Tag Archives: nonsubscriber

An Open Letter on the Oklahoma Option

I’m the founder and CEO of WorkersCompensationOptions.com (WCO), a company dedicated to workers’ compensation (WC) and its legal alternatives. This letter is intended to quell the concerns of employees in our client companies—employees who may have been distressed by the recent (mostly negative) publicity from ProPublica and NPR regarding options to WC in Texas and Oklahoma.

In case you only saw one installment from the Insult to Injury series, I’ll provide a quick summary. In 2014, the project’s authors started to assimilate massive amounts of data from their research concerning each state’s (and the federal government’s) WC system. In March 2015, the authors began releasing articles with an indisputable premise: Collectively, these systems need improvement.

That commendable beginning eventually gave way, however, to a hypothesis that is supported neither by reality nor by the overwhelming quantity of data the authors provide. Their conclusion (that employers are in cahoots with insurers to pressure attorneys, anonymous doctors and legislators into discarding the lives of an unfortunate few for the sake of bolstering corporate profits) completely misses the mark in pinpointing why so many WC systems are broken beyond repair. In fact, attorneys and doctors put at least as much pressure on WC systems as insurers, and any attempt to depict the medical and legal communities as innocent bystanders in the WC feud is simply too naive to be taken seriously.[1] I do not doubt the authors’ sincerity in addressing a serious societal problem, but I also do not believe they are equipped to understand the problem they sought—however earnestly—to demystify for their readers. Worse yet, I fear they have positioned themselves in the WC space in a manner that is only likely to retard the implementation of practical solutions.

This letter is prompted by the article on Oct. 14, 2015, which painted an inaccurate—even an irresponsible—picture of both Texas nonsubscription (TXNS) and the Oklahoma option (OKO). As that article’s title (“Inside Corporate America’s Campaign to Ditch Workers’ Comp”) is lengthy, I’ll shorten it to CDWC going forward.

Texas Nonsubscribing Employees: What Can We Learn?

Texas is exceptional in the WC world because it has, for more than a century, offered employers a viable alternative to WC. Of approximately 380,000 employers in Texas, roughly two-thirds subscribe to a traditional WC system; the other third are nonsubscribers who develop their own models. That’s about 120,000 different systems, and there is plenty to be learned. We’ve seen various organically grown components develop from these disparate systems, many of which superficially resemble WC. Despite those similarities, however, industry experts understand how counterproductive it is to make unilateral comparisons between TXNS and WC.

The authors of CDWC didn’t get that memo.

Of all the various lessons learned from diverse TXNS models, one runs counter to conventional WC dogma: Employers can protect themselves while delivering superior care for employees at a fraction of the cost of WC. Eliminating the inflated costs associated with abusive practices that run rampant in WC is a critical component of that particular lesson.

Because the CDWC authors insist on judging TXNS through the lens of WC, TXNS looks to them like a system that would appeal to skinflint employers who simply do not care whether their employees get hurt. However, because employees of nonsubscribing companies can sue their employers for tort, the decision to opt out of WC is likely to be penny-wise and pound-foolish for employers who do not take measures to ensure the safety of employees. The CDWC authors’ failure to unpack the importance of tort negligence means many readers will come away from the article without understanding that a typical $50,000 payout in WC could easily be either $0 or $5 million in TXNS—depending on who is at fault for the accident. Even more disappointing is CDWC’s attempt, in a one-sentence paragraph, to gloss over one of WC’s most dangerous shortcomings: the extent to which the no-fault arrangement between employers and employees has removed incentives for safety in the workplace throughout the country.

If you are an employee of one of our Texas nonsubscribers, rest assured that your employer has every reason to minimize workplace accidents and to take very good care of you if an occupational injury occurs.

In a nutshell, your interests are aligned with your employer’s—another critical lesson we’ve learned from TXNS.

Oklahoma Option Employees: A Whack-a-Mole WC System Led You Here

ProPublica and NPR harp on a consistent theme throughout the Insult to Injury series: WC is broken. We at WCO agree, and Oklahoma may provide the single best example of how and why a state’s WC system becomes unsustainable.

