Tag Archives: kodak

Lemonade Really Does Have a Big Heart

Twelve months ago, Lemonade opened for business. For me, it marked the start of a new chapter in the history of the insurance industry. To coincide with their launch, I posted this article after speaking with CEO and co-founder Daniel Schreiber. The headline was “insurance will never be the same again!”

Of course, it was easy for me to make such a grand pronouncement 12 months ago, on the day that Lemonade hit the street. At that time, they had no customers, had not written any insurance and had certainly never paid a claim.

One year on, and Lemonade is up and running. Was I right to say insurance would never be the same again? I caught up with Daniel again to find out!

Disruptive Innovation

First things first, let me set some context. A question I get asked a lot by insurers and industry folk is, “why should we be interested in what Lemonade are doing?” It’s a great question and exactly what they should be asking. (I also point out that they need to be really interested in what ZhongAn is doing, as well).

To massively over-simplify and paraphrase Clayton Christensen, Lemonade has brought simplicity, convenience and affordability to a marketplace where the existing offering is complicated, expensive and inaccessible.

This is why the incumbent insurers need to take note when Lemonade pays a claim in three seconds. Otherwise, they could end up like DEC. Once the market leaders in minicomputers, DEC dismissed the rise of PCs, only to watch helplessly as IBM and Apple ate their lunch with personal computers.

Or Kodak, the inventor of digital photography. The company was too wedded to an outdated business model that relied on people printing their photos. That was until it was too late, and Kodak went from being the world’s fourth largest brand to bankrupt in less than two decades!

Now, it might have taken about 15 years for the demise of Kodak and about 10 for DEC to wake up and smell the coffee. The point being that disruptive innovations don’t take hold overnight; they need time to gain traction and build momentum.

But in this digital age, this speed of change is increasing. This is the key characteristic in the World Economic Forum’s definition of the 4th Industrial Revolution. It took Google just five years to hit a $1 billion in revenues. And Amazon only four!

Just think about this for a second. A decade ago, we didn’t have the iPhone, the iPad, Kindle, Uber, AirBnB, Android, Spotify, Instagram, WhatsApp, 4G. Could you imagine life without these now? Could you conceive that insurance is going to change and for the better?

You trust me, and I will trust you

There is another reason why incumbent insurers should be watching Lemonade very closely. It has addressed the fundamental issue with insurance and customer perception, which is trust, behavior and the conflict of interest.

There’s a ton of research and data that shows customers don’t trust insurers. And for good reason.

Insurers make the product complicated by using fancy jargon that Joe and Josephine Bloggs can’t understand. Insurers get paid up front and then create hurdles and barriers when the customer rightfully asks the insurer to do what they’ve already paid them to do.

And worse, the customer has to prove they are not a liar to the insurer’s satisfaction before a penny is paid out.

“Insurance fraud has become a self-fulfilling prophecy for incumbent insurers,” Daniel said. “They don’t trust customers to be fair and honest. This drives their behavior toward customers. And guess what, customers respond accordingly. Which justifies the insurer’s behavior in the first place. It’s a vicious circle that neither side can break.”

See also: Lemonade’s New Push: Zero Everything  

Lemonade’s virtuous circle

This conflict of interest doesn’t exist in the Lemonade business model. By operating as a tech platform that is also an insurance carrier, Lemonade has separated cost of operations from the pool of risk capital. It has also raised the bar when it comes to total cost of operations at 20% GWP.

Lemonade don’t profit from non-payment of a claim (in the way an incumbent insurer does). The company starts by trusting customers to make honest claims. Which is why Lemonade pays out straight away, with around a third of claim payouts fully automated. No human intervention at all.

Lemonade accepts that there are a few bad apples but works on the premise that most of us are fundamentally decent people.

It is usually at this point that the diehards and old laggards of the insurance industry start throwing fraud and loss data at me. Citing decades of data that proves Lemonade will eventually crash and burn under the weight of inflated and illegal claims.

My response is always the same “hands up everyone who is a bad person.” Of course, no hands go up because the vast majority of us are decent, respectful, honest people.

Which is why Lemonade has now had six, yes ,SIX, customers who have handed claims payouts back.

Just think about this for a moment.

A customer makes a claim (in seconds), gets paid (immediately), finds the situation has changed (later), realizes he got paid too much (oops!), then gives the payment back (you kidding me?).

