Tag Archives: landis

Captives: Congress Shoots, Misses

In late December, Congress put together a last-minute “tax extender” package that, among many other things, made some changes to section 831(b) of the Internal Revenue Code. That section allows “small” captive insurance companies to elect to exempt from income tax all of their insurance income.

These small captives have been widely used in recent years by owners of large, privately held businesses to allegedly add to their existing insurance coverages while enjoying immediate income tax reductions. Further tax benefits could include conversion of ordinary income to capital gains and a potential estate transfer benefit, depending on the ownership of the captive.

Congress has changed those benefits a bit, by eliminating any estate planning benefits, starting in 2017. But Congress failed to address the true levels of abuse that this code section has spawned and, indeed, may have made things worse.

These “enterprise risk” or “micro” captives are primarily used as a form of tax shelter, notwithstanding the pious claims of captive managers that they are meeting legitimate insurance needs. While such needs certainly may exist in some clear cases, the vast majority of entrepreneurs forming these captives care much more about the tax benefits than any increased insurance coverage.

The IRS knows this and has stepped up both audits of individual companies and larger, promoter audits of captive managers in an effort to crack down on captives that are being formed without the intent to form an insurance company. In addition, the IRS is well aware that unscrupulous captive managers create vastly inflated “premiums” payable by the operating company to the captive to maximize the tax benefits of owning such a small captive. These premiums often bear no relation to third-party market costs, nor can they be justified by a reasonable actuarial analysis of the actual risk being insured by the captive.

Another abuse is found in captive managers’ offering the new captive owner what the IRS would call a sham “pooling” arrangement, to comply with certain “risk distribution” requirements of court cases and revenue rulings.

There are many cases pending in the Tax Court that attempt to corral these abuses. Their outcome is, of course, uncertain.

So the Treasury Department went to the Senate Finance Committee in early 2015, hoping to obtain legislation that would gut section 831(b) (and put a lot of captive managers out of business).

Instead, the department got legislation that only stops these captives from being used as estate planning tools.

The legislation also increased the annual allowable premium paid to such captives, from $1.2 million to $2.2 million, indexed for inflation. The reasons for this failure have a lot to do with Sen. Chuck Grassley of Iowa, who has long wanted an increase in premium to benefit certain farm bureau captives in his state. He needed some revenue offset to allow for the increase, and, by closing this “estate planning loophole,” he can claim that tax revenues will increase.

That claim may be doubtful (only about 1% of taxpayers end up being subject to the estate tax), and captive managers now have a new, higher goal of $2.2 million for the “premiums” to be paid to these small captives.

It is also clear that this new legislation will have no effect on the current robust enforcement actions underway by the IRS. The issues of inflated premiums, sham pooling arrangements and lack of substance in the alleged insurance transaction remain in force and subject to serious scrutiny.

It is unlikely that Congress will bother to look at this code section again any time in the near future.

As a result of this new legislation, section 831(b) captives can generally no longer be owned by the entrepreneur’s spouse, children, grandchildren or trusts benefiting them. (Details about how the legislation achieves this change can be found in other sources).

Perhaps as many as half of all existing micro captives were formed with estate planning in mind. These captives will have to change their ownership or dissolve before the end of 2016. Tax professionals should review all captives owned by their clients to ensure that they remain complaint with the changes in the law. Relying on the captive managers may not be sufficient.

How to Prevent IRS Issues for Captives

A regulator of captive insurance is responsible for many aspects of the business of captive insurance companies. He or she must coordinate the application process for obtaining a license, including the financial analysis and financial examination of each captive insurance company. The regulator is also a key marketing person in promoting the domicile as a favorable place to do business, thus fostering economic development for the state.

The captive regulator is not, however, a tax adviser. No statute and regulation in any domestic domicile requires an analysis of the potential tax status of the captives under consideration or under regulation. If the application complies with the stated statutory and regulatory requirements, the regulator must favorably consider the application and allow the new company to be licensed as an insurance company under state law.

That new insurance company may not, however, be considered an insurance company under federal tax law. The Internal Revenue Service recently listed captives as one of their annual “Dirty Dozen” tax scams, citing “esoteric or improbable risks for exorbitant premiums.” And at least seven captive managers (and therefore their clients) have been targeted for “promoter” audits, for allegedly promoting abusive tax transactions.

Yet all of these captives received a license from a regulator, mostly in the U.S. Obviously these regulators did not consider the pricing of the risks to be transferred to the captive, except perhaps at the macro level.

