Tag Archives: highmark

11 Questions for Ron Goetzel on Wellness

We thank Ron Goetzel, representing Truven Health and Johns Hopkins, for posting on Insurance Thought Leadership a rebuttal to our viral November posting, “Workplace Wellness Shows No Savings.” Paradoxically, while he conceived and produced the posting, we are happy to publicize it for him. If you’ve heard that song before, think Mike Dukakis’s tank ride during his disastrous 1988 presidential campaign.

Goetzel’s rebuttal, “The Value of Workplace Wellness Programs,” raises at least 11 questions that he has been declining to answer. We hope he will respond here on ITL. And, of course, we are happy to answer any specific questions he would ask us, as we think we are already doing in the case of the point he raises about wellness-sensitive medical events. (We offer, for the third time, to have a straight-up debate and hope that he reconsiders his previous refusals.)

Ron:

(1)    How can you say you are not familiar with measuring wellness-sensitive medical events (WSMEs), like heart attacks? Your exact words are: “What are these events? Where have they been published? Who has peer-reviewed them?” Didn’t you yourself just review an article on that very topic, a study that we ourselves had hyperlinked as an example of peer-reviewed WSMEs in the exact article of ours that you are rebutting now? WSMEs are the events that should decline because of a wellness program. Example: If you institute a wellness program aimed at avoiding heart attacks, you’d measure the change in the number of heart attacks across your population as a “plausibility test” to see if the program worked, just like you’d measure the impact of a campaign to avoid teenage pregnancies by observing the change in the rate of teenage pregnancies. We’re not sure why you think that simple concept of testing plausibility using WSMEs needs peer review. Indeed, we don’t know how else one would measure impact of either program, which is why the esteemed Validation Institute recognizes only that methodology. (In any event, you did already review WMSEs in your own article.) We certainly concur with your related view that randomized controlled trials are impractical in workplace settings (and can’t blame you for avoiding them, given that your colleague Michael O’Donnell’s journal published a meta-analysis showing RCTs have negative ROIs).

(2)    How do you reconcile your role as Highmark’s consultant for the notoriously humiliating, unpopular and counterproductive Penn State wellness program with your current position that employees need to be treated with “respect and dignity”? Exactly what about Penn State’s required monthly testicle check and $1,200 fine on female employees for not disclosing their pregnancy plans respected the dignity of employees?

(3)    Which of your programs adhere to U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF) screening guidelines and intervals that you now claim to embrace? Once again, we cite the Penn State example, because it is in the public domain — almost nothing about that program was USPSTF-compliant, starting with the aforementioned testicle checks.

(4)    Your posting mentions “peer review” nine times. If peer review is so important to wellness true believers,  how come none of your colleagues editing the three wellness promotional journals (JOEM, AJPM and AJHP) has ever asked either of us to peer-review a single article, despite the fact that we’ve amply demonstrated our prowess at peer review by exposing two dozen fraudulent claims on They Said What?, including exposés of four companies represented on your Koop Award committee (Staywell, Mercer, Milliman and Wellsteps) along with three fraudulent claims in Koop Award-winning programs?

(5)    Perhaps the most popular slide used in support of wellness-industry ROI actually shows the reverse — that motivation, rather than the wellness programs themselves, drives the health spending differential between participants and non-participants. How do we know that? Because on that Eastman Chemical-Health Fitness Corp. slide (reproduced below), significant savings accrued and were counted for 2005 – the year before the wellness program was implemented. Now you say 2005 was “unfortunately mislabeled” on that slide. Unless this mislabeling was an act of God, please use the active voice: Who mislabeled this slide for five years; where is the person’s apology; and why didn’t any of the analytical luminaries on your committee disclose this mislabeling even after they knew it was mislabeled? The problem was noted in both Surviving Workplace Wellness and the trade-bestselling, award-winning Why Nobody Believes the Numbers, which we know you’ve read because you copied pages from it before Wiley & Sons demanded you stop? Was it because HFC sponsors your committee, or was it because Koop Committee members lack the basic error identification skills taught in courses on outcomes analysis that no committee member has ever passed?

wellness-article

(6)    Why doesn’t anyone on the Koop Committee notice any of these “unfortunate mislabelings” until several years after we point out that they are in plain view?