Could the customer’s behavior be directly related to Lemonade’s behavior?

Yes, certainly! You only have to look at customer behavior at Grameen Bank in Bangladesh to see that trust can be relied  upon. Here, unsecured personal loans are repaid on time without the need for credit scores and debt collection agencies.

You don’t have to take my word for it, either. Hot out of the oven is this video of Lemonade customers in New York.

So, what’s the story, one year on?

Lemonade has been true to its word on the subject of transparency.

Throughout the year, the company has published its numbers, warts and all, for everyone to see. Building and maintaining trust is fundamental to Lemonade’s business model, and this starts with being open and honest.

Daniel has shared with me the latest numbers, and they are very impressive. I won’t repeat them here, because I know the team will be posting them all shortly in the latest Transparency Chronicles. They’re proud of the numbers, and rightly so.

See also: Lemonade: World’s First Live Policy  

All I will say is that Daniel and the team have steered a considered and thoughtful course in their first year. They could have chased the numbers, as many first year startups would do, only to regret the quality of business they end up with.

But Lemonade’s team has stuck to their knitting, have impressive growth numbers, a quality customer base completely aligned to the brand and are now licensed in 18 states (with more to follow).

Our job has only just started,” Daniel said. “Over the next year, we will continue to make insurance easier and better for our customers. One area we’ve started to look at now is the underlying insurance language and the products that form the heart of all insurance.”

Are you surprised?

You shouldn’t be! Lemonade is a highly professional startup and will no doubt become the definitive case study for exactly how “it” should be done.

But has this surprised Daniel?

“There are two things that have surprised us this year,” Daniel told me. “First, the extent of the warm reception we’ve received across the industry and from customers. We hoped customers would like us, but we never took for it granted.

“After all, you can’t beta test a new insurance company. The MVP (minimally viable product) approach simply doesn’t apply to insurance. It’s regulated and has to be the real deal from the get-go, right first time. So, for us, having customers put their faith in Lemonade from Day One has been very satisfying.

“The second is that our faith in humanity and behavioral economics has been affirmed. There will always be people who want to game the system, but on the whole, all our expectations about customer behavior have been exceeded.

“Who would have thought we would have six customers who gave their claim payouts back. That is very gratifying and also humbling for us. And gives us encouragement to continue doing what we are doing.”

Lemonade is live; insurance will never be the same again!

For me, I’m convinced. Historians will look back to Sept. 21, 2016, the day that Lemonade opened for business, as a watershed for the insurance industry.

Which means, of course, that the key question now is, who among the incumbent insurers will provide the Kodak moment? The one who simply missed that the world had changed until it was too late.

The Big Lesson From Amazon-Whole Foods

I doubt that Google and Microsoft ever worried about the prospect that a book retailer, Amazon, would come to lead one of their highest-growth markets: cloud services. And I doubt that Apple ever feared that Amazon’s Alexa would eat Apple’s Siri for lunch.

For that matter, the taxi industry couldn’t have imagined that a Silicon Valley startup would be its greatest threat, and AT&T and Verizon surely didn’t imagine that a social media company, Facebook, could become a dominant player in mobile telecommunications.

But this is the new nature of disruption: Disruptive competition comes out of nowhere. The incumbents aren’t ready for this and, as a result, the vast majority of today’s leading companies will likely become what toast—in a decade or less.

Note the march of Amazon. First it was bookstores, publishing and distribution, then cleaning supplies, electronics and assorted home goods. Now, Amazon is set to dominate all forms of retail as well as cloud services, electronic gadgetry and small-business lending. And the proposed acquisition of Whole Foods sees Amazon literally breaking the barriers between the digital and physical realms.

See also: Huge Opportunity in Today’s Uncertainty  

This is the type of disruption we will see in almost every industry over the next decade, as technologies advance and converge and turn the incumbents into toast. We have experienced the advances in our computing devices, with smartphones having greater computing power than yesterday’s supercomputers. Now, every technology with a computing base is advancing on an exponential curve—including sensors, artificial intelligence, robotics, synthetic biology and 3-D printing. And when technologies converge, they allow industries to encroach on one another.

