malfunctioning system. While WC stakeholders assure us they are only a few more whacks-at-the-mole away from making WC hum, Oklahoma lawmakers have written a new chapter in the history of workplace accident legislation. The OKO is neither WC nor TXNS.

The brilliance of the OKO is that it doesn’t attempt to overhaul a broken WC system. The legislators effectively stepped away from that decades-old stalemate. Instead of an all-out overthrow, they left WC in place and created an option for employers who were willing to try something new—which is exactly how WC itself was introduced a century ago.

Because the OKO is substantially modeled on TXNS, it is easy to see why the CDWC writers conflated the two in their analysis. The errors in CDWC concerning ERISA’s applicability, employee benefits and appeals committee processes in Oklahoma are all presumably honest mistakes made by writers who, in their zeal to distinguish TXNS and the OKO from WC, failed to distinguish TXNS and the OKO from each other.

Nevertheless, it’s important for employees to understand that TXNS varies dramatically from one employer to another, and many of the rules concerning TXNS do not apply north of the Red River.

Although the CDWC authors misleadingly couple TXNS and the OKO with respect to ERISA’s applicability, ERISA plays no direct role in occupational accidents in the OKO.[4] We’ll be happy to get you a legal opinion on that, but for our purposes regarding CDWC, take my non-legal opinion as on the record. If others disagree, they should go on the record, as well. While ERISA has served employers and employees well in TXNS, its role in the OKO is only implied (if that). We are free to use it where we wish, as long as we are compliant at the state level.

Presumably tied to their ERISA misapplication, the CDWC authors assert that “benefits under opt-out plans are subject to income and payroll taxes.” Such tax advice is unusual from investigative journalists without citation, and I have asked the authors to share their source. Although the jury is still out on this tax issue, it is a point the CDWC authors must distort to substantiate their otherwise baffling claim that the workplace accident plans of OKO employers “almost universally have lower benefits.”[5] If any OKO plans really do offer benefits that aren’t at least as good as those provided by WC, they’re illegal. That’s how the legislators have written the law, and it’s what they’re dedicated to achieving for workers, regardless of obfuscations invoking TXNS, ERISA and unresolved tax implications.

The authors of CDWC also completely misrepresent appeals committees for at least a majority of OKO employers. The authors overlook a dramatic improvement to employee protection that the OKO makes to TXNS when they claim that appeals committees in Oklahoma work analogously to appeals committees in Texas: “Workers must accept whatever is offered or lose all benefits. If they wish to appeal, they can—to a committee set up by their employers.” That’s dead wrong. Executives at each of our OKO employers are fully aware that, in case of an employee appeal, the employer has nothing to do with the selection of the appeals committee panel members or the work they complete. The process is independent from the employer and extremely fair.[6] The CDWC authors would do well to read Section 211 of the law more carefully.

On the subject of benefit denials, I’ll share a single data point from our OKO book: To date, we have denied exactly one claim. This is a nascent system, so we must be very careful in drawing actuarial conclusions. Still, our company has led more employers from traditional WC into the new OKO than any other retailer, so we have a bit of credibility to offer on this subject. The point of the system isn’t to deny benefits to deserving employees but to ensure benefits are delivered more efficiently. The system is working.

The CDWC authors only provide one OKO case study, Rachel Jenkins. Strangely, they lump Jenkins in with four TXNS case studies. The Jenkins case is still being tried. We will withhold opinions—as we hope others would—until a more appropriate time.

As a reminder, while the OKO law is stronger today than ever, if it were to be deemed unconstitutional by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, we would have 90 days to get everyone back into traditional WC (per Section 213.B.4.).

Next: Vigilance and Diligence

My comments are mine and mine alone. I do not speak for any associations or lobbyists. I have no interest in debating those who inexplicably assume that any alternatives proposed to a failing system must stem from sinister motives. However, I encourage anyone (from prospective clients to employees of existing clients) with questions or concerns to call me.

Another option for learning more is to click here and watch a formal debate regarding the OKO. This footage was shot in September 2015. It features Michael Clingman arguing against the OKO while I, predictably, argue for it. One thing you can’t miss in that video is my desire to oust most attorneys from the scene. To help explain, I’ll adapt a quotation from John F. Kennedy (who was discussing taxation) to my own area of concern (the well-being of employees): “In short, it is a paradoxical truth that employee outcomes from increased WC protections are worse today, while economic results suffer, and the soundest way to create higher and better standards of living for employees is to eliminate these abused protections.” For philosopher kings, the theory of the OKO may not sound as good as the theory of WC, but when it comes to practical realities the results demand everyone’s attention.

