Tag Archives: hugh carter donahue

Healthcare Debate Misses Key Point

As Congress considers another healthcare bill, the conversation continues to be about insurance, even though a form of reinsurance could solve many of the problems we face as a nation. The money for what I call “transparent health reinsurance” is already even in the various bills that Congress has considered; the more than $100 billion that has been designated for stabilizing healthcare insurance in the individual states would simply have to be redirected.

See also: Transparent Reinsurance for Health  

Transparent health reinsurance enables more people to receive better health care at less cost. As I wrote on this site in May 2016, “Transparent reinsurance programs could emerge as significant opportunities for healthcare providers, issuers, reinsurers, technology innovators and regulators to address health insurance.”

Transparent health reinsurance, pioneered by Marketcore, creates robust technologies that enable better, patient-centered health care through predictive analytics.

“Sharing information generates participation and creates cross-network efficiencies to enhance quality, improve delivery and reduce costs,” remarks Constance Erlanger, Marketcore’s CEO. “For healthcare insurers and providers, there are two key value-adds. First, the technologies incorporate any and all specific features a state and insurers in its jurisdiction may or may not include in state healthcare markets. Second, risk lenses clarify quality, delivery, outcome and cost across the 56 states and territories for transparent health insurance and healthcare services. Such robust information symmetry could rationalize healthcare insurance, quality and delivery. Such technologies, created by Marketcore, are already in development for bankers and insurers in multiple markets for complex risk assessments to finance recoveries from large-scale natural disasters.”

Everyone experiences strategic and financial advantage

Transparent health reinsurance supports these innovations by providing incentives that tackle the “widespread lack of transparency about both the costs and the effectiveness of treatments,” as Dr. Brian Holzer calls for in a timely article.

Any state could create a high-claim reinsurance pool managed by a recognized reinsurance operative. With supervision by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), a state insurance commission or its designee could invite qualified firms to function as a recognized reinsurer. These recognized reinsurers would work with qualified, innovative health service providers that demonstrate abilities to improve health outcomes at reduced expense.

The reinsurers would be part of a matrix solution, where some firms provide health management solutions, while others provide disease- specific solutions and others provide innovations in treatment. A state could, perhaps, elect to focus on the largest drivers of healthcare costs in its jurisdiction, such as chronically ill individuals or those with acute conditions that are difficult to predict.

Due to the technology’s granularity and clarity, a state could just as readily specify participation among all issuers for any plan being offered in its jurisdiction, including every participant in every plan or defining reinsurance participation for individuals with chronic conditions in employee-sponsored or state-managed plans.

Or, states could fund a high-claim reinsurance pool with a payment per covered life, preferably covering everyone in the state, thus lowering the per-life charge.

Pending state decision-making, employers would have the right to move employees into this pool, and would want to do so if it was clear that the innovative approaches reduced costs while improving health outcomes. Clearly, the lowest per-capita contributions would occur with the widest participation.

If a state targets the largest cost drivers, reinsurer and insurers would then work together to assign “high-claim” individuals to reinsurance pools once those individuals cross a defined expense threshold. Each individual would be assigned to one or more innovators under contract to deliver better health outcomes at reduced costs. An innovative tracking mechanism would measure and rank outcomes and savings. Crowd-sourced information would drive confidence scores.

Burgeoning digital applications managing chronic illness would yield voluminous, timely data, and blockchain technologies afford accountability.

Scoring would rank service providers and eliminate failed providers.

A state insurance commission or its designee as reinsurer could manage transparent health reinsurance as states reach management decisions with stabilization funds. A single designated entity could oversee a system that would reward innovative, successful healthcare delivery and quality. To that end, participating firms would be for proposals detailing expected improved health outcomes and costs.

The technology leverages continuing achievement. Some studies indicate 40% cost reductions for some chronic conditions. By adding transparency to these achievements, the technology scales to yield much lower overall healthcare costs, healthier populations and stabilized or lower insurer premiums.