(7)    Why is it that every time HFC admits lying, the penalty that you assess — as president of the Koop Award Committee — is to anoint their programs as “best practices” in health promotion? (See Eastman Chemical and Nebraska in the list below.) Doesn’t that send a signal that Dr. Koop might have objected to?

(8)    Whenever HFC publishes lengthy press releases announcing that its customers received the “prestigious” Koop Award, it always forgets to mention that it sponsors the awards. With your post’s emphasis on “the spirit of full disclosure” and “transparency,” why haven’t you insisted HFC disclose that it finances the award (sort of like when Nero used to win the Olympics because he ran them)?

(9)    Speaking of “best practices” and Koop Award winners, HFC’s admitted lies about saving the lives of 514 cancer victims in its award-winning Nebraska program are technically a violation of the state’s anti-fraud statute, because HFC accepted state money and then misrepresented outcomes. Which is it: Is HFC a best practice, or should it be prosecuted for fraud?

(10)    RAND Corp.’s wellness guru Soeren Mattke, who also disputes wellness ROIs, has observed that every time one of the wellness industry’s unsupportable claims gets disproven, wellness defenders say they didn’t really mean it, and they really meant something else altogether. Isn’t this exactly what you are doing here, with the “mislabeled” slide, with your sudden epiphany about following USPSTF guidelines and respecting employee dignity and with your new position that ROI doesn’t matter any more, now that most ROI claims have been invalidated?

(11)    Why are you still quoting Katherine Baicker’s five-year-old meta-analysis claiming 3.27-to-1 savings from wellness in (roughly) 16-year-old studies, even though you must be fully aware that she herself has repeatedly disowned it and now says: “There are very few studies that have reliable data on the costs and benefits”? We have offered to compliment wellness defenders for telling the truth in every instance in which they acknowledge all her backpedaling whenever they cite her study. We look forward to being able to compliment you on truthfulness when you admit this. This offer, if you accept it, is an improvement over our current Groundhog Day-type cycle where you cite her study, we point out that she’s walked it back four times, and you somehow never notice her recantations and then continue to cite the meta-analysis as though it’s beyond reproach.

To end on a positive note, while we see many differences between your words and your deeds, let us give you the benefit of the doubt and assume you mean what you say and not what you do. In that case, we invite you to join us in writing an open letter to Penn State, the Business Roundtable, Honeywell, Highmark and every other organization (including Vik Khanna’s wife’s employer) that forces employees to choose between forfeiting large sums of money and maintaining their dignity and privacy. We could collectively advise them to do exactly what you now say: Instead of playing doctor with “pry, poke, prod and punish” programs, we would encourage employers to adhere to USPSTF screening guidelines and frequencies and otherwise stay out of employees’ personal medical affairs unless they ask for help, because overdoctoring produces neither positive ROIs nor even healthier employers. And we need to emphasize that it’s OK if there is no ROI because ROI doesn’t matter.

As a gesture to mend fences, we will offer a 50% discount to all Koop Committee members for the Critical Outcomes Report Analysis course and certification, which is also recognized by the Validation Institute. This course will help your committee members learn how to avoid the embarrassing mistakes they consistently otherwise make and (assuming you institute conflict-of-interest rules as well to require disclosure of sponsorships) ensure that worthy candidates win your awards.

The Value of Workplace Wellness

The recent blog post by Al Lewis, Vik Khanna and Shana Montrose titled, “Workplace Wellness Produces No Savings,” has triggered much interest and media attention. It highlights the controversy surrounding the value of workplace health promotion programs that 22 authors addressed in an article published in the September 2014 issue of the Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, titled, “Do Workplace Health Promotion (Wellness) Programs Work?” That article also inspired several follow-up discussions and media reports, including one published by New York Times columnists Frakt and Carroll, who answered the above question with: “usually not.”