To summarize my primary criticism of Insult to Injury, it simply hasn’t done enough. The story it tells is insufficient and smacks of partisanship and ideology, two biases that ProPublica’s journalists allegedly avoid. WC is substantially more complex than a corporation-out-to-exploit-its-workforce short story. Ignoring abuse in each of the communities in a five-sided WC debate demonstrates a lack of journalistic impartiality and a stunning deficiency of perception. Moreover, to my knowledge, ProPublica hasn’t crafted any relevant suggestions for legislation, simply leaving its readers with the vague and implicit notion that federal oversight is needed. If that is the goal of Insult to Injury—to provide one-sided, emotional yarns alongside a treasure trove of data, hoping it will all spur some federally elected officials to create real change at long last—then I suspect ProPublica will still be holding this subject up to the light of opprobrium upon the retirement of each of the series’ authors.

We do not aspire to win over the authors or even their followers. We will focus our energies each day on providing the best workplace accident programs for employers and employees alike. Our results should speak for themselves.

Finally, I am not an attorney, and nothing in this letter should be taken as legal advice.

Sincere regards,

Daryl Davis

Footnotes:

[1] With medical providers, overutilization is always a concern. Click here and watch the video from the 12-minute to the 15-minute mark for a detailed description of rampant WC abuse by surgeons who provide unnecessary and damaging back procedures. If the workers weren’t disabled prior to the surgeries, many were afterward. As for the legal community, simply view slide 73 of the NCCI’s 2013 Oklahoma Advisory Forum. WC disability payments, which is where attorneys get their cut, were 38% higher in Oklahoma than in neighboring states—not because jobs are 38% more dangerous in Oklahoma than in Kansas or Texas but because Oklahoma attorneys are 38% more effective at gaming the state’s WC system.

[2] Alabama SB 330—which was prompted by Insult to Injurynever got out of conference. From what I could gather, lengthy negotiations between several different interest groups led nowhere, with the Alabama Medical Association at the center of this particular stalemate. Not surprisingly, the two special sessions called by Alabama Gov. Bentley in 2015 were strictly focused on the state’s budgetary crisis; this bill was never discussed.

[3] The final Texas case study offered in CDWC deals with Billy Walker, who fell to his death while on the job. The upside to TXNS is his estate’s common law right to pursue a tort lawsuit against his employer. The employer could have been ordered to pay Walker’s estate a settlement in the millions, but the employer filed bankruptcy before any such judgment could be awarded, which is plainly an unacceptable outcome. This demonstrates a lack of surety—the single biggest problem in TXNS. OKO addresses this issue in various ways, most notably in Section 205 of Title 85A, which guarantees surety for injured workers.

[4] For the non-occupational components of your OKO program, ERISA does apply.

[5] Per Section 203.B. of the statute, compliant plans “shall provide for payment of the same forms of benefits included in the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act for temporary total disability; temporary partial disability; permanent partial disability; vocational rehabilitation; permanent total disability; disfigurement; amputation or permanent total loss of use of a scheduled member; death; and medical benefits as a result of an occupational injury, on a no-fault basis, with the same statute of limitations, and with dollar, percentage and duration limits that are at least equal to or greater than the dollar, percentage and duration limits contained in Sections 45, 46 and 47 of this act.” (Emphasis mine.)

[6] Details of OKO appeals committee procedures are generally misunderstood—for now—by plaintiffs’ attorneys (and, apparently, investigative journalists). Attorneys frequently assume that, because the employer foots the bill, the employer controls the process. For a peek at how the appeals committee process really works for a majority of OKO employers, those curious should watch this video.

Texas Is NOT an Opt-Out State

There were two sessions on “Opt Out” at the 32nd WCRI Annual Issues & Research Conference, but a single, critical point was generally omitted by all six speakers across both sessions; an omission that could cause confusion for those not well-versed in the vernacular of alternative workers’ compensation systems.

Texas is not an Opt Out state. It never has been. No one may “opt out” in Texas. Period.