The WC ecosystem is made up of five major communities: insurance, medical, legal, employer and employee. Abuse within the system by any of these communities leads to adjustments to the boundaries of the system. Throughout the Insult to Injury series, the authors go out of their way to sidestep the discussion of systemic abuse. They even attempt to dismiss fraud by citing a study that minimizes its role. Abuse and fraud in WC are, in some ways, analogous to speeding on the highway: Almost all drivers abuse the speed limit, but very few are issued citations. Similarly, the cases of clear-cut fraud in WC only reflect a small portion of the amount of abuse going on. But even if we allow the authors to exclude all instances of clear-cut fraud from the WC conversation, we are still left with rampant abuse driven by insidious systemic incentives.

For decades, abuses and inefficiencies within the WC system have led to each of the five communities touting the need for major reforms—at the others’ expense. Real reform threatens each community, which leads to stalemates in negotiations. Major upheaval has been avoided via the compromise of pushing and pulling the system’s boundaries, resulting in a decades-long game of whack-a-mole being played across the nation. If one voice cries, “Data shows an alarming trend in opioid abuse,” that mole gets swatted by requiring more medical credentials for prescribing pain killers. When another shrieks, “Overutilization is surging,” that mole is whacked through costly and time-consuming independent medical examinations. When someone else observes, “Our disability payouts are higher than neighboring jurisdictions,” that mole prompts us to lower disability payouts. Immediately, a fourth voice shouts, “Pharmaceutical abuses make up 8.4% of total costs,” and that mole persuades us to introduce drug formularies. But there isn’t even a moment of silence before another voice remarks, “Our analysis shows dismemberment payouts in this jurisdiction are lower than those of our neighboring jurisdiction.” That mole gets whacked by proposing legislation to increase dismemberment payouts—legislation that is dead on arrival.[2] At some point, we have to realize the moles are multiplying faster than we can whack them. (If my commentary doesn’t apply to other jurisdictions, I’m happy to restrict it to Oklahoma and Texas because writers can best serve their readers by acknowledging the limitations of their own expertise.)

Even if we concede that the changes detailed in the paragraph above aren’t necessarily bad (which I’m not conceding; I’m just trying to be polite and move the argument along), they demonstrate a persistent pattern of outcomes, inclusive of abuse, inherent in any hierarchical bureaucratic system. Regulators are busy reacting to entrenched abuses while market participants find new and exciting ways to game the system. This futile game of whack-a-mole is endless.

The Sooner State had a front row seat to witness what TXNS accomplished—both the good and the bad.[3] With that first-hand knowledge, the Oklahoma legislature has finally provided the state—and the country—with an opportunity to see whether real change can restore function to a malfunctioning system. While WC stakeholders assure us they are only a few more whacks-at-the-mole away from making WC hum, Oklahoma lawmakers have written a new chapter in the history of workplace accident legislation. The OKO is neither WC nor TXNS.

The brilliance of the OKO is that it doesn’t attempt to overhaul a broken WC system. The legislators effectively stepped away from that decades-old stalemate. Instead of an all-out overthrow, they left WC in place and created an option for employers who were willing to try something new—which is exactly how WC itself was introduced a century ago.

Because the OKO is substantially modeled on TXNS, it is easy to see why the CDWC writers conflated the two in their analysis. The errors in CDWC concerning ERISA’s applicability, employee benefits and appeals committee processes in Oklahoma are all presumably honest mistakes made by writers who, in their zeal to distinguish TXNS and the OKO from WC, failed to distinguish TXNS and the OKO from each other.

Nevertheless, it’s important for employees to understand that TXNS varies dramatically from one employer to another, and many of the rules concerning TXNS do not apply north of the Red River.

Although the CDWC authors misleadingly couple TXNS and the OKO with respect to ERISA’s applicability, ERISA plays no direct role in occupational accidents in the OKO.[4] We’ll be happy to get you a legal opinion on that, but for our purposes regarding CDWC, take my non-legal opinion as on the record. If others disagree, they should go on the record, as well. While ERISA has served employers and employees well in TXNS, its role in the OKO is only implied (if that). We are free to use it where we wish, as long as we are compliant at the state level.