There are certainly many points of contention and areas for continued discussion on this topic. It turns out that Lewis et al. and I agree on many things, and there are other areas where we see things differently.

Where we agree…

Biometric screenings. Biometric screenings are important for collection of baseline health risk data and are often viewed as an added value by employees participating in workplace health promotion programs. Lewis et al. and I agree that employers should screen their workers for health risks in accordance with guidelines recommended by the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF). These guidelines are clear about the necessity and periodicity of biometric screenings for high blood pressure, obesity, cholesterol, glucose, triglycerides, cervical cancer, colon cancer, breast cancer and other conditions.

We agree that over-testing people is not a good idea and may lead to false positives, as well as unnecessary medical interventions that are costly and add little value. For readers seeking guidance on biometric screenings in a workplace setting, I refer them to a peer-reviewed article published in the October 2013 issue of the Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine.

Incentives. Workplace health promotion programs are not the same as incentive programs. “Smart” incentives are part of a well-designed program, but such programs need to be embedded in healthy company cultures where employers encourage and reward healthy behaviors. Comprehensive wellness programs often use financial incentives to attract participation and, in some instances, encourage behaviors that lead to risk reduction.

Most experts in workplace health promotion agree that creating intrinsic motivation for health improvement is an essential component of an effective program. As Daniel Pink points out in his book Drive, people are motivated to behave a certain way when they feel a sense of autonomy, when they are able to master certain skills needed to change a behavior and when they can connect changing that behavior to a larger purpose in life. This applies to individuals wishing to achieve certain health goals, such as quitting smoking, being more physically active and eating a healthier diet.

Paying people to improve their health in an unhealthy work environment is a futile strategy. Workers will expect higher payments each year, will view “non-compliance” as a penalty and will mistrust their employer for trying to do things to them instead of with them.

To summarize, incentives need to be practical, ethical and legal. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) legislation should not be used as a vehicle or excuse for “blaming” workers for poor health habits, or to penalize them financially for not achieving certain health outcomes. Employers share responsibility for the health and well-being of workers and can do much to create a healthy company culture.

For readers interested in a more in-depth discussion of health promotion incentive programs, I refer them to a series of Health Affairs blog posts and a guidance document prepared by the Health Enhancement Research Organization, American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, American Cancer Society and American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network, American Diabetes Association and American Heart Association.

Culture of health. We also agree that effective workplace health promotion programs need to be embedded within a culture of health that respects workers’ rights to make informed choices about personal health matters. Without question, workplaces need to be safe, and employees need to be treated with respect and dignity. Workers also have a right to be in a healthy work environment where positive health behaviors are encouraged and supported. That means making healthy food available in vending machines and cafeterias, encouraging physical activity, prohibiting on-site smoking, offering vaccination programs and providing health insurance.

The list of programs, policies and environmental supports for a healthy workplace is long, and there are hundreds of environmental and policy interventions available to employers who wish to send a clear message that the company encourages and supports good health. For a more complete discussion of how companies can achieve a healthy culture, see the May 2013 issue of The Art of Health Promotion.

The importance of studying “wellness-sensitive” events…in addition to overall utilization and costs. Lewis et al. highlight the need to focus on “wellness-sensitive” medical events when conducting cost analyses. I agree but ask the authors: What are these events? Where have descriptions been published? Who has reviewed them? Why do they only apply to in-patient claims? Are there not any “wellness-sensitive” events that would appear in out-patient settings?

The idea of analyzing claims for conditions likely to be most readily influenced by health promotion programs is sensible. In many of our studies, we have analyzed utilization and cost patterns for what we call “lifestyle diagnosis groups,” or LDGs. For example, in a 1998 peer-reviewed study, we evaluated Procter & Gamble’s health promotion program and found a 36% difference in lifestyle-related costs in the third study year when comparing 3,993 program participants with 4,341 non-participants.

Although it’s important to analyze a subset of diagnoses when evaluating wellness programs, it is equally important to analyze utilization and costs for all conditions. After all, one’s actual well-being and perception of well-being influences health holistically, not just any one particular organ or body system.