At the end of each year, a new reinsurance pool would be formulated with adjustments based on actual experiences. If the previous pool ended up in surplus, a portion of that surplus would be retained in reserve, and any remaining amount could be returned to individuals, providers or both. If the previous pool ended up in deficit, the reinsurer could choose to fund that, with contributions in the following year meant to provide for recovery.

Several states could decide to form an umbrella reinsurance pool to cover some or all of their high-claim individuals.

All activities focus on improving health outcomes at reduced costs.

No state residents are asked to fend for themselves.

States are encouraged to develop innovative firms.

Overall health of state residents should improve, which would lead to a healthier economy.

Ultimately, state-related healthcare costs would decline.

In the process, transparent health reinsurance would animate highly profitable growth for corporations with domain strengths in mobile data, operating systems, search and social media. These firms could tap data and metadata markets by creating valuable, time-sensitive risk information and metrics. (With such robust technologies, privacy matters, and all platforms are HIPAA-compliant.)

As healthcare reform faltered in the Senate, Govs. John Kasich (R-Iowa) and John Hickenlooper (D-Colorado) called for bipartisan solutions. Technologies and tools are at hand to make those solutions possible.

“If I am for myself alone, who will be for me? If not now, when?” the prophet Hillel remarked centuries ago.

How Literature and the NFL Shed Light on Innovation

Baltimore Ravens Coach John Harbaugh complained that Patriots Coach Bill Belichick used deceptive tactics in a playoff game last weekend, after a novel, efficiently executed series of third-quarter plays disoriented the Ravens defense and helped power the Patriots to AFC championship game. But the complaint is short on Henry Wadsworth Longfellow and Ralph Waldo Emerson and overlarded with Edgar Allan Poe.

Everything about the Patriots resounds with innovation, resourcefulness and the persistence celebrated by Longfellow and Emerson.

In “Paul Revere’s Ride,” Longfellow expressly celebrates those virtues achieving independence against a stronger adversary:

“In the books you have read,

How the British Regulars fired and fled,

–How the farmers gave them ball for ball,

From behind each fence and farmyard-wall,

Chasing the red-coats down the lane,

Then crossing the fields to emerge again

Under the trees at the turn of the road,

And only pausing to fire and load.”

Individual and organization, player and team, succeed when all embrace innovation, as Emerson says in “Self-Reliance”: “Power…resides in the moment of transition from a past to a new state…. This one fact the world hates, that the soul becomes; for that forever degrades the past…. [A] man or a company of men, plastic and permeable to principles, by the law of nature must overpower and ride all cities, nations, kings, rich men, poets, who are not.”

The Patriots’ clever disguise of which players were eligible receivers and which ineligible presented a new way of reading, a fresh legibility executing so quickly that the Ravens could not read the play until it had transpired.

The play was simply another of Belichick’s irrepressible innovations. A decade or so ago, in two Super Bowls, linebacker Mike Vrabel deployed on offense and caught touchdown passes in both games.

Ravens Coach John Harbaugh’s choice of words after last week’s deception captures his frustration. “It’s a substitution type of a trick type of thing,” Harbaugh told journalists. “They don’t give you a chance to make the proper substitutions…. It’s not something that anybody’s ever done before…. They…announce the ineligible player, and then Tom Brady would take them to the line right away and snap the ball before we had a chance to figure out who was lined up where. That was the deception part of it.” A complaint got nowhere with the league. Celerity trumped incumbent legibility.

In effect, Coach Harbaugh is perseverating Poe.

Poe portends as much in the team’s namesake, the poem “The Raven”:

“Prophet!” said I, “thing of evil!-prophet still, if bird or devil!-

Whether Tempter sent, or whether tempest tossed thee here ashore,

Desolate yet all undaunted, on this desert land enchanted-

On this home by Horror haunted-tell me truly, I implore-

Is there—is there balm in Gilead?-tell me-tell me, I implore!”

Quoth the Raven “Nevermore.”

Of course, no one is saying “nevermore” about the Ravens or the coach, whose team did well in a competitive game and won a Super Bowl but two years ago.

But immersive reading in Emerson and Longfellow charts the Colts’ best shot prepping for the AFC championship game against the Patriots. Colts coaches and players would find few other drills as efficient or effective as they get ready to challenge New England champs.