Presumably tied to their ERISA misapplication, the CDWC authors assert that “benefits under opt-out plans are subject to income and payroll taxes.” Such tax advice is unusual from investigative journalists without citation, and I have asked the authors to share their source. Although the jury is still out on this tax issue, it is a point the CDWC authors must distort to substantiate their otherwise baffling claim that the workplace accident plans of OKO employers “almost universally have lower benefits.”[5] If any OKO plans really do offer benefits that aren’t at least as good as those provided by WC, they’re illegal. That’s how the legislators have written the law, and it’s what they’re dedicated to achieving for workers, regardless of obfuscations invoking TXNS, ERISA and unresolved tax implications.

The authors of CDWC also completely misrepresent appeals committees for at least a majority of OKO employers. The authors overlook a dramatic improvement to employee protection that the OKO makes to TXNS when they claim that appeals committees in Oklahoma work analogously to appeals committees in Texas: “Workers must accept whatever is offered or lose all benefits. If they wish to appeal, they can—to a committee set up by their employers.” That’s dead wrong. Executives at each of our OKO employers are fully aware that, in case of an employee appeal, the employer has nothing to do with the selection of the appeals committee panel members or the work they complete. The process is independent from the employer and extremely fair.[6] The CDWC authors would do well to read Section 211 of the law more carefully.

On the subject of benefit denials, I’ll share a single data point from our OKO book: To date, we have denied exactly one claim. This is a nascent system, so we must be very careful in drawing actuarial conclusions. Still, our company has led more employers from traditional WC into the new OKO than any other retailer, so we have a bit of credibility to offer on this subject. The point of the system isn’t to deny benefits to deserving employees but to ensure benefits are delivered more efficiently. The system is working.

The CDWC authors only provide one OKO case study, Rachel Jenkins. Strangely, they lump Jenkins in with four TXNS case studies. The Jenkins case is still being tried. We will withhold opinions—as we hope others would—until a more appropriate time.

As a reminder, while the OKO law is stronger today than ever, if it were to be deemed unconstitutional by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, we would have 90 days to get everyone back into traditional WC (per Section 213.B.4.).

Next: Vigilance and Diligence

My comments are mine and mine alone. I do not speak for any associations or lobbyists. I have no interest in debating those who inexplicably assume that any alternatives proposed to a failing system must stem from sinister motives. However, I encourage anyone (from prospective clients to employees of existing clients) with questions or concerns to call me.

Another option for learning more is to click here and watch a formal debate regarding the OKO. This footage was shot in September 2015. It features Michael Clingman arguing against the OKO while I, predictably, argue for it. One thing you can’t miss in that video is my desire to oust most attorneys from the scene. To help explain, I’ll adapt a quotation from John F. Kennedy (who was discussing taxation) to my own area of concern (the well-being of employees): “In short, it is a paradoxical truth that employee outcomes from increased WC protections are worse today, while economic results suffer, and the soundest way to create higher and better standards of living for employees is to eliminate these abused protections.” For philosopher kings, the theory of the OKO may not sound as good as the theory of WC, but when it comes to practical realities the results demand everyone’s attention.

To summarize my primary criticism of Insult to Injury, it simply hasn’t done enough. The story it tells is insufficient and smacks of partisanship and ideology, two biases that ProPublica’s journalists allegedly avoid. WC is substantially more complex than a corporation-out-to-exploit-its-workforce short story. Ignoring abuse in each of the communities in a five-sided WC debate demonstrates a lack of journalistic impartiality and a stunning deficiency of perception. Moreover, to my knowledge, ProPublica hasn’t crafted any relevant suggestions for legislation, simply leaving its readers with the vague and implicit notion that federal oversight is needed. If that is the goal of Insult to Injury—to provide one-sided, emotional yarns alongside a treasure trove of data, hoping it will all spur some federally elected officials to create real change at long last—then I suspect ProPublica will still be holding this subject up to the light of opprobrium upon the retirement of each of the series’ authors.

We do not aspire to win over the authors or even their followers. We will focus our energies each day on providing the best workplace accident programs for employers and employees alike. Our results should speak for themselves.

Finally, I am not an attorney, and nothing in this letter should be taken as legal advice.