Instead, Texas is, and always has been, an “Opt In” state. Workers’ compensation coverage is not required of employers there. They can choose to buy insurance, or not. They can choose to set up alternative plans, or not. Either way, they can “opt” for some sort of coverage or go completely bare; they don’t have to have a policy, a plan or a prayer.

Those that do not acquire coverage or self-insure under state auspices are called “non-subscribers,” on the surface, the distinction about Opt Out vs. Opt In may seem like a shallow and insignificant point. But the differences in the Texas and Oklahoma systems run deep, and the speakers should have pointed that out.

Instead, I believe some intentionally conflate the two for the benefit of their arguments.

Most notably, for employers in Texas who choose not to opt in for workers’ compensation coverage, open liability prominently remains. They can be sued for negligence. They can be found responsible for pain and suffering. They are wide open to all of the foibles and pitfalls generally absent for those who choose to participate in the grand bargain and the exclusive remedy it provides.

By comparison, employers in Oklahoma have managed to develop a system that gives them unparalleled secrecy and control while maintaining the benefits of exclusive remedy. They have liability protections that Texas employers can only dream about.

Common sense would tell us that any alternative plans in Texas are probably better than those found to their north in Oklahoma. The looming reality of open liability means that employers actually have to be responsible if they wish to avoid litigious challenges and expensive jury verdicts. Yet people continually speak of “Opt Out” as if it was one common theme in both states. Our session speakers are not the only ones to do that. Recent articles in ProPublica and NPR also failed to adequately define the difference between the two.

See Also: The Bizarre Decision on Oklahoma Option

Bill Minick, a Dallas attorney whose firm has written most of the Oklahoma Option plans, mentioned the more than “20 years of history” when talking about the “proven” success of Opt Out. He did not really mention that the 20 years he repeatedly referred to was all based in Texas. Oklahoma has only offered the Option for two years, and only 60 of the state’s 70,000 employers have gone that route. Similarly, presenter Elizabeth Bailey of Waffle House, spoke only of their experience in Texas as a non-subscriber. To her credit, she was the only speaker to deliver hard statistics about the experience in that area, but she made no mention of the Oklahoma Option except to note that they had elected not to Opt Out in Oklahoma. She did not say why.

And I really would’ve liked to know.

Really, none of the speakers made an effort to define the difference between these two systems. To the uninitiated, it would seem they are the same thing. They are not. Oklahoma-style Opt Out is what is being proposed in at least two other states, not Texas-style non-subscription. Future sessions on the subject should clarify that point, focus on actual Opt Out and call out presenters if they dilute or confuse the facts.

Additionally, only one speaker, Trey Gillespie of Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, really mentioned that the Oklahoma Option has been ruled unconstitutional in that state. From an overall panel perspective, that fact was almost a non-event, like it never even happened. But more on that later…

See Also: Five Workers’ Compensation Myths

The point is, the Texas non-subscriber system has been around for a long time. The Oklahoma Option, by Minick’s own admission, is an “experiment” (one commenter at the conference pointed out that Frankenstein’s monster was also an experiment). We should not confuse the two. Oklahoma Opt Out, along with proposed similar plans in Tennessee and South Carolina, are unique creatures that deserve to be fully judged on their own scant merits and significant flaws. We should stop providing them cover by supporting them with the alleged achievements of a dissimilar system.

After all, Texas has never been an Opt Out state, and we should stop talking about it like it is.

Key Misunderstanding on Oklahoma Option

Most critics and supporters of the Oklahoma option (OKO) have one thing in common: a misunderstanding about the applicability of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). In part, this misunderstanding is widespread because it hasn’t yet garnered the attention of tax authorities and attorneys, and those of us who aren’t tax attorneys are reluctant to engage this subject because we fear we will be misinterpreted as giving tax advice.

Let me be absolutely clear—nothing in this article should be construed as tax advice, as I am not qualified to offer such advice.

But the ProPublica and NPR journalists who assume ERISA must govern the taxation of OKO benefits simply because it governs the taxation of Texas nonsubscription (TXNS) benefits[1] aren’t qualified, either.

Put simply, ERISA’s governance of OKO workplace injury claims has yet to be demonstrated in any way, and it was certainly not confirmed by rulings in 2015 by two federal judges for the Western District of Oklahoma who considered the jurisdiction of federal courts over OKO-based claims and appeals processes..