Uber became a threat to the transportation industry by taking advantage of the advances in smartphones, GPS sensors and networks. Airbnb did the same to hotels by using these advancing technologies to connect people with lodging. Netflix’s ability to use internet connections put Blockbuster out of business. Facebook’s  WhatsApp and Microsoft’s Skype helped decimate the costs of texting and roaming, causing an estimated $386 billion loss to telecommunications companies from 2012 to 2018.

Similarly, having proven the viability of electric vehicles, Tesla is building batteries and solar technologies that could shake up the global energy industry.

Now, tech companies are building sensor devices that monitor health. With artificial intelligence, these will be able to provide better analysis of medical data than doctors can. Apple’s ResearchKit is gathering so much clinical-trial data that it could eventually upend the pharmaceutical industry by correlating the effectiveness and side effects of the medications we take.

As well, Google, Facebook, SpaceX and Oneweb are in a race to provide Wi-Fi internet access everywhere through drones, microsatellites and balloons. At first, they will use the telecom companies to provide their services; then they will turn the telecom companies into toast. The motivation of the technology industry is, after all, to have everyone online all the time. The industry’s business models are to monetize data rather than to charge cell, data or access fees. They will also end up disrupting electronic entertainment—and every other industry that deals with information.

The disruptions don’t happen within an industry, as business executives have been taught by gurus such as Clayton Christensen, author of management bible “The Innovator’s Dilemma”; rather, the disruptions come from where you would least expect them to. Christensen postulated that companies tend to ignore the markets most susceptible to disruptive innovations because these markets usually have very tight profit margins or are too small, leading competitors to start by providing lower-end products and then scale them up, or to go for niches in a market that the incumbent is ignoring. But the competition no longer comes from the lower end of a market; it comes from other, completely different industries.

The problem for incumbents, the market leaders, is that they aren’t ready for this disruption and are often in denial.

Because they have succeeded in the past, companies believe that they can succeed in the future, that old business models can support new products. Large companies are usually organized into divisions and functional silos, each with its own product development, sales, marketing, customer support and finance functions. Each division acts from self-interest and focuses on its own success; within a fortress that protects its ideas, it has its own leadership and culture. And employees focus on the problems of their own divisions or departments—not on those of the company. Too often, the divisions of a company consider their competitors to be the company’s other divisions; they can’t envisage new industries or see the threat from other industries.

This is why the majority of today’s leading companies are likely to go the way of Blockbuster, Motorola, Sears and Kodak, which were at the top of their game until their markets were disrupted, sending them toward oblivion.

See also: How to Respond to Industry Disruption  

Companies now have to be on a war footing. They need to learn about technology advances and see themselves as a technology startup in Silicon Valley would: as a juicy target for disruption. They have to realize that the threat may arise in any industry, with any new technology. Companies need all hands on board — with all divisions working together employing bold new thinking to find ways to reinvent themselves and defend themselves from the onslaught of new competition.

The choice that leaders face is to disrupt themselves—or to be disrupted.

How to Master the ABCs of Innovation

Innovation is an imperative. Fortune 500 CEOs cited dealing with the rapid pace of technological change as their “single biggest challenge.” Another global survey of board members and senior executives identified the speed of disruptive innovation as one of the highest risks facing their organizations.

Innovation is also the source of great opportunity. More than half of CEOs in a PWC global survey ranked R&D and innovation as generating the greatest return.

Yet, the intense attention on innovation often misses a key element. Many companies are paying attention to immediate challenges and opportunities, including six technological disruptions that might make or break many companies. In my experience, however, too few are being innovative in how they innovate. This is the difference between buying fish and learning how to fish.

Douglas Engelbart, the noted engineer and inventor, captured the critical difference when he wrote: “The key to the long-term viability of an organization is to get better and better at improving itself.”

See also: Where Will Real Innovation Start?  

To understand why, take a look at Englebart’s framework for the “ABCs of Organizational Improvement.”

Every organization has an “A” process, which includes its core activities, such as product development, manufacturing, distribution, marketing, sales, etc. The A process is all about execution—carrying out today’s strategy and business model as well as possible.

Innovation is often thought of as the “B” process, which is to improve the organization’s ability to perform A. This includes improving through hiring and training, introducing new tools, adopting process improvements, etc. Effective organizations have systematic B processes for continuous improvement using methods like knowledge management, business process reengineering and Six Sigma. The B process is responsible for making the A process faster, better, cheaper and more profitable.