Sincere regards,

Daryl Davis

Footnotes:

[1] With medical providers, overutilization is always a concern. Click here and watch the video from the 12-minute to the 15-minute mark for a detailed description of rampant WC abuse by surgeons who provide unnecessary and damaging back procedures. If the workers weren’t disabled prior to the surgeries, many were afterward. As for the legal community, simply view slide 73 of the NCCI’s 2013 Oklahoma Advisory Forum. WC disability payments, which is where attorneys get their cut, were 38% higher in Oklahoma than in neighboring states—not because jobs are 38% more dangerous in Oklahoma than in Kansas or Texas but because Oklahoma attorneys are 38% more effective at gaming the state’s WC system.

[2] Alabama SB 330—which was prompted by Insult to Injurynever got out of conference. From what I could gather, lengthy negotiations between several different interest groups led nowhere, with the Alabama Medical Association at the center of this particular stalemate. Not surprisingly, the two special sessions called by Alabama Gov. Bentley in 2015 were strictly focused on the state’s budgetary crisis; this bill was never discussed.

[3] The final Texas case study offered in CDWC deals with Billy Walker, who fell to his death while on the job. The upside to TXNS is his estate’s common law right to pursue a tort lawsuit against his employer. The employer could have been ordered to pay Walker’s estate a settlement in the millions, but the employer filed bankruptcy before any such judgment could be awarded, which is plainly an unacceptable outcome. This demonstrates a lack of surety—the single biggest problem in TXNS. OKO addresses this issue in various ways, most notably in Section 205 of Title 85A, which guarantees surety for injured workers.

[4] For the non-occupational components of your OKO program, ERISA does apply.

[5] Per Section 203.B. of the statute, compliant plans “shall provide for payment of the same forms of benefits included in the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act for temporary total disability; temporary partial disability; permanent partial disability; vocational rehabilitation; permanent total disability; disfigurement; amputation or permanent total loss of use of a scheduled member; death; and medical benefits as a result of an occupational injury, on a no-fault basis, with the same statute of limitations, and with dollar, percentage and duration limits that are at least equal to or greater than the dollar, percentage and duration limits contained in Sections 45, 46 and 47 of this act.” (Emphasis mine.)

[6] Details of OKO appeals committee procedures are generally misunderstood—for now—by plaintiffs’ attorneys (and, apparently, investigative journalists). Attorneys frequently assume that, because the employer foots the bill, the employer controls the process. For a peek at how the appeals committee process really works for a majority of OKO employers, those curious should watch this video.

Debunking ‘Opt-Out’ Myths (Part 4)

I’m aware of no logic, facts or data to support the assertion that options increase workers’ compensation premiums. The exact opposite can be easily demonstrated.

Ask yourself, are prices higher or lower when employers have only one product to choose from vs. when they are able to choose among competing products? Texas went from the 10th most expensive workers’ compensation system in the U.S. in 2003 to the 38th most expensive state in 2013 through a combination of workers’ compensation system reforms and competitive pressures from employers electing the Texas “nonsubscriber” option – choosing not to be part of the state’s workers’ compensation system. One-third of all Texas employers have elected the option. Employers representing hundreds of thousands of Texas workers evaluated the impact each system would have on their claim costs, compared insurance premiums and exited the state system between 2003 and 2013.

Likewise, Oklahoma simultaneously enacted workers’ compensation reform and option legislation in 2013. Workers’ compensation premiums have since dropped more than 20%, and Oklahoma option programs are saving even more.

Further debunking the myth option program raise workers’ compensation costs, a 2015 report from the Workers’ Compensation Research Institute studied workers’ compensation claims in 17 states and found that the total average cost per claim for injured workers in Texas was among the lowest. Costs per claim grew in Texas only 2.5% per year from 2008 to 2013, as measured in 2014. In contrast, for National Council on Compliance Insurance (NCCI) states, the average indemnity cost per lost-time claim increased by 4% in 2014, and the average medical cost per lost-time claim increased by 4% in 2014.

Texas workers’ compensation is outperforming national averages because Texas employers have a choice. The option creates a greater sense of urgency among regulators and workers’ compensation insurance carriers to manage claims better so they can reduce premium rates and compete with the alternative system. The option also makes implementation of workers’ compensation reforms more manageable, because they happen across a smaller base of claims.

