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The Real Powerhouses in Silicon Valley

One of the most important lessons that Silicon Valley learned, that gives it a strategic advantage, is to think bigger than products and business models: It builds platforms.

The fastest-growing and most disruptive powerhouses in history — Google, Amazon, Uber, AirBnb and eBay—aren’t focused on selling products; they are building platforms.

The trend goes beyond tech.  Companies such as Walmart, Nike, John Deere, and GE are also building platforms for their industries. John Deere, for example, is building a hub for agricultural products.

Platforms are becoming increasingly important as all information becomes digitized; as everything becomes an information technology and entire industries get disrupted.

A platform isn’t a new concept; it is simply a way of building something that is open and inclusive and has a strategic focus. Think of the difference between a roadside store and a shopping center. The mall has many advantages in size and scale, and every store benefits from the marketing and promotion done by others.

See Also: Pursue Innovation or Transformation

They share infrastructure and costs. The mall owner could have tried to have it all by building one big store, but it would have missed out on the opportunities to collect rent from everyone and benefit from the diverse crowds that the tenants attract.

Platform businesses bring together producers and consumers in high-value exchanges in which the chief assets are information and interactions. These interactions are the creators of value, the sources of competitive advantage.

The power of platforms is explained in a new book, Platform Revolution: How Networked Markets are Transforming the Economy and How to Make Them Work for You, by Geoffrey Parker, Marshall Van Alstyne and Sangeet Choudary. The authors illustrate how Apple became the most profitable player in the mobile space with the iPhone by leveraging platforms.

As recently as 2007, Nokia, Samsung, Motorola, Sony Ericsson and LG collectively controlled 90% of the industry’s global profits. And then came the iPhone with its beautiful design and marketplaces — iTunes and the App store. With these, by 2015, the iPhone had grabbed 92% of global profits and left the others in the dust.

Nokia Shutterstock

Nokia and the others had classic strategic advantages that should have protected them: strong product differentiation, trusted brands, leading operating systems, excellent logistics, protective regulation, huge R&D budgets and massive scale.

But Apple imagined the iPhone and iOS as more than a product or a conduit for services. They were a way to connect participants in two-sided markets — app developers on one side and app users on the other.

These generated value for both groups and allowed Apple to charge a tax on each transaction. As the number of developers increased, so did the number of users. This created the “network effect” — a process in which the value snowballs as more production attracts more consumption and more consumption leads to more production.

By January 2015. the company’s App Store offered 1.4 million apps and had cumulatively generated $25 billion for developers.

Just as malls have linked consumers and merchants, newspapers have long linked subscribers and advertisers. What has changed is that technology has reduced the need to own infrastructure and assets and made it significantly cheaper to build and scale digital platforms.

Traditional businesses, called “pipelines” by Parker, Van Alstyne and Choudary, create value by controlling a linear series of processes. The inputs at one end of the value chain, materials provided by suppliers, undergo a series of transformations to make them worth more.

pipes

Apple’s handset business was a classic pipeline, but when combined with the App Store, the marketplace that connects developers with users, it became a platform. As a platform, it grew exponentially because of the network effects.

The authors say that the move from pipeline to platform involves three key shifts:

  1. From resource control to orchestration. In the pipeline world, the key assets are tangible — such as mines and real estate. With platforms, the value is in the intellectual property and community. The network generates the ideas and data — the most valuable of all assets in the digital economy.
  2. From internal optimization to external interaction. Pipeline businesses achieve efficiency by optimizing labor and processes. With platforms, the key is to facilitate greater interactions between producers and consumers. To improve effectiveness and efficiency, you must optimize the ecosystem itself.
  3. From the individual to the ecosystem. Rather than focusing on the value of a single customer as traditional businesses do, in the platform world it is all about expanding the total value of an expanding ecosystem in a circular, iterative and feedback-driven process. This means that the metrics for measuring success must themselves change.

But not every industry is ripe for platforms because the underlying technologies and regulations may not be there yet.

See Also: InsurTech: Golden Opportunity to Innovate

In a paper in Harvard Business Review on “transitional business platforms,” Kellogg School of Management professor Robert Wolcott illustrates the problems that Netflix founder Reed Hastings had in 1997 in building a platform.

Hastings had always wanted to provide on-demand video, but the technology infrastructure just wasn’t there when he needed it. So he started by building a DVDs-by-mail business — while he plotted a long-term strategy for today’s platform.

According to Wolcott, Uber has a strategic intent of providing self-driving cars, but while the technology evolves it is managing with human drivers. It has built a platform that enables rapid evolution as technologies, consumer behaviors and regulations change.

Building platforms requires a vision, but does not require predicting the future. What you need is to understand the opportunity to build the mall instead of the store and be flexible in how you get there. Remember that business models now triumph products—and platforms triumph business models.

What the Apple Watch Says About Innovation

Now that the dust has settled on the long-anticipated unveiling of the Apple Watch, a major obstacle to its success is coming into view: the iPhone.

The Apple Watch has been the subject of breathless anticipation for years because, as Tim Cook said at its introduction, it represents “the next chapter in Apple’s story.” Conceived three years ago, shortly after Steve Jobs’ passing, the Watch is the embodiment of multiple dramatic arcs and aspirations.

It is the first major product developed under Tim Cook and Jony Ive outside of Jobs’ shadow—and thus has huge personal and legacy implications for both men.