Comprehension of Emerson’s and Longfellow’s insights shows how to innovate in a highly competitive game.

Whistleblower: Fed Defers to Big Banks

“This American Life” teamed up with ProPublica for a blockbuster story that Federal Reserve regulators defer to mega bank Goldman Sachs on compliance issues. Thanks to whistleblower Carmen Segarra, the report about the culture at the Fed was so explosive that Sen. Elizabeth Warren called for an investigation within 24 hours.

The whole mechanics of the story highlight the problems with our current system. But for a whistleblower coming forward, no one would likely learn of the big bank’s conduct or of regulators’ deference to it. Once she provided authentic, unimpeachable audio, a compelling broadcast led a legislator to call for an investigation, but any probe may or may not yield  findings of  wrongdoing. The main result seems likely to be publicity for lawmakers, regulators and bankers. All pretty much par for the course, underscoring the concern I expressed in an earlier piece that a lack of control by the Fed could leave banks and markets in the same sort of condition that led to disaster in 2008.

These issues are consequential for insurers not least because the industry holds $120 billion in mortgage-backed securities for commercial and multifamily real estate,  $336 billion in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBSs) and asset-backed securities (ABSs) and $365 billion in residential mortgage-backed securities, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association and Federal Reserve. The insurance industry relies on these investments for significant portions of its operating profits, so it needs a safe and efficient financial system.

A solution is at hand. “Interactive finance” addresses the insurance industry’s transparency needs with large banks by powering real-time monitoring and compliance as it creates efficient markets  and reduces regulatory costs.

Marketcore, a firm I advise, is pioneering interactive finance to generate liquidity by rewarding individuals and institutions for revealing information that details risks.

Interactive finance crowd-sources market participation by rewarding individuals, organizations and institutions seeking loans, lines of credit or mortgages or negotiating contracts with monetary or strategic incentives. These  rewards are  offered in exchange for risk-detailing, confidence-building disclosures that increase trading volumes. Whether risk takers are a bank, insurance company or counter party, all granters define rewards. A reward can constitute a financial advantage — say, a discount on the cost of information or transaction. The sale of the information more than makes up for the discounted fee. The time-sensitive grant of advantage can actually be directed to specific products, benefiting traders.

All this transpires on currently existing electronic displays broadband, multimedia, mobile and interactive information networks and grids. Interactive finance realizes a neutral risk identification and mitigation system with a system architecture that scans and values risks, even down to individual risk elements and their aggregations. As parties and counter parties crowd markets, each revealing specific risk information in return for equally precise and narrowly tailored rewards and incentives, their trading generates fresh data and meta data on risk tolerances in real time and near real time. This data and meta data can then be deployed to provide real-time confidence scoring of risk in dynamic markets. Every element is dynamic, like so many Internet activities and transactions.

Interactive finance constantly authenticates risks with constantly refreshing feedback loops. Risk determination permits insureds, brokers and carriers to update risks through “a transparency index. . . based. . . on the quality and quantity of the risk data records.”

Through these capabilities, Marketcore technologies connect the specific, individual risk vehicle with macro market data to present the current monetary value of the risk instrument, a transparency index documenting all the risk information about it and information on the comparative financial instruments. Anyone participating receives a comprehensive depiction of certainty, risk, disclosures and value.

There will be vastly more efficiency once interactive finance provides timely information that allows for easy monitoring by regulators and lawmakers, provides incentives for compliance by big banks and stimulates efficient markets.

There will be no more need for whistleblowers if interactive finance provides timely information that allows for easy monitoring by regulators and lawmakers that forces compliance by big banks and markets.

Is the Fed Going Soft on Big Banks?

In a Senate Banking Committee hearing earlier this summer, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet Yellen played their parts brilliantly. They acted out a time-tried political science convention, that legislators and journalists are judged on results while bureaucrats and professors are judged on rules.