There was never any intent in the Oklahoma legislation to have ERISA govern the OKO, and the term “ERISA” never appears—not once!—in the language of the Oklahoma law. Even more importantly, two-and-a-half years after passage, there is zero case law to support any claim that ERISA applies to OKO.

These revelations may be counterintuitive for industry insiders and regulators, but what should be intuitive is that state and federal court systems are in charge of ruling on state and federal laws. Consultants, employers, employees, investigative journalists, insurance carriers, brokers, attorneys, ivory tower experts, doctors and conference debaters don’t get to make such calls. The only ones whose opinions matter are the judges in a position to make these determinations, and the only two judges known to have had the opportunity to consider any issue concerning the relationship between the OKO and ERISA concluded that the judges did not have jurisdiction over cases where the employer sought to have ERISA govern employee appeals of decisions regarding occupational OKO claims.

In April 2015, Judge Joe Heaton of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma issued an order regarding ERISA’s applicability to the occupational accident components of OKO plans in the case of Cavazos v. Harrah Nursing Center (aka Marsh Pointe) that, in part, reads:

“Marsh Pointe alleges … that, pursuant to the Oklahoma [Employee] Injury Benefit Act, it has elected to be exempt from the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act and become a ‘qualified employer’ by meeting certain requirements including the adoption of a written benefit plan. That well may be. Nonetheless, the case [filed by the plaintiff] arose ‘under the workmen’s compensation laws’ of the State of Oklahoma. As such, it may not be removed to any district court of the United States.”

Judge Heaton’s ruling was a narrow one, aimed only at determining whether the federal court could exercise jurisdiction over the case before it. That case had been removed by the employer to federal court from the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Commission (OWCC), based on the assertion that ERISA ought to govern the employee’s pursuit of a claim against her employer’s OKO plan. The court held that, regardless of whether ERISA applied to certain aspects of the OKO plan, the employee’s claim arose under Oklahoma’s WC laws and, therefore, a specific federal jurisdictional statute (28 USC §1445(c)) prevented removal of the case to federal court. Judge Heaton sent the matter back to the OWCC, and his order made it crystal clear that such cases cannot be removed to the federal court system.[2] In other words, ERISA (a federal law) does not give federal courts jurisdiction over the occupational accident claims of employees whose injury benefit plans are governed by the OKO (a state law)—no matter how frequently ERISA is referred to in an employer’s benefit plan and regardless of whether ERISA applies to other aspects of that benefit plan.

The Cavazos case was the first real opportunity we had to see whether removal of such claims to the federal courts was possible. Then, in September, Judge Stephen Friot (from the same Western District Court of Oklahoma) followed Heaton’s logic in Vasquez v. Dillards, our second opportunity to see whether federal court involvement in the OKO claims process was available. The decision read:

“The court concludes that the [Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act] is part of Oklahoma’s statutory scheme governing occupational injuries and workplace liability; in other words, the OEIBA is part of Oklahoma’s statutory scheme governing workmen’s compensation.”

The case before Judge Friot was a bit different procedurally, but it came to the same result. In the Vasquez case, the employee received an adverse decision from her employer regarding her claim for benefits under the employer’s OKO plan. She then sought review by the OWCC as provided for in the Oklahoma statute. The employer removed the case to federal court, contending that the company’s plan was governed by ERISA and, therefore, that ERISA pre-empted state law on the issue and that the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction. The employee moved to remand the case to the OWCC. Judge Friot sided with the employee and remanded the case, which was to be expected post-Cavazos. The ruling in Vasquez (which features a more detailed discussion than the one provided by Judge Heaton in Cavazos) concludes that 28 USC §1445(c) (the same jurisdictional statute relied upon by Judge Heaton) barred removal of the case to the federal court, even if, as Judge Friot specifically presumed for purposes of his ruling, the “plan under which [the employee files] claims may be … an ERISA plan.”

The explicit—and antiquated—language from the 1974 ERISA law indicates that ERISA doesn’t apply to “workmen’s compensation.” ERISA’s authors recognized a long tradition of federal deference to individual states on workers’ compensation issues. While the OKO is different from traditional workers’ compensation, in the only cases known to address the issue thus far, the federal court system has concluded that it cannot exercise jurisdiction over the on-the-job injury claims of OKO employees.