The Watch is also Apple’s attempt to catalyze and dominate the wearables category. Given the intense competition in the smartphone market and the widespread view that new killer products, platforms and ecosystems will emerge somewhere at the intersection of the Internet of Things and wearable computing, the Watch is central to Apple’s post-iPhone strategy.

It might seem that the iPhone should be the Apple Watch’s greatest asset. Apple is positioning the Watch as a jaw-dropping, must-have peripheral to the iPhone. Millions of iPhone-toting Apple fans are sure to queue up upon the Watch’s 2015 launch to buy it. But do not mistake early adopters for market validation. For billions of other potential customers, the Watch’s close linkage and tethering to the iPhone could be a fundamental weakness.

In the short term, Apple must convince existing customers that they need a Watch in addition to their iPhone. Apple, however, has yet to offer a convincing case for this.

Long-rumored groundbreaking health apps built on Watch-mounted sensors have not materialized—disappointing many healthcare watchers (including me). That leaves Apple competing against more narrowly focused wearable devices like the Fitbit and Pebble—but at multiple times the price and fractions of the battery life.

Apple is also touting Apple Pay as a killer app that will attract consumers to the Watch. But, while Apple Pay is an intriguing service-oriented strategy for Apple, there is no need for consumers to buy an Apple Watch to use it. Apple Pay will work fine with just the iPhone.

For now, it seems that Apple has higher hopes for the Watch as a fashion accessory than as a category-defining killer app. But even that highbrow aspiration has ample skeptics who question the Watch’s fashion chops and business potential.

In the long term, when and if compelling apps emerge for the Watch, Apple will have to convince Watch enthusiasts that they need an iPhone in addition to the Watch.

This might not seem like a limiting factor given that there are more than 300 million active iPhone users. But imagine if the iPhone were just a peripheral to the Mac, thereby limiting its addressable market to Mac owners. Or imagine if the iPhone had to be tethered to the iPod. Do not such scenarios, in retrospect, sound implausibly shortsighted?

Both the Mac and the iPod were great products with loyal followings at the iPhone’s introduction. Apple, however, did not limit the iPhone to its predecessors’ market niches. As shown in Figure 1, the result was a blockbuster that lifted Apple far beyond those earlier products. The iPhone has grown to represent more than half of Apple’s revenues and perhaps even more of its profits.

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Figure 1 — Apple Device Sales

Now the iPhone has a loyal following but a small share of the smartphone market. Will Tim Cook limit the Apple Watch’s success to iPhone owners, or will Cook free it to dominate the potentially larger wearable devices space?

Freeing the Watch is a strategic imperative.

History tells us that market-leading technology products like the iPhone inevitably fade. The companies that depend on them must innovate into the succeeding categories or fade as well. Kodak, Polaroid, IBM, DEC, Nokia, Motorola, Blackberry, Intel, Sony, Dell and Microsoft are among those fading or faded companies.

All of those other companies underutilized disruptive advances in information technology for (at best) incremental enhancements to their dominant products. By doing so, they missed out on new killer products, business models and industries that coalesced around the new platforms enabled by those technology advances.

Thus, Kodak wasted decades trying to deploy digital photography (which it invented) as an enhancer to its dominant film-driven businesses. Microsoft was slow to the web and the cloud and killed its early e-reader and tablet devices because of internecine struggles over how those new categories related to its Windows and Office businesses. The list goes on: IBM did not lead in minicomputers. DEC and every other leading minicomputer maker missed out on personal computers. Motorola and Nokia were killed by smartphones, and Blackberry is near death.

Limiting the Watch to a peripheral role in the iPhone-centric ecosystem would repeat the same mistake made by those earlier market-leading technology companies.

That’s not to say there is not a lot of money to be made in the defend-the-cash-cow approach. Just look at the more than $650 billion in revenue and nearly $250 billion in earnings that Steve Ballmer delivered in his tenure as Microsoft CEO. Ballmer achieved those impressive numbers by defending and milking Microsoft’s dominant Office and Windows products. Ballmer, Microsoft and its investors missed out, however, on the market value created by Google, Apple, Facebook, Twitter and others that capitalized on search, big data, cloud computing, mobile devices and social media. Ballmer’s inability to grow beyond the core products that he inherited stagnated Microsoft’s market value for a decade.

Likewise, Tim Cook could nurse Apple’s iPhone-driven revenue stream for a long time. I doubt, however, that Tim Cook would be satisfied with a value-creation legacy comparable to Steve Ballmer’s.

It is too early to dismiss the Apple Watch’s potential to transcend the iPhone. We’ll get a measure of Apple’s foresight when it releases the software development kit (SDK) for the Watch. That will show how fundamentally tethered the Watch is to the iPhone and whether Apple has laid the groundwork for the Watch to be standalone at some point.

The real gut check for Tim Cook is further out in time, when technology and creativity enables wearable devices like the Watch to not only stand alone from the iPhone but also to replace it.

Will Tim Cook allow the Watch to cannibalize iPhone sales—as Apple previously allowed the iPhone to eat away at the iPod and risked the iPad’s doing the same to the Mac? Or will Apple stagnate as competitors and new entrants out-innovate it? Will Apple fade away as the riches from new killer apps, devices, ecosystems and business models that coalesce around emerging wearables-centric platforms flow to others?