In Engelbart’s model, there also needs to be a “C” process. The C focuses  on improving the B process; it improves how we improve. It is the “C” process that is too often missing or haphazard.

The C process should systematically explore both the content and process of improving the A and B processes.

This includes adapting and adopting better tools and methods for continuous improvement, such as customer co-creation, open innovation, agile development and cloud computing.

The C process also provides license and resources to think big—to go beyond the incremental and consider the full range of possible futures for the organization. It explores doomsday scenarios that might drive the company out of business. And, rather than just looking for incrementally faster, better or cheaper innovations, the C process dares to dream big. It gives responsible license to start from a clean sheet of paper to explore truly disruptive innovation opportunities.

C process thinking led Xerox to create Xerox PARC and, as a result, invent laser printing and many aspects of the personal, networked computing. It also led Apple to the iPhone and Google to driverless cars.

The lack of a robust C process contributed to Kodak’s failure; Kodak resisted, for decades, thinking about digital photography as more than an incremental extension to its A process business built on film, paper and chemicals.

See also: 4 Hot Spots for Innovation in Insurance  

To use a racing analogy, the A process is the position of the racer. The B process determines the speed at which the racer is moving. The C process determines the acceleration, or the rate at which the racer’s speed is changing. (In math terms, the B process determines the first derivative, and the C process sets the second derivative.)

In the long game of business, a slow leader will lose to a faster competitor. The fastest competitor will be the one with the greatest sustained acceleration.

As you consider the innovation challenges to your core business, do you have a systematic B process? Just as important, do you have a systematic C process?

Do We Even Need Insurers Any Longer?

Voltaire once said that “if God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him.” Could you say the same about insurers today, I wonder?

It is striking that, as organizations have sought to come to terms with the pace and scale of change now confronting them, the story of Kodak’s rapid decline from controlling 90% of U.S. film sales and 85% of camera sales to eventual bankruptcy has emerged as the cautionary tale of what can happen when you fail to keep pace with technological change. The corporate equivalent of the man who failed to sign the Beatles.

However, what many people forget is that Kodak actually invented the world’s first digital camera — in 1975. Far from being some sort of industrial dinosaur, therefore, Kodak was an innovation-driven company operating right at the cutting edge of photographic technology. And while endless books and articles have been written about the reasons for Kodak’s demise, in my view, the principal issue was less the failure to keep pace with change and more a lack of imagination.

See also: Matching Game for InsurTech, Insurers  

Kodak could not imagine a world where a digital camera would be for anyone but the dedicated professional, given its (at the time) prohibitive cost. Kodak could not imagine a world where processing speeds, image resolution, battery life and storage capacity would increase exponentially, at a fraction of the cost. Kodak could not imagine a world where people would not wish to take rolls of film down to the chemist to get them developed, pick them up a few days later and then diligently stick that “Kodak moment” in an album. Kodak could not imagine a world where everyone would carry a mobile phone that contained a camera that allowed images to be instantly shared on vast online networks.

If Kodak hadn’t been helping invent this new world, the failure would have perhaps been more understandable. At the time, such a world must have seemed to have been drawn from the pages of a science fiction novel. And executives’ lack of imagination was compounded by a fatal cocktail of arrogance — Kodak famously saw little point in sponsoring the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984 given its dominant position, allowing Fuji to gain a foothold in the U.S. market and grow its market share from almost nothing to 17% by 1997 — and a complete failure to articulate and execute a plan once the scale of the threat to the core business had become clearer. Fuji, faced with the same market dynamics and yet without the benefits of Kodak’s pioneering R&D, did not fall into the same trap.

To my mind, there is a clear read-across to the financial services industry, right now.

There is no shortage of activity. Market commentators and the media are lining up to sell their vision of both the El Dorado that lies just over the horizon and the sixth circle of Hell (heresy, for those of you who don’t know you Dante!) that awaits those who fail to convert to this new religion based on innovation. Every large player has got some sort of incubator or lab or chief innovation officer, whatever that is. Joint ventures are being formed. Data scrubbed. Analytics teams hired. Digital strategies unveiled. Billions of dollars is pouring into fintech and insurtech startups, most of which will likely not survive the first round of funding.

But does the innovation go far enough? Are the incumbents correctly reading the signs but merely agitating the surface in response, while deep down changing nothing? Are they like Kodak, incapable of imagining what tomorrow’s world could look like, because to do so conjures up an image so terrifying that it implies that they should torch their existing business so as to give birth to a new one from its ashes?