Further, consider that most employers that implement option programs have some frequency of injury claims. Very few employers with no injury claims are willing to go to the time, effort and expense of adopting and communicating a special injury benefit plan, buying special insurance coverage, contracting a claims handling specialist and satisfying newly applicable state and federal compliance requirements (which may include a state qualification process and filing fee). Because options take many companies that have injury claim losses out of the workers’ compensation system, workers’ compensation insurance carriers suffer fewer losses and can reduce workers’ compensation premiums. The carriers must compete harder for business, and they have no justification for charging higher premiums when their total loss experience improves.

Associations that represent workers’ compensation insurance companies have labeled options an “external threat” to the industry at a time when premium volume and carrier profits are up and losses are at a 17-year low.  Calendar-year 2014 underwriting results, combined with investment gains on insurance transactions, produced a workers’ compensation pretax operating gain of 14%. These insurance companies urge state legislators to protect their monopolistic, one-size-fits-all product and its profits. They also fight to maintain an anti-competitive web of price-setting collaborations that would violate antitrust laws in other industries.

As David DePaolo recently noted on WorkCompCentral, in “the business of workers’ compensation insurance… investors (the business side) want to know whether they are going to make money, and how much, by financing the system; not whether the system is working ‘correctly’ or not.” This is an important insight in the context of workers’ compensation insurance lobbyist objections to an option. The lobbyists promote the idea that workers’ compensation systems are superior and working fine, but that is not their primary motivation in trying to shut down competitive alternatives.

Some insurance association members have defected and embrace free-market competition. More than $150 million in the Texas nonsubscriber option insurance premium was written last year alone. The Oklahoma option insurance market is just starting up. Many “A-rated” insurance companies now oversee the successful resolution of approximately 50,000 injury claims per year under option programs.

An option can be authorized by a state legislature before, after or at the same time as workers’ compensation reforms are adopted. Legislators suffering from “workers’ comp fatigue” find option legislation to be dramatically less voluminous, time-consuming, confusing and contentious than major workers’ compensation reform.  And, as proven in Texas and Oklahoma, the option can slash employer claims costs by 40% or more. A single state (like Tennessee or South Carolina) can see lower government regulatory expense and more than $100 million in annual public and private employer savings. That impact grows exponentially through economic development multipliers. Those are dollars that can be used to create private-sector jobs and invest in education, safety, transportation and other legislative priorities.

In contrast, when standing alone, workers’ compensation system reforms are typically returning single-digit premium rate reductions that do not move the needle on injured employee medical outcomes or economic development. Even the widely referenced Oregon premium ranking study (like many others) questions the ability of traditional workers’ comp reforms to create significant movement in employer costs or employee satisfaction.

Options to workers’ compensation have particularly worked to the advantage of small employers, which pay most of the workers’ compensation industry premiums. Small companies that experience few, if any, on-the-job injuries typically purchase workers’ compensation insurance coverage on a guaranteed-cost (zero-deductible) basis. They get competitive quotes on both workers’ compensation and option insurance products, then typically choose to write the workers’ compensation premium check and be done. However, both big and small businesses can benefit from option programs. There are several Texas nonsubscriber insurance carriers that write policies for hundreds, even thousands, of small employers. In fact, the vast majority of Texas and Oklahoma employers that have elected the option are small, local businesses.

Many reputable insurance providers sell “bundled” programs for small business that supply all option program components, including the insurance policy, injury benefit plan, employee communications, claims administration and legal compliance. It is a simple, turnkey service for insurance agents and employers, delivering better medical outcomes and higher employee satisfaction when the rare injury occurs.

If an employer that has elected the option does not like it (for whatever reason), it can go back into the workers’ compensation system at any time. These facts are all reflected in the migration of small employers back and forth between workers’ compensation and option programs in Texas, choosing the best route for their companies and employees as workers’ compensation premium rates have moved up and down over the past quarter century.

Even if (as seen in Texas) a significant percentage of a state’s employers elect an option, the “pool” of workers’ compensation premiums can still be hundreds of millions of dollars, a figure large enough to spread the risk and absorb catastrophic claims.

Those who say that workers’ compensation premium rates will go up when a state legislature authorizes an option need to back up their fear mongering with similar logic, facts and data or admit their true, anti-competitive motivations.