Should the domicile care about the potential tax status of licensed captives? David Provost, Vermont’s Deputy Commissioner of Captive Insurance, has said, “We do not license Section 831(b) captives; we license insurance companies.” While that statement is technically correct, this paper argues that, with respect to small captives, regulators should care about the tax implications of licenses in extreme cases, consistent, of course, with the laws and regulations under which it operates.

Small captives, i.e. those with annual premiums of no more than $1.2 million, can elect under section 831(b) of the Internal Revenue Code to have their insurance income exempt from federal taxation. This provision, combined with certain revenue rulings and case law, creates a strong tax and financial planning incentive to form such a captive insurance company.

This incentive can lead to an “over-pricing” of premiums being paid to the new captive, to maximize the tax benefits on offer. The premiums may be “over-priced” relative to market rates, even after being adjusted for the breadth of policy form, size and age of the insurance company and, in some cases, the uniqueness of the risk being insured by the captive. But “over-priced” in whose eyes?

Insurance regulators are usually more concerned with whether enough premium is being paid to a captive to meet its policy obligations. From that perspective, “too much” premium can never be a bad thing. Indeed, captive statutes and regulations generally use the standard of being “able to meet policy obligations” as the basis of evaluating captive applications or conducting financial reviews. And actuarial studies provided with captive applications generally conclude that “…the level of capitalization plus premiums will provide sufficient funds to cover expected underwriting results.”

These actuarial studies do not usually include a rate analysis, by risk, because none is required by captive statute or regulation.

Small “831(b)” captives, therefore, may easily satisfy the financial requirements set forth in captive statutes and regulations. If, however, the Internal Revenue Service finds on audit that the premiums paid to that captive are “unreasonable,” then the insured and the captive manager may face additional taxes and penalties, and the captive may be dissolved, to the loss of the domicile.

And, as has happened recently, the IRS may believe that a particular captive manager has consistently over-priced the risk being transferred to its captives and may initiate a “promoter” audit, covering all of those captives. Such an action could result in unfavorable publicity to the domiciles that approved those captive applications, regardless of the fact that the regulators were following their own rules and regulations to the letter.

It is that risk of broad bad publicity that should encourage regulators to temper the rush to license as many captives as possible. There should be some level of concern for the “reasonableness” of the premiums being paid to the captives.

One helpful step would be to change captive statutes or regulations to require that actuarial feasibility studies include a detailed rate analysis. Such an analysis would compare proposed premium rates with those of the marketplace and offer specific justifications for any large deviations from market. (Given the competition among jurisdictions for captive business, such a change would only be possible if every domicile acted together, eliminating the fear that a domicile would lose its competitive edge by acting alone.)

Absent such a change, however, regulators still have the power to stop applications that do not pass the “smell test.” Most captive statutes require each applicant to file evidence of the “overall soundness” of its plan of operation, which would logically include its proposed premiums. If the premiums seem unreasonably high for the risks being assumed, the plan of operation may not be “sound,” in that it might face adverse results upon an IRS audit.

Regulators are not actuaries and often have had little or no underwriting experience. They, therefore, could not and should not “nit-pick” a particular premium or coverage. But some applications may be so egregious on their face that even non-insurance people can legitimately question the efficacy of the captive’s business plan.

Insurance professionals know from both experience and nationally published studies that the cost of risk for most companies is less than 2% of revenue. “Cost of risk” includes losses not covered by traditional third-party insurance, which are generally the type of losses covered by “small” captive insurance companies.

If a captive regulator receives an application in which the “cost” of coverage by that captive is, say, 10% to 12% or more of the revenue of the insured, alarm bells should go off. That captive certainly would have plenty of assets to cover its policy obligations! But in the overall scheme of things, including the real world of taxation, that business plan is not likely “sound.”

At that point, the regulator has a choice of rejecting the applicant, requiring a change in the business plan/premiums or demanding additional support for the proposed plan. We are aware of one case in which the captive regulator required the applicant to provide a rate analysis from an independent actuary when he received an application whose premiums did not appear reasonable.

A rate analysis is not, of course, a guarantee that the IRS will find the premiums acceptable on audit. No one can expect guarantees, but a properly done rate analysis has a better chance of assuring all the parties that the captive has been properly formed as a real insurance company and not simply as a way to reduce the taxable income of the insured and its owners.