At issue is Federal Reserve Board enforcement of its statutory obligations under Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act, to see to it that JP Morgan has orderly resolution plans in the event of failure. Broadly stated, that section of the Dodd-Frank Act empowered the Fed to impose “prudential standards” on bank holding companies with assets of at least $50 billion if an institution’s failure could affect “the financial stability of the United States.” The section also required the Fed to report its determinations annually to Congress.

The hearing demonstrated the limits of our current system and the need for interactive finance, by which I mean rewarding institutions and individuals with financial or strategic advantage for revealing information that details risk. Interactive finance will provide indispensable liquidity to crucial markets that currently see little trading. More importantly, interactive finance addresses the core challenges of concentrated market power in banking and of sclerotic market administration — of which Fed efforts to manage orderly resolution of JP Morgan are but a single, frightening circumstance.

The issues are crucial not just for our economy as a whole but for insurers, in particular, because they are such large investors in securities offered by major financial institutions. The investments generate a high percentage of the insurance industry’s operating profits but expose it to catastrophic losses. For instance, in mortgage-backed securities, insurers hold more than $900 billion in commercial and multifamily real estate mortgages, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association’s Q4 2013 report. (That’s $343 billion in commercial and multifamily mortgage debt plus $567 billion in commercial mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations and asset-backed securities.) The Federal Reserve tallies life insurance companies’ holdings of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) at $365 billion as of the end of the first quarter, 2014.

In that wonderfully well-acted hearing, Sen. Warren asked Chairwoman Yellen if JPMorgan could sell its assets without disrupting the economy and impelling a taxpayer bailout. Warren also asked: Where are those reports the Fed is to provide annually?

Warren was raising a key question: Is the Fed forbearing, being lenient on JPMorgan and other huge financial institutions?

Congress enacted Dodd-Frank in July 2010, and this March the Federal Reserve Board published 100 pages of rules and regulations implementing Section 165. That is a gap of 33 months. Congress has yet to see any Federal Reserve reports, but for a wholly lacking 35-page document, Warren asserts.

It’s possible that market administration is so complicated that it simply takes inordinately long to articulate and implement regulation and to report outcomes to Congress and the public. But the Warren-Yellen exchange revealed vastly more, specifically what appears to be a Federal Reserve policy to forbear on implementing its statutory obligations under Dodd Frank 165 in connection with JP Morgan and orderly resolution.

In the hearing, Sen. Warren expressly asked Chairman Yellen, “Can you honestly say that JPMorgan can be resolved in a rapid and orderly fashion…with no threats to the economy and no need for a taxpayer bailout?” And, “Are you saying the plans [for resolution] are not credible, and you’re asking them to change their plans?”

Yellen never really indicated that JPMorgan has any credible plan in place for its orderly resolution or has submitted any since 2012. Instead, she articulated process, iteration and feedback. Dodging Warren’s direct questions, Yellen essentially said that complexity drives inconclusiveness and explains the lack of annual reports to Congress. Yellen used the word, “feedback,” five times in her replies.

Both Yellen’s circumlocution on JPMorgan resolution and its outsized concentration are but symptoms of market and market administration sclerosis, which Warren is trying desperately to treat.

Absolutely brilliant performances by each woman. No question about it. As a legislator, Warren underscored that she wants results. As a regulator, Yellen adhered to processes and rules and the Federal Reserve Board’s traditional discretion in so weighty and complex a matter.

Requests for clarification from the Federal Reserve Board for this article elicited no further information about the important question: Is the Federal Reserve forbearing on implementation of Dodd-Frank 165 bank resolution?

End of story?

No. Two problems remain.

First, what of the JPMorgan resolution elephant in the room?
Why couldn’t Yellen assert simply to Sen. Warren that JPMorgan — with its $2.5 trillion in assets and 3,391 subsidiaries — has credible plans in place for rapid, orderly resolution without triggering a systemic threat or taxpayer bailout?