Die-hard ERISA champions, as it turns out, can cling just as stubbornly to obsolete ideas as can workers’ compensation stakeholders. But OKO supporters don’t need to win such folks over; the law is already on the side of progress. The OKO clearly seeks to stand on its own, and it doesn’t want ERISA as a crutch. Being free from ERISA has advantages beyond tax implications. The OKO clearly sits much closer to traditional workers’ compensation than does TXNS—and, as such, OKO may be regularly accepted as a replacement in the state’s important oil and gas industry. In both Texas and Oklahoma, the larger energy companies almost always require traditional workers’ comp to be held by contracted companies. That won’t change in Texas, but it very well could in Oklahoma. Moreover, these federal court orders should provide solace to the Sooner State because they suggest the oversight and development of this new creation will be the responsibility of Oklahomans.[3]

[1] See “Inside Corporate America’s Campaign to Ditch Workers’ Comp,” an installment in the Insult to Injury series.

[2] The court remanded the case just two days after it was removed without seeking briefs from either party.

[3] To date, all three branches of the Oklahoma state government have actively or tacitly supported the OKO. At worst, the state has adopted a wait-and-see approach to this new alternative. At best, Oklahomans—sans attorneys—are eager to discover whether the incredibly promising early gains made possible through the OKO are sustainable over the long term.

At WorkersCompensationOptions.com, we’re convinced the gains are sustainable. There’s nothing theoretical about our promise of delivering superior care to employees at reduced costs to employers. We’re already doing it in Oklahoma, and we at WCO are proud to be part of this long overdue transformation.

Healthcare Reforms Aren’t Sustainable

A recent NPR program celebrated the success of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The benchmark was that many really sick people finally had coverage and that many poor people were now obtaining coverage because of subsidies or because of the expansion of Medicaid. If measured by participation, the healthcare reform under ACA is a success, with more growth anticipated.

Unfortunately, the long-term benchmark must be sustainability and outcomes, not participation. Government programs are often popular in the short term but not sustainable in the long term. The National Flood Insurance Program, Medicare, Medicaid, the VA, etc. will ultimately have to be “adjusted” because 100% of the taxpayers are funding these systems and a very much smaller percentage of us use them.

At some point, the non-users scream “enough already.” “Other people’s money” always runs out, and the $2.6 trillion-plus spent on healthcare is not evenly divided. 47% is spent on the sickest 5% of the population, and just 3% is spent on the healthiest 50% of Americans, according to “Healing a Broken Healthcare System,” from the Louisiana Healthcare Education Coalition. Half of the people are hardly benefiting from the money they contribute under healthcare reform.

Our systems of healthcare and healthcare financing cannot be sustained as they are trending. Yesterday’s system was not sustainable; neither is today’s ACA. The marketplace must innovate. More government and more taxes are not the answer.

Obesity and diabetes are running rampant, and too many folks (especially young people) are living a sedentary lifestyle. This lifestyle adds to the “diseased population” and the future problems and costs.

Personal and family responsibility are a necessity. Nutrition (diet) and activities (exercise) are a start. Addressing the individual in all her elements — mind, body and spirit — is a must. Answers to this crisis are inside of us as individuals and populations — not just at the doctor’s office.

Providers and institutions delivering care must leverage technology for efficiency of operations and efficacy of results. Increased availability and utilization of naturopathic physicians, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, health coaches, nutritionists, counselors and tele-medicine will ensure increased patient engagement and ultimately satisfaction and enhanced results.

Preventive medicine for all and “bringing” care and prevention to populations who can’t get to the marketplace available to most will improve lives and reduce costs. We need fewer dollars to be spent on prescriptions and invasive surgeries. It’s okay for providers and payers to just say no to demands that are not in the consumer’s best interest — regardless of what the TV commercial suggests.

Genomics, improved diagnostics to ensure earlier interventions, a focus on extending life (versus delaying death), integrated/holistic care, marrying technology and touch and technology, natural medicine and other changes are in the works now.