Captive insurance regulators have a big job, particularly as the pace of captive formations increases. To protect the domicile from appearing on the front page of the Wall Street Journal, the regulator must consider all aspects of the proposed captive’s business, including, in extreme cases, its vulnerability to adverse federal tax rulings.

831(b) Captives and the IRS: Underwriting and Audit Roulette

Much has been written about the financial and tax power of forming and operating a captive insurance company that qualifies for the tax benefits of section 831(b) of the Internal Revenue Code. But all too often, promoters of this concept forget that each captive must be first and foremost a risk management tool with legitimate risks and properly priced premiums.

An “831(b)” captive is an insurance company whose premiums do not exceed $1.2 million a year and that elects to have those premiums exempted from taxation. If the captive has proper “risk distribution” (a topic for another article), then the insured company can deduct the premium being paid to the captive, while the captive pays no income taxes on that premium. After the payment of losses and expenses, any profits in that captive can be distributed at a favorable dividend rate or can be distributed in a full liquidation of the captive, and the shareholders will receive those accumulated profits at capital gains rates. And if the captive is owned by trusts or adult children, the entrepreneur can also enhance the benefits in his or her estate plan by sidestepping the estate tax.

But these benefits are only possible if you first get the underwriting right. Over the years, we have conducted audits on existing 831(b) captives formed by some of our competitors. We have been amazed by what people are charging for risks, many of which can be insured in the traditional insurance market at much lower rates. We call it “underwriting by the blind.” The IRS is well aware of the pricing abuses in our industry. As we understand it, the majority of negative audits recently have not been because of faulty “risk distribution” mechanisms, but because of badly overpriced premiums being paid to the captive.

For example, we found a $10 million (revenue) manufacturer that had purchased a $1 million general liability policy, including products liability, in the insurance market for an estimated $25,000 annual premium. The new captive issued a “differences in condition” policy with a $1 million limit and charged the insured more than $200,000 in annual premium. This type of policy covers things like exclusions in the underlying policy. It does not take an insurance expert to realize that such a premium is unreasonable and bears no relation to either market rates or the real risk that is being assumed (particularly because the insured was manufacturing a non-hazardous consumer product).

Another example of egregious pricing is in the area of terrorism risk. One provider is promoting captives with more than $600,000 in premium for $10 million in limits for this type of risk even though the client could purchase that same coverage in the standard insurance market for less than $5,000. How can such a payment be “ordinary and necessary” and therefore be deductible?

Knowing that these captives were approved by a regulator, we keep asking ourselves, “Where are the actuaries and the regulators, and why do they not concern themselves with the relationship between the risk assumed and the premiums charged?”

The simple fact is that the requirements of the captive insurance laws fall far short of the requirements of the IRS. The laws of each captive insurance jurisdiction in the U.S. require that an actuarial opinion accompany each application for an insurance license. But that opinion is limited to determining “the amount and liquidity of its [the captive’s] assets relative to the risks to be assumed [meaning the policy limits].” Thus, a regulator’s primary concern is to ensure the solvency of the captive. Typically, this is achieved through pro-formas showing 3- to 5-year expected and adverse loss scenarios. Note that there is no requirement to examine or opine on individual rates used to price specific exposures being assumed by the captive.

This “gap” between the captive insurance law and the realities of the tax authorities can be immense. One of the first questions asked by the IRS in the audit of a captive is, “How were the premiums (pricing) determined for each risk assumed?” Without an opinion of an actuary regarding these rates, it then comes down to the knowledge of the underwriter used by the captive management company. It is apparent that many captive managers do not have sufficient depth in this area or do not care to go beyond the specific requirements of the captive licensing requirements. (We, however, require that our actuaries examine every rate that we use in our feasibility studies.)

A rule of thumb is that a properly priced portfolio of risk for a captive should equate to total premiums equal to 1% to 2% of the insured’s revenue. The reason revenue is a good guide is because the majority of risks being transferred to section 831(b) captives are casualty risks. And the exposure base for casualty risks is generally revenue. The underwriter cannot change the exposure base, but he can raise the rate that is multiplied times the exposure base to get to a higher premium as desired by the client. But the captive will not survive an audit if rates are raised too high.

That estimate of 1% to 2% of revenue is only a guideline: There are exceptions. But if you see a captive manager suggest that the premiums payable to an 831(b) captive can be 6% to 10% (or more) of revenue, run! That manager is ignoring the important risk management requirements of this captive concept, to the detriment of its clients. And the clients are playing audit roulette, hoping their “number” does not come up.