Could it be “the economy, stupid,” in James Carville’s bald turn of phrase? Monetary policy regulators repeatedly assert they have a very small palette of choices. At a conference of central bankers in Jackson Hole on Aug. 22, Yellen acknowledged that monetary policy makers are grappling with how to determine the best mechanisms to foster growth and to maintain price stability. “While these assessments have always been imprecise and subject to revision, the task has become especially challenging in the aftermath of the Great Recession, which brought nearly unprecedented cyclical dislocations and may have been associated with similarly unprecedented structural changes in the labor market — changes that have yet to be fully understood,” she said. Eleven days earlier, in a speech to a finance conference in Sweden, Fed Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer cautioned of protracted economic slowdown well over a dozen times as he articulated policy-making constraints. “In the United States, three major aggregate demand headwinds appear to have kept a more vigorous recovery from taking hold: the unusual weakness of the housing sector during the recovery period; the significant drag — now waning — from fiscal policy; and the negative impact from the growth slowdown abroad — particularly in Europe,” he said.

In such weak economies, the last thing Yellen or any senior regulator with any sense of self-preservation would do is to acknowledge that JPMorgan cannot credibly assert that it can resolve itself. Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz’s analysis (1963) that regulators — and not a spending crisis — triggered the Great Depression through monetary policy yet resounds in economic thinking. Hence all of Yellen’s process talk, for it would be incautious to respond negatively to Sen. Warren’s unambiguous questions whether JPMorgan can resolve itself without wreckage or bailout.

In the pantheon of Federal Reserve Board chairs, if one thinks of Fed Chairman William McChesney Martin (1951-1970) for probity, Arthur Burns (1970-1978) for concision, G. William Miller for brevity (1978-1979), Paul Volcker for decency (1979-1987), Alan Greenspan for obscurity (1987-2006) and Ben Bernanke (2006-2014) for agility, Yellen may be laying claim as the Fed’s Rocky Balboa. In winter and early spring, she said weather was the economy’s problem. In mid-summer, she gamely parried Warren’s Ted Kennedy, who was insisting government can do better.

Screenshot-2014-09-23-17.51.33Screenshot-2014-09-23-17.51.04

Second, what of sclerotic market administration? This represents the graver challenge. Warren got no answers or reports. Yellen advertised she cannot or will not enforce Fed rules. All they achieved is good video. Both came up empty.

Citizens voted for change six years and again two years ago. Certainly, voluminous regulation — the rules and regulations on Section 165 fill 100 pages with single-spaced, eight-point type — is a change in a very narrow sense from Bush-Cheney deregulation, outsourcing and selling of public resources and lands. However, such extensive regulation raises regulatory costs and seems to mainly benefit practitioners of crafting and evading the regulations rather than providing broader economic benefits.

Interactive Finance

Technology now affords near-real-time or even real-time market administration, providing the kind of protection that the Fed can’t and removing the JPMorgans of the world as existential threats to the economy. Interactive finance animates the next step to create wealth with the data and meta data. There’s everything to gain and nothing to lose.

Prudential valuation based on credit ratings has had its run. In terms of evaluating securities, the system is so laden with conflicts of interest between the rating agencies and the offering firms that it is amazing it has persisted after having such catastrophic effects in the 2008 asset crisis.

An International Accounting Standards Board/International Finance Reporting Standards draft report is exploring new approaches to risk management generally. And confidence accounting is receiving more traction for its greater transparency and accuracy than traditional, prudential valuation. Its robust explanatory powers support greater prospective certainty and exactness determining value and risk.

But the most promising possibility is interactive finance, which administers markets more efficiently than the incumbent regulatory system, so frustrating to Warren and Yellen alike, and more effectively than the compromised prudential valuation system.

Let’s begin with a shared orientation that information and data are the crucial wealth generation engines of the 21st century. Large search firms like Google and online retailers like Amazon or news and information content providers like Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters necessarily seek to exploit first-mover advantages and deep domain competencies by controlling as much of the data associated with their online businesses as possible. The new wealth in information is no less hoarded than pre-Internet wealth in fiat currencies, art, precious metals, insurance and real estate.
But remember: The markets are liberalized. Better mousetraps beat the world to innovators’ enterprises.