Where we disagree…

Whether only randomized trials can determine whether workplace programs are effective. Health services research and the field of epidemiology have a long track record of studying naturally occurring phenomena and drawing conclusions from observations of those phenomena. That’s how we have learned what causes hospital-acquired infections. We have also learned from long-lasting epidemiological investigations like the Framingham studies that a sedentary lifestyle, smoking and obesity are causes of heart disease, diabetes and cancers.

These “natural experiments” inform the scientific community about what happens to individuals or groups “exposed” to a condition, where others are not. Natural experiments are employed when a randomized controlled trial (RCT) is impractical or unethical.

How does this apply to evaluation of workplace health promotion programs? Imagine trying to convince the head of human resources of a company to approve a double-blinded randomized trial that would test the effectiveness of a wellness program, over three to five years, by randomly assigning some workers to a comprehensive health promotion program that includes health coaching on smoking cessation, weight management, physical activity and stress reduction while other workers are denied access to the program. Not only that, the HR executive would be asked to allow the researcher to administer a series of blood tests to participants and non-participants, access their medical claims and ask workers to complete periodic health surveys. The employer would also be prohibited from instituting organizational policies promoting health while this experiment is underway.

It’s hard to imagine a situation in which a company executive would allow this, never mind an institutional review board at a university.

Alternatively, when health services researchers conduct natural experiments, care is taken to control for any confounding variables and address alternative hypotheses. In our research, we use statistical techniques such as propensity score matching and multivariate regression to compare the health and cost experience of “treatment” workers (those offered health-promotion programs) and “comparison” workers (those not offered the programs). Most often, when comparing participants with non-participants, we match entire populations exposed to a program (whether or not individuals participate in that program) and those not exposed. In that regard, we are investigating program impacts on population health and not only comparing outcomes for motivated participants in programs compared with less motivated non-participants.

We publish our analyses in peer-reviewed journals so that the scientific community can review and critique our methods. We are also transparent about the limitations to our research in these peer-reviewed articles.

By the way, there are experimental studies focused on large populations (not necessarily at the workplace) demonstrating the value of health-promotion programs. One such trial was recently concluded by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) as part of the senior risk reduction demonstration (SRRD). Two vendors were involved in the demonstration, which lasted two to three years.  Beneficiaries participating in Vendor A’s risk-reduction programs achieved statistically significant improvements in stress, general well-being and overall risk, and beneficiaries participating in Vendor B’s program achieved statistically significant improvements in back care, nutrition, physical activity, stress, general well-being and overall risk.

Interestingly, the interventions were determined to be “cost-neutral,” meaning that Medicare spending for participants in the intervention group was not statistically different from spending for participants in the control group. This was a large-scale study where about 50,000 beneficiaries were recruited and approximately 20,000 participated in the health-promotion program in any given year. The bottom line: Significant health improvements were achieved at no cost to the government.

Interpreting the data. Lewis et al. highlight errors in others’ presentation of results. I have no argument with that. That is, after all, what a peer review process is all about: Conduct the study, subject it to peer review and publish the findings. The problem is that Lewis et al. have not (yet) published any studies in which their interventions are evaluated, nor have their methods been subject to peer review. That is unfortunate because I believe (truly) that all of us can learn from vetted research studies and apply that knowledge to future evaluations.

I am the first to admit that the methods we use to evaluate wellness programs have evolved over time and are still undergoing revisions as we learn from our mistakes. I invite Lewis et al. to reveal their methods for evaluating workplace programs and to publish those methods in peer-reviewed publications — we can all benefit from that intelligence.

Lewis et al. point to a study conducted by Health Fitness Corp. (HFC) for Eastman Chemical, which earned the company the C. Everett Koop Award. (In the spirit of full disclosure, I am the president and CEO of the Health Project. which annually confers the Koop prize to organizations able to clearly and unambiguously document health improvements and cost savings for their employees.) Eastman Chemical’s application is online and subject to review.