James Landis collaborated with Rick Eldridge in writing this article. Eldridge is the president and CEO of Intuitive Insurance and the managing partner of Intuitive Captive Solutions.

Section 831(b) Captive Insurance Companies And The Tax Preparer Penalty

An Actual Scenario: A CPA was preparing the tax return of a longtime client who had purchased three captive insurance companies from a well-known provider of such entities, and had paid $3.3 million in insurance premiums to these companies. The client wished to show that payment as a tax deductible item. The client had $28 million in revenue and paid $92,000 annually for their usual third-party insurance program. The insurance premiums paid to these new captives were for “coverages” that supplemented their existing insurance. What could the CPA do with this request?

Background: Owners of profitable businesses are attracted to the tax and financial planning benefits of forming and owning a captive insurance company that qualifies for the tax benefits of section 831(b) of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”).

The Code section provides that if an insurance company has no more than $1.2 million in annual premium income, it can elect to exempt that income from taxation. And under a series of judicial decisions and Revenue Rulings, the insured company may be able to fully deduct the premium paid, even if the same person (or persons) owns both the insured and the insurance company.

This concept can be financially powerful, resulting in an immediate reduction in the owner's tax bill, yet virtually all of the funds remain tax free inside a related company. The profits of that company can either be accessed later at capital gains rates or passed to heirs outside of the estate tax regime.

The Problem: The deductibility of the premium is not automatic. The hurdles for properly deducting premiums paid to one's own insurance company are both numerous and, to some extent, subjective. The new insurance company must demonstrate sufficient “risk distribution,” the amounts charged by the insurance company as premium for the coverages offered must be “reasonable,” and the client must demonstrate an adequate “business purpose” for entering into the transaction, to name just a few of the important hurdles involved. These are each very important requirements that a tax preparer is unlikely to be able to judge with any degree of comfort.

Tax preparers who face the request to sign a return that reflects the deduction of such premiums must be careful not to run afoul of the Return Preparer Penalties of section 6694 of the Code. In addition, the client could face an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662 of the Code equal to 20 percent of the underpaid tax should the deduction ultimately be disallowed.

The standard for avoiding the Return Preparer Penalty is that the preparer held a reasonable belief that the position (the deductibility of the insurance premium) would have a greater than 50 percent likelihood of being sustained on its merits.

One of the factors included in the Regulations covering Section 6662 to determine whether a tax return has been negligently prepared is “failure to reasonably ascertain the correctness of an item that to a reasonably prudent person would appear 'too good to be true' under the circumstances.”

In this case, it appeared that a sudden increase in insurance expense from $92,000 to over $3 million might make the deduction of that expense “too good to be true.” But how could the preparer “reasonably ascertain” the likelihood of this deduction being upheld in audit?

The third party that the client relied on for advice in this transaction was the captive insurance company provider that sold them the program in the first place. But that party obviously believed that their program was fully compliant and therefore could not deliver a truly objective response to the CPA's concerns.

The client's attorney was not versed in captive insurance companies and could not be helpful without an expensive journey up the learning curve.

Turning to another captive insurance provider for an analysis of the client's situation was an obvious option. But each provider has their own competing program and clearly has an incentive to undermine the competition and encourage the client to switch providers. Certainly this may not always be the case, but it is wise to question the objectivity of the person doing the analysis if that person is a competitor.

The Solution: In this case, the CPA needed two sources of help. First, she needed to find an expert in captive insurance who did not also offer his own competing program. Second, she had to find an independent actuary who was familiar with captive insurance programs and who would be willing to opine as to the “reasonableness” of the premiums being charged by the captives.

Finding these independent advisors required networking with other CPA firms, searching the web for relevant articles and identifying their authors, and locating captive insurance sites and blogs.

The Result: The independent advisor created a report that the CPA could rely on, stating that while the structure of the captive insurance program would likely be compliant, the amounts of the premiums being charged did not appear reasonable, given both the nature of the client's business and relevant premium rates in the third-party market. The CPA then advised the client to hire an independent actuary to perform a rate review. The actuary ultimately opined that the client could reasonably support premiums of about half of the amount originally considered.

The client got a large tax deduction and the preparer had in file objective third-party support for the position ultimately taken on the tax return. While this support does not guarantee a favorable result in the event of audit, it should be very valuable evidence in any such audit and should satisfy the requirements for avoiding the Return Preparer Penalty.