Airbnb is using an overlay of information to disintermediate hospitality and accommodations incumbents, and Uber is throwing hackney licensing for a loop. New entrants Datacoup and Meeco are enabling users to sell their data, even challenging the largest Internet firms in the world. And, because of liberalized markets, more and more innovation and individual and institutional wealth creation with data and meta data will take place.

Marketcore, a firm I advise, is pioneering interactive finance to generate liquidity by rewarding individuals and institutions for sharing information with financial or strategic advantage for revealing information that details risks.

Think of it this way: Interactive finance crowd-sources market participation by rewarding individuals, organizations and institutions seeking loans, lines of credit or mortgages or negotiating contracts with monetary or strategic incentives and rewards. Whether risk takers are a bank, insurance company or counter party, granters define rewards. A reward can constitute a financial advantage — say, a discount on the next interval of a policy for individuals purchasing retail products. The reward can express a strategic advantage — say, foreknowledge of risk exposure for institutions dealing in structured risks like residential mortgage-backed securities or bonds, contracts, insurance policies, lines of credit, loans or securities.

As crucially, transaction credits empower any and all market participants to act as granters of rewards. Individuals, organizations and institutions grant strategic or monetary incentives to counter parties seeking to acquire risks, too.

All this transpires on currently existing broadband, multimedia, mobile and interactive information networks and grids. Interactive finance realizes a neutral risk identification and mitigation system with a system architecture that scans and values risks, even down to individual risk elements and their aggregations. As parties and counter parties crowd markets, each revealing specific risk information in return for equally precise and narrowly tailored rewards and incentives, their trading generates fresh data and meta data on risk tolerances in real time and near real time. This data and meta data can then be deployed to provide real-time confidence scoring of risk in dynamic markets. Every element is dynamic, like so many Internet activities and transactions.

Talk about efficiency!

Crucially, interactive finance constantly authenticates risks with constantly refreshing feedback loops. Risk determination permits insureds, brokers and carriers to update risks through “a transparency index. . . based. . . on the quality and quantity of the risk data records.” Component analysis of pooled securities facilitates drilling down in structured risk vehicles so risk takers, including insurers and reinsurers, can address complex contracts and special pool arrangements with foreknowledge of risk. Real-time revaluation of contracts clarifies “the risk factors and valuation of [an] instrument” and, in so doing, “increases liquidity and tracks risks’ associated values even as derivative instruments are created.”

Through these capabilities, Marketcore technologies connect the specific, individual risk vehicle with macro market data to present the current monetary value of the risk instrument, a transparency index documenting all the risk information about it and information on the comparative financial instruments. Anyone participating receives a complete, comprehensive depiction of certainty, risk, disclosures and value.

Think how readily Chairwoman Yellen could respond to Sen. Warren with information replenished constantly and willingly by market participants and verified by constantly updating feedback loops.
Think how much Sen. Warren could ask regarding transparency. She’d receive a verifiable response, with great confidence.

Interactive finance allows for transparent markets capable of clearing and self-correcting. With interactive finance, legislator and regulator can get results and adhere to rules. Sen. Warren could administer vibrant, efficient, self-stimulating and self-correcting markets powered by information and data-verifying risks and clarifying confidence. Chairwoman Yellen could enforce Fed rules.
Both could get well beyond JPMorgan’s compliance issues to apply their appreciable talents administering information economies, the wellsprings of 21st century commerce and economic growth.

Smarter, Faster Trades — and Without Fraud

New York Times senior economic correspondent Neil Irwin did great public service in his Upshot column provocatively titled, “Why Can’t the Banking Industry Solve Its Ethics Problems?

While Irwin addressed the issue for investors in general, his column should hold particular interest for those in the insurance business because insurers are such large investors and generate such a high percentage of their operating profit from investments. In terms of commercial and multifamily real estate mortgages alone, insurers hold more than $900 billion of investments, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association’s Q4 2013 report. (That’s $343 billion in commercial and multifamily mortgage debt plus $567 billion in commercial mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations and asset-backed securities.) The Federal Reserve tallies life insurance companies’ holdings of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) at $365 billion as of the end of the first quarter, 2014. Insurers need the investment industry to clean up its problems if they are to get maximum value from these huge investments.