This question is of particular relevance to the insurance market, an industry whose often-archaic business practices and antiquated operating models, not to mention huge frictional costs and under-investment in IT systems, must have the financiers and techies in Silicon Valley licking their chops in anticipation. Show me another industry where a U.S. client, say, will find its risk placed via a local broker, via a U.S. wholesale broker, via a London wholesale broker, via an MGA, into a Lloyd’s syndicate, only to be reinsured via a FAC reinsurance broker to a reinsurer and then potentially via another treaty reinsurance broker to another reinsurer, with each stage of the chain clipping the ticket.

How much of every dollar of premium goes to providing the actual cover versus feeding a serpent in danger of swallowing its own tail?

It doesn’t take much imagination to see the huge potential for eliminating or automating steps in this chain, creating value for the disruptor and hugely improving client outcomes in terms of cost and service levels. But the real winners here will be those who have the scale, firepower and smarts to invest in the analytics and systems to drive not just marginal efficiency improvements in discrete parts of the value chain but to challenge the very basis of the way things are done. Traditional small to medium-sized players, therefore, unless they are operating in very specific niches, may find themselves at a long-term, structural disadvantage to larger and smarter players with more access to data and more ability to invest in the people and systems required to drive insight from it.

More critical than ever, however, will be client relationships and access. Improved analytics and slick systems is all fine, but if you don’t have the customer or the products and marketing skills to get to them, you’re wasting your time. That, at least, has not changed. In fact, if anything, in a more clinical, automated, digital world, client contact and warmth is set to become more important than ever.

This, is turn, raises an interesting question, though. While for years, brokers have operated under the somewhat existential threat of disintermediation, is the boot not now very firmly on the other foot? Unlike the insurers, who only know what they underwrite, the larger brokers, in particular, potentially have access to vast swathes of client and claims data across every single class of business and geography. Armed with this and the client relationships, and with a wall of capital looking to be deployed in the market (the rise of the ILS market bears potent witness) why do they need the insurers at all? Why not just rent the capital, underwrite the best business themselves and use the traditional market for the rest and to reinsure out the peaks? And if the brokers can do that, why not Google or Amazon, which have huge client reach and brand loyalty, unmatched analytical ability and the firepower to build, buy or hire in whatever insurance expertise they might need?

See also: 3 Ways to Improve Agent/Insurer Links  

Of course, the situation is not that simple. The market has not evolved in the way it has by accident. Large, complex and long-tail risks require huge balance sheets and often syndicated underwriting and reinsurance towers, to be written at all. Shareholder returns vary massively between brokers and insurers for a reason. In the rush to embrace the new, we risk ignoring all that works and that is good about the old. And because of this, change, when it comes, is likely to be more gradual and evolutionary.

But change it will, and, as the Kodak story shows, the key risk may well not be that people fail to recognize that the change is coming — I believe most do — but that they fail to imagine quite how radical that change could be and therefore fail to plan accordingly.

Henry Ford famously said that, “If I had asked people what they wanted, they would have said faster horses.”

The danger is that many risk now falling into the same trap.

The Dangers of Standing Still

One of the most telling episodes of Kodak’s slide into bankruptcy was how it incorporated digital capabilities into its Advantix camera system.

Kodak spent more than $500 million to develop and launch the Advantix in 1996. The system capitalized on emerging digital capabilities— especially the digital sensors that Kodak engineers had invented two decades earlier—to capture date, time, shutter speed and lighting conditions to produce better pictures. The strategy culminated in the Advantix Preview camera, which allowed photographers to preview shots and mark how many prints they wanted. Kodak gave users no ability to save the digital images, however. The Advantix required traditional silver halide film and prints.

Advantix flopped. Why buy a digital camera and still pay for film and prints? Kodak wrote off almost the entire cost of development.

Kodak’s strategic blunder was not because of a lack of technological prowess; it was because of an inability to embrace business model innovation. Kodak was the market-leading photo film, chemical and paper business. It bet its future on “the hope that demand for digital images would sell more film.” As a result, Kodak protected its traditional business to the bitter end—until others leveraged digital to make film irrelevant.