Series LLCs And Section 831(b) Captives

Ever since the Department of Treasury issued Proposed Regulations in September 2010, there has been increased awareness and “hype” surrounding the use of Series LLCs and their accompanying Special Business Units (“SBUs”) for the formation of captive insurance companies. It seems that many captive providers think this new structure is “better than sliced bread.” In our view, it is just bread.

A Series LLC is a Special Purpose Captive allowed under the captive insurance statutes of a few states, most notably Delaware. The Special Purpose Captive acts as a “core” company under which are created SBUs, with each SBU insuring a different company (or each insuring different risks of one company). Although each SBU is managed by the core company, for tax and legal purposes, each SBU is “owned” by the persons who bear the “economic benefits and burdens of ownership” in the SBU.

The Proposed IRS Regulations, for the first time, contemplates recognizing cells and SBUs as “stand alone” corporate entities for tax purposes, allowing each of them to make elections such as those available under section 831(b) of the Code. (Although the Service has not yet issued Final Regulations, every indication is that they will do so soon with few changes, if any from the Proposed Regs). This has created some of the hype about SBUs.

Section 831(b) of the Code allows an insurance company with no more than $1,200,000 in annual premiums to exclude those premiums (and thus the net underwriting profits) from taxation. An insurance company choosing to take advantage of this section must attach a written election to its first tax return (an1120-PC). Section 831(b)(2)(B) of the Code sets forth complex “attribution rules” that must be carefully followed so that two or more captives (or SBUs) are not deemed to be owned together, thus adding their gross premiums together and perhaps violating the annual $1,200,000 limit for electing insurance companies.

So, do SBUs work for section 831(b) captives? The answer is “yes,” but using the Series LLC structure does not offer as many advantages as some providers would like you to believe.

First, since each SBU is treated as an independent entity, the attribution rules of section 831(b) still apply. Some providers believe that just because each SBU is separate, a company can have several of them, each making the 831(b) election. This is not true unless each SBU is deemed to be owned by separate adults (or some combination of adults) that satisfy the attribution rules. These rules have not been suspended just because one uses a Series LLC.

Second, although set-up costs for each SBU will be less than for a stand-alone captive insurance company, the savings will not be enormous. Delaware is proposing that each new SBU pay a set-up fee of $2,400 (although this remains under discussion) as compared to $3,200 for a stand-alone captive. But each new SBU will still need an actuarial opinion, business plan and biographical affidavits. And clients will likely incur higher legal fees as their counsel must review the SBU and LLC agreements. The only other savings will be the lack of a filing for a new corporate charter, but that fee is minimal.

Does an SBU need its own capital? Some providers advertise that this type of captive needs no capital (unlike a stand-alone captive that must have a minimum of $250,000 in capital by statute). It is true that current statutes do not require capital other than at the core company. (Delaware, however, has circulated a proposed administrative order requiring that each SBU have capital, but the amount is nominal.)

The IRS has, however, always viewed inadequate capital as one element in finding that an entity is not an insurance company for tax purposes (thus denying the deduction for premium paid to that entity). Since each SBU will be treated as a single entity for tax purposes, it is logical to assume that the IRS will not be pleased if an SBU has zero or inadequate capital relative to premiums received.

Annual costs for an SBU will be approximately 10-15% less than for a stand-alone. This reduction is based on the annual premium tax being allocated among all of the SBUs under a single core and because annual accounting and actuarial costs will be somewhat lower than that for a stand-alone company.

The Series LLC structure therefore does hold some advantages over a stand-alone captive. But all of the basic rules still apply. First and foremost, each SBU must be an insurance company with qualified, diversified and properly priced risks. Second, the Series LLC does add some complication to the entire concept of creating one’s own insurance company. We have seen some presentations by captive providers that are a maze of boxes and arrows. Is this complication for complication’s sake? We believe so.

Entrepreneurs interested in owning a private insurance company are often quite cautious (as they should be) about new ventures, particularly ones with significant tax benefits. For many it remains difficult to comprehend how one “owns” a captive in the legal sense while technically the SBU is part of a Series LLC owned by others.

Perhaps the (few) benefits of a Series LLC outweigh these complications. However everyone should beware of captive insurance providers that exaggerate these benefits and those that ignore the important basic details that make the difference between a true insurance company and a sloppy structure that may be viewed as a sham by the IRS. After all, if it quacks like a duck…it probably is.

James Landis collaborated with Rick Eldridge in writing this article. Rick Eldridge is the President & CEO of Intuitive Insurance Corporation and the Managing Partner of Intuitive Captive Solutions, LLC.