Other hopes rest in vascular therapy, tailored and embraced wellness plans, systems that can intervene with populations in need during crises and tailored and personalized process management for chronically ill mental health patients. Accountable care, outcome-based payment mechanisms, new models of care and care delivery and consumer engagement (personal avatars facilitating our own motivation allowing us to design our own “road to well”) are solutions now or yet to be introduced in the market of tomorrow. These are our future. Marcus Welby, M.D., is dead, but the healing and caring he delivered can live on.

This article was written in August. Last week, I received proof of the concepts. A friend received his renewal for his ACA policy. Coverage was reduced from a 70/30 co-pay (insurer pays 70%,) to a 60/40 plan, yet his premiums increased 31%. This is just the beginning — it will get worse. When you insure a majority of sick people and you subsidize many of their premiums, you will get participation. When relatively healthy and unsubsidized policyholders receive prohibitive rate increases, they will discontinue coverage, and the insured pool suffers adverse selection. Did I mention that the situation will get worse?

Whistleblower: Fed Defers to Big Banks

“This American Life” teamed up with ProPublica for a blockbuster story that Federal Reserve regulators defer to mega bank Goldman Sachs on compliance issues. Thanks to whistleblower Carmen Segarra, the report about the culture at the Fed was so explosive that Sen. Elizabeth Warren called for an investigation within 24 hours.

The whole mechanics of the story highlight the problems with our current system. But for a whistleblower coming forward, no one would likely learn of the big bank’s conduct or of regulators’ deference to it. Once she provided authentic, unimpeachable audio, a compelling broadcast led a legislator to call for an investigation, but any probe may or may not yield  findings of  wrongdoing. The main result seems likely to be publicity for lawmakers, regulators and bankers. All pretty much par for the course, underscoring the concern I expressed in an earlier piece that a lack of control by the Fed could leave banks and markets in the same sort of condition that led to disaster in 2008.

These issues are consequential for insurers not least because the industry holds $120 billion in mortgage-backed securities for commercial and multifamily real estate,  $336 billion in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBSs) and asset-backed securities (ABSs) and $365 billion in residential mortgage-backed securities, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association and Federal Reserve. The insurance industry relies on these investments for significant portions of its operating profits, so it needs a safe and efficient financial system.

A solution is at hand. “Interactive finance” addresses the insurance industry’s transparency needs with large banks by powering real-time monitoring and compliance as it creates efficient markets  and reduces regulatory costs.

Marketcore, a firm I advise, is pioneering interactive finance to generate liquidity by rewarding individuals and institutions for revealing information that details risks.

Interactive finance crowd-sources market participation by rewarding individuals, organizations and institutions seeking loans, lines of credit or mortgages or negotiating contracts with monetary or strategic incentives. These  rewards are  offered in exchange for risk-detailing, confidence-building disclosures that increase trading volumes. Whether risk takers are a bank, insurance company or counter party, all granters define rewards. A reward can constitute a financial advantage — say, a discount on the cost of information or transaction. The sale of the information more than makes up for the discounted fee. The time-sensitive grant of advantage can actually be directed to specific products, benefiting traders.

All this transpires on currently existing electronic displays broadband, multimedia, mobile and interactive information networks and grids. Interactive finance realizes a neutral risk identification and mitigation system with a system architecture that scans and values risks, even down to individual risk elements and their aggregations. As parties and counter parties crowd markets, each revealing specific risk information in return for equally precise and narrowly tailored rewards and incentives, their trading generates fresh data and meta data on risk tolerances in real time and near real time. This data and meta data can then be deployed to provide real-time confidence scoring of risk in dynamic markets. Every element is dynamic, like so many Internet activities and transactions.

Interactive finance constantly authenticates risks with constantly refreshing feedback loops. Risk determination permits insureds, brokers and carriers to update risks through “a transparency index. . . based. . . on the quality and quantity of the risk data records.”

Through these capabilities, Marketcore technologies connect the specific, individual risk vehicle with macro market data to present the current monetary value of the risk instrument, a transparency index documenting all the risk information about it and information on the comparative financial instruments. Anyone participating receives a comprehensive depiction of certainty, risk, disclosures and value.

There will be vastly more efficiency once interactive finance provides timely information that allows for easy monitoring by regulators and lawmakers, provides incentives for compliance by big banks and stimulates efficient markets.

There will be no more need for whistleblowers if interactive finance provides timely information that allows for easy monitoring by regulators and lawmakers that forces compliance by big banks and markets.