Tag Archives: department of industrial relations

Appeals Court Settles Key Work Comp Issue

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit has issued its long-awaited decision in the Angelotti Chiropractic Inc. v Baker case. In what can only be considered a resounding win for both the legislature’s power to create the workers’ compensation system and the Department of Industrial Relation’s authority to enforce the provisions of SB 863, the appeals court has, in its 32-page decision, upheld the portions of the lower court’s decision that were favorable to the DIR and reversed the portion that had challenged the validity of the statutory scheme. The result is a knockout, but not necessarily final, victory for the legislature and employer community’s efforts to rein in lien litigation madness.

One of the hallmarks of the most recent reforms to the worker’s compensation system in SB 863 was the adoption of both lien filing and lien activation fees. The intent of the fees was to filter out some of the less valid liens, encourage realistic settlement of liens before litigation and ultimately reduce the backlog of pending liens. Under the structure legislatively created, liens filed before Jan. 1, 2013, (the effective date of the statute) would be subject to an “activation fee” of $100 to actively pursue the lien before the W.C.A.B. Additionally, all pending liens as of Jan. 1, 2013, were required to have paid an activation fee by Jan. 1, 2014, or else be dismissed by operation of law. The second prong of the effort to reduce the backlog was to require lien claimants filing after Jan. 1, 2013, to pay a $150 filing fee. The challenge in this case was to the lien activation fee only, but the case has been watched carefully as similar arguments have been made in opposition to the lien filing fee. For many, Angelotti was considered a bellwether case on the lien fee validity.

Not surprising, shortly after its passage, the issue of the validity of the lien fee provisions in SB 863 was attacked in court with various challenges. In a ruling with what appeared to have the most potential for the challengers, a lower court had previously ruled that the plaintiffs in the Angelotti litigation had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of prevailing in their efforts to have the lien activation fee provisions declared unconstitutional. While by no means final, the resulting decision was accompanied by a temporary restraining order prohibiting the DIR from enforcing the lien activation fee provision. In its decision, the lower court rejected some of the plaintiff’s arguments that the lien activation fee violated constitutional prohibitions under the takings clause and the due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution. That part of the claim was dismissed. The lower court, however, was much more impressed with the equal protection arguments advanced by the plaintiffs, finding that the different treatment of institutional lien claimants vs. direct medical providers did not constitute a rational distinction. As a result of the temporary injunction, the DWC suspended its enforcement of the lien activation fee provisions but appealed the ruling.

In its decision, the appeals court upheld the district court’s rulings dismissing the plaintiff’s causes of action based on the takings and due process arguments, finding that the lower court’s rationale was well-founded. (The dismissal of those issues had been sought by the Angelotti plaintiffs.) However, in response to the defendant’s appeal of the restraining order and the failure to dismiss the equal protection claim, the court soundly rejected the lower court’s ruling that plaintiffs had established a probability of prevailing on an equal protection argument, reversing that holding and vacating the existing restraining order prohibiting the DIR from enforcing the lien activation fee provisions. That argument was based on the different treatment between institutional lien claimants (such as insurance companies) and private lien claimants (such as individual practitioners).

In reversing the lower court, the circuit court found the distinctions created by the legislature were both rational and within the wide latitude of the legislature to create:

“The legislature’s approach also is consistent with the principle that ‘the legislature must be allowed leeway to approach a perceived problem incrementally.’ Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 316; see also Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 124 (1929) (stating that ‘[i]t is enough that the present statute strikes at the evil where it is felt and reaches the class of cases where it most frequently occurs.’). Targeting the biggest contributors to the backlog-an approach that is both incremental, see Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 316, and focused on the group that “most frequently” files liens, see Silver, 280 U.S. at 124,-is certainly rationally related to a legitimate policy goal. Therefore, on this record, ‘the relationship of the classification to [the Legislature’s] goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.'”

The appellate court further noted it was the plaintiff’s burden to negate “every conceivable basis” that might have supported the distinction between exempt and non-exempt entities. The circuit (appellate) court said the district court did not put the plaintiffs to the proper test in this regard, instead rejecting the argument made by the defendants (DIR) that the activation fee was aimed at clearing up a backlog of liens. The circuit court found multiple flaws with the lower court’s analysis on this argument, including that it failed to give proper deference to the legislature’s fact finding. Instead, the court held the proper application of correct legal principles demonstrated the plaintiffs, rather than showing a likelihood of success, actually showed no chance of success:

“…that plaintiffs have no chance of success on the merits because, regardless of what facts plaintiffs might prove during the course of litigation, ‘a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.’ See Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315. Thus, the presence in the commission report of evidence suggesting that non-exempt entities are the biggest contributors to the backlog is sufficient to eliminate any chance of plaintiffs succeeding on the merits.”

While the plaintiffs in this matter have further appeal rights, it does not appear that under this decision the plaintiffs will be entitled to a trial at the lower court. The court not only vacated the injunction but took the unusual step of reversing the trial court’s denial of defendant’s petition to dismiss the equal protection cause of action. As noted in the above quote, the legislative authority to fashion a remedy effectively eliminated any chance of plaintiff’s prevailing.

Comments and Conclusions:

While the decision in this appeal took some time to come, the finality of the decision, and the tenor of the court’s ruling, will undoubtedly be considered well worth the wait. By reversing the lower court’s failure to dismiss the equal protection clause, the appellate court left very little opening for preservation of this lawsuit. While the plaintiffs can both ask for a rehearing and appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, those levels of appeal come with rapidly diminishing probability of success.

With the DIR no longer hamstrung by the restraining order, we can anticipate a rapid enforcement of the lien regulations requiring activation fees. What will be a fascinating sideshow to this will be what happens to the provisions of Labor Code § 4903.06(a)(5), the requirement to pay the activation fee on any pre-1/1/13 lien claim on or before 1/1/14, a date long since passed. The DWC stopped collecting activation fees pursuant to the now vacated restraining order shortly after the TRO issued. Interestingly the language on the W.C.A.B.’s website indicated lien claimants were not obligated to pay the activation fee to appear at a hearing or file a DOR. However, it makes no mention of the dismissal language in 4903.06.

It is highly likely that few if any lien claimants paid activation fees by 1/1/14. It also seems unlikely, though not necessarily impossible, that the DIR or W.C.A.B. will be able to enforce the dismissal by operation by law provisions without allowing some kind of grace period for lien claimants to comply with the activation fee requirement before lowering the boom on liens without such fees. Lien claimants are now in something of a no man’s land with the faint hope that a further appeal may save them from the lien activation cost, but the compliance clock will probably be ticking, and once it stops the jig will be up on their liens.

It would certainly make sense for any current lien claimants, especially those who are set for hearings, to start looking into complying with the activation fee requirements. Showing up at the W.C.A.B. on a pre- 1/1/13 lien claim without having paid the activation fee may very well