In their analysis of the Eastman Chemical application, Lewis at al. complain that costs for participants and non-participants diverged in the baseline years of the program; therefore, it was not the program that explains cost savings. Here’s the real story: Eastman Chemical’s program has been in place since the early 1990s. The chart found on the website (unfortunately mislabeled) shows participant and non-participant medical costs at baseline (2004), in subsequent years and in the final year of the study (2008).

The study compares medical and drug claims for minimally engaged (non-participant) and engaged (participant) employees matched at baseline (using propensity score matching) on age, gender, employee status, insurance plan, medical costs and other variables. No significant differences were found between participant and non-participant costs at baseline, but their claims experience differed significantly at follow up. Although not a perfect study, the economic results, coupled with significant and positive health improvements in many of the health behaviors and risk factors examined for a multi-year cohort of employees, convinced the Health Project board that Eastman Chemical earned the C. Everett Koop prize in 2011.

Whether return-on-investment (ROI) is the only metric for evaluating workplace health promotion programs. It seems that too much of the debate and controversy surrounding workplace health promotion is focused narrowly on whether these programs save money. If that were the aperture by which we judged medical care, in general, we would withhold treatment from almost every patient and for almost every procedure, with the exception of a few preventive services that are either cost-neutral or minimally cost-saving. That makes no sense for a compassionate society.

In a February 2009 Health Affairs article, I argued that prevention should not be held to a higher standard than treatment; both should be evaluated on their relative cost-effectiveness (not cost-benefit) in achieving positive health outcomes and improved quality of life.

Take a simple example of two employees. One has just suffered a heart attack and undergoes a coronary bypass. If the individual is willing, he is then engaged in counseling that encourages him to quit smoking, become more physically active, eat a healthy diet, manage stress, take medications to control blood pressure and see the doctor for regularly scheduled preventive visits. For that individual, I would be surprised if an employer providing medical coverage would demand a positive ROI.

How about a second employee? That person is overweight, smokes cigarettes, eats an unhealthy diet, is sedentary, experiences stress at work and has hypertension. He has not (yet) suffered a heart attack, although most would agree he is at high risk. To justify a health promotion program for that employee and others in the company, many employers insist on a positive ROI. Why is that a requirement? If a well-designed program can achieve population health improvement (as demonstrated using valid measures and an appropriate study design), and the program is cost-neutral or relatively inexpensive, why wouldn’t an employer invest in a wellness program, especially if is viewed as high value to both workers and their organization?

It’s time to change the metric for success. Instead of demanding a high ROI, employers should require data supporting high engagement rates by workers, satisfaction with program components, population health improvement, an ability to attract and retain top talent, fewer safety incidents, higher productivity and perceived organizational support for one’s health and well-being. That’s where program evaluations should be focused, not simply on achieving a positive ROI.

I appreciate the reality that some employers may still require an ROI result. Fortunately, there is evidence, published in peer-reviewed journals, that well-designed and effectively executed programs, founded on best practices and behavior change theory, can achieve a positive ROI. I won’t re-litigate this point, other than to point newcomers to a large body of literature showing significant health improvements and net cost savings from workplace heath promotion programs. (See, for example, studies for Johnson & JohnsonHighmark and Citibank and several literature reviews on the topic).

I challenge proponents and opponents of workplace wellness to direct their energy away from proving an ROI to measuring one or several of the important outcomes of interest to employers. Achievement of these outcomes is only possible when management and labor work toward a mutually beneficial goal — creating a healthy workplace environment. Health promotion programs require time to take root and be self-sustaining, but the benefits to employees and their organizations are worth the effort.

Wellness Industry’s Terrible, Horrible, No-Good, Very Bad Week

Just as the Bear Stearns implosion presaged the 2008 financial crisis, the events of the last few days, building on earlier events, are presaging the collapse of the “pry, poke, prod and punish” wellness industry.

For those readers still living in Biosphere 2, here is a brief review of how we got here:

First was Honeywell’s self-immolation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). We’re not sure how Honeywell’s benefits consultants failed to advise that all the company needed to do was offer a simple wellness program alternative that didn’t require medical exams, and there would be no way Honeywell would get hit with an  EEOC lawsuit. But they didn’t.