Judging from recent comments by Carlos Ghosn, Nissan’s chief executive, we might one day read about how Nissan repeated the pattern of Kodak’s decades-long blunder and demonstrated the dangers of standing still during a period of industry innovation (like what’s happening in insurance).

Ghosn has championed his company’s efforts to develop autonomous driving technologies to allow cars to operate without human intervention. And, unlike some other large automakers (such as Toyota), Ghosn does not dispute the technical feasibility of driverless cars.

But Ghosn views the choice of semi-autonomous vs. driverless as a strategic decision—and he is clear that his choice is to use autonomous technologies as incremental enhancements to cars with drivers. As reported by the Associated Press via the New York Times: Ghosn said Nissan sees autonomous vehicles as adding to driving pleasure, and a totally driverless car is not at the center of the automaker’s plans. The autonomous driving Nissan foresees will assist or enhance driving. Nissan may end up with a driverless car, but that was not the automaker’s goal, he said. “That is the car of the future. But the consumer is more conservative. That makes us cautious.”

In other words, Ghosn’s strategy is to hope that the demand for autonomous technologies will sell more cars. Like Kodak, he is aiming to reinforce Nissan’s current business model rather than embrace business model innovation.

By being cautious, however, Ghosn risks emulating Kodak’s failure by waiting for others to leverage driverless technologies to make traditional cars irrelevant. He also risks ceding emerging business innovations to Google, Uber and others willing to make driverless cars their explicit primary goal.

The unanswered question is whether Ghosn, behind the scenes, is parlaying his technological forward-mindedness into strategic preparedness.

Carlos Ghosn need not shed his caution. But, as I previously argued, trillions hang in the balance. Given those stakes, has Ghosn hedged Nissan’s strategic bets in case the driverless “car of the future” comes more quickly than he expects?

Some argue that, of course, Nissan won’t be caught flat-footed even if driverless cars come sooner than expected. Look, for example, at its research partnership with NASA. But research is not enough.

A trap that market-leading companies fall into is believing that they can catch up if their initially cautious strategies turn out to be wrong. One lesson that Paul Carroll and I found in our study of thousands of large company failures is that it is very hard to excise denial from multiple layers of the organization—even after objective evidence argues for doing so. Another lesson is that, while it is possible to catch up on raw technical expertise, it is hard to catch up after yielding multiple product-oriented learning cycles to competitors.

Take electric hybrid cars. A former senior technologist of one of the big automakers told me his company considered but rejected hybrid electric cars before Toyota launched the Prius. The automaker was at first dismissive of the Prius and then surprised by its market success. It did jump into the market with its own offering. But, the technologist bemoaned, it has not been able to catch up. With each model, Toyota gets further ahead. The company ceded too many learning cycles to Toyota.

The same could be happening with driverless cars.

Nissan espouses caution about driverless cars. Whatever research is going on in its labs is mostly hidden from the public (perhaps to not confuse the market or provide succor to competing strategies).

Google, on the other hand, will soon release 25 prototype driverless cars onto the streets of Mountain View, with plans to launch 75 more. Google’s self-driving cars have logged a collective 1.7 million miles and are adding about 10,000 miles per week, mostly on city streets. Google has not cracked all the issues involved with driverless cars. It has, however, created the ability to learn faster.

Kodak, as evidenced by its own tongue-in-cheek marketing video, ended up play “grab ass” for years with digital photography. Late attempts to “get serious” were too late. Even now, 40 years after Kodak engineer Steven Sasson invented the digital still camera, Kodak still struggles to realize the potential of its IP portfolio.

Likewise, every market-leading department retailer of the 1950s and ’60s, such as Macy’s, Woolworth’s and Ames, thought it could contend with discount retailers like Wal-Mart if the need arose.

Only Dayton Hudson took the discounting business model seriously. Rather than watch and wait, Dayton Hudson formed a discounting business unit and unleashed that subsidiary to compete as hard as possible against the traditional business. That discount subsidiary was named Target. Of the more than 300 department-store chains in the U.S. in the late 1950s, only Dayton Hudson/Target successfully moved into discount retailing. Most of the others preceded Kodak on the path to bankruptcy.

Rather than following in the footsteps of Kodak and all those defunct department stores, Nissan should be more like Dayton Hudson.

Instead of just betting on caution, Nissan should also unleash innovators to create its own driverless offering and charge them with competing as hard as possible against its traditional business.