Why does fraud occur so repeatedly? Irwin ponders.

The answer: gamed markets.

Since the Great Depression, investments systems have relied on enforcement after the fact. If companies were investigated, prosecuted and found to have done something wrong, they were punished. Typically, this is now done through fines and stricter monitoring, meaning that current and future staff – not those in place at the time of the fraud – and shareholders bear the costs. Sometimes, individual perpetrators are forced to retire (with pensions). Only in the past few years have the Department of Justice, Federal Housing Finance Administration and Securities and Exchange Commission begun extracting hefty fines and settlements with the largest banks, such as: Citigroup’s $7 billion, JPMorgan Chase’s $13 billion and Bank of America’s $6.3 billion with FHFA and the reported $17 billion with DOJ in connection with residential mortgage-backed securities.

As Irwin notes, fraud continues to occur despite extensive efforts to address the problems that led to the near-collapse of the financial system that spawned the Great Recession.

Gaming the system through high-speed trading remains legal. As long as there is no insider trading, traders can greatly increase the speed of their transactions with network equipment, software and advantageous location of their computers.

Insider trading is illegal but hard to root out. Successful prosecution almost always entails a whistleblower coming forward to provide regulators with precise information. And coming forward as a whistleblower entails consequential career risks.

Two innovations address these systemic challenges by providing better information for the market in real time and creating a feedback loop that improves that information – rather than waiting until after the fact to police bad guys. The innovations are interactive finance and confidence accounting.

First, Interactive finance rewards institutions and individuals with financial or strategic advantage for revealing information that details risk. That information could be, for instance, about the changing value of a house, about the payment history of the mortgagee, other financial information about the borrower, etc. That information would stay with the mortgage even if it became part of a pool that was sliced and diced into mortgage-backed securities, so that a potential buyer could probe and could track changes in real time, rather than rely on a single-point-in-time evaluation by a ratings agency. Interactive finance – not enforcement – would keep agencies from giving their highest ratings to securities whose underlying assets were suspect, as happened with sub-prime mortgages in the buildup to the Great Recession.

Marketcore, an intellectual property firm I advise, offers such interactive finance technology. It supports the determination of risk for financial products, continuous revaluation and analysis of components of pooled securities, among other capabilities that make markets and clear them.

Its technology diminishes incentives for fraud by making opacity and concealment anachronistic and replacing them with transparency. The IP also charts effective pathways to employ crowd data and meta data for timely detection of risk, building on the growing availability of information in a “big data” world and allowing for a generational improvement in detecting risk and rating credit.

Second, confidence accounting yields greater transparency and accuracy than traditional, prudential valuation. In confidence accounting, you don’t just set a value for an asset. You say there is an xx% chance that the valuation will fall within a certain range. You then roll up all the assessments and have a probability-based understanding of the likely range of total value. You can also use the estimations as a feedback loop and identify people or institutions that consistently overstate value – if someone says asset values will fall within a certain range 95% of the time, do those values, in fact, fall within that range 95% of the time?

As risk expert David M. Rowe explains in a current Risk blog (citing work by Ian Harris, Michael Mainelli and Jan-Peter Onstwedder) confidence accounting can illuminate “the degree of uncertainty around valuation estimates…including how to partition uncertainty surrounding current valuation from the more familiar concept of risk from uncertain future events, and the messy issue of how to aggregate valuation uncertainty for specific positions into the implied uncertainty of net worth.”

Through these two innovations, interactive finance and confidence accounting, banks would have much easier times detecting rogues and suppressing rascals. In the process, banks would not only increase their own wellbeing but that of their shareholders, employees and the investing public, including insurance companies.

Going forward is now a simple business decision for us all. We must pick up the pieces of what we have learned and refashion and rebuild data-refreshing business models in which everyone can participate as an information merchant. We must deliver a common architecture in which data is consistently revalued, in a system that continually rewards disclosures about risks and values.

Interactive finance and confidence accounting are emergent technologies poised to  play key roles shaping and defining smarter, faster, ethical trades in 21st century finance.