Second, the Business Roundtable (BRT) decided to go to the mat with the president over this EEOC-wellness issue. It is possible that there is some conspiracy at work here, where large companies really want to retain the ability to shame and fine overweight employees into quitting (because you can’t fire people for being overweight). But we lean toward a less sensationalistic interpretation: that the BRT is simply getting lousy advice, likely from consultants whose business model depends on more companies doing wellness. Because the BRT’s member CEOs have actual day jobs, they can be excused for taking the BRT’s word for the benefits of wellness and not investigating this industry on their own; if they did, they would find that the wellness industry attracts more than its share of well-intentioned innumerates and outright scoundrels, perhaps because the industry lacks adult supervision.

Third was our popular Health Affairs posting, which spurred see-we-told-you-so pickups by the Incidental Economist and Los Angeles Times, the latter of which helpfully added the word “scam” to the discussion.

Thus, we bore witness to a perfect storm, the first-ever lay media feeding frenzy on wellness, from both the right-leaning Federalist and the, uh, non-right-leaning All Things Considered. Those would be the first times wellness in general (as opposed to specific programs like, for instance, the Truven/Highmark Penn State debacle or Nebraska’s falsified outcomes) has attracted the lay media. Additionally, the comments, even on the typically erudite All Things Considered, were merciless. Skeptics that we are, we still underestimated employee resentment of forced screenings and risk assessments.

The wellness true believers’ rebuttals were quite in character. As we say in Surviving Workplace Wellness, in this field you don’t have to challenge the data to invalidate it. You merely have to read the data. It will invalidate itself. Because most of the true believers’ “A Team” are ethically compromised, they had to go to their bench to find a rebutter. Against all those eviscerations in the major national media, they countered with: Siyan Baxter, a graduate student at the University of Tasmania, who claimed a positive return on investment (ROI) for wellness. She wrote in a journal that contains the words “health promotion” in its very title and has never once published a negative article about wellness savings. Publication bias, anyone? That isn’t even the punchline. The punchline is that, as our book predicted, Ms. Baxter self-invalidated. She says, right in the article: “Randomized controlled trials show negative ROIs.”

How did she still come up with a positive assessment of wellness? Because she “averaged” those ROIs with studies she herself describes as low quality, to get a positive ROI. (These 5- to 30-year-old studies were conducted in an era when, as the award-winning book The Big Fat Surprise observes, the American Heart Association bestowed a “heart-healthy” endorsement on every box of Kellogg’s Frosted Flakes.)

Her approach is, of course, is like averaging Ptolemy and Copernicus to conclude that the earth revolves halfway around the sun.

The other rebuttal was from Professor Katherine Baicker, who is considered a deity in this field because she basically launched it with a claim, published five years ago in Health Affairs, that wellness achieves a very precise 3.27-to-1 ROI. (As with Baxter, the wellness programs where Baicker found savings were conducted during the era when the AHA apparently conflated Tony the Tiger with Dean Ornish). Having recently stated she no longer had interest in wellness and having more recently blamed readers for relying on the headline “Workplace Wellness Can Generate Savings” and not reading the fine print, she nonetheless decided to defend her legacy.

Her defense on NPR is worth reviewing. Baicker said: “There are very few studies that have reliable data on the costs and benefits.” That, of course, is not the case – the wellness true believers’ own meta-analysis above shows that in well-designed assessments, the programs lose money. Baicker also said: “It could be that when the full set of evidence comes in, it will have huge returns on investment, and the billions we’re spending on it are warranted.”

This all sounds a little different from the three significant digits of: “Wellness achieves a 3.27-to-1 ROI.” And it is invalid because, as any epidemiologist knows – and as Dr. Gilbert Welch elegantly explained in Overdiagnosed — if an impact is truly meaningful, it would show up in a small or medium-sized sample. This means that, if indeed there were “billions” to be saved, we’d know it based on the hundreds of millions of employee-years that have been subjected to wellness in the last 10 years.

The “full set of evidence” is already in….and it’s game, set and match to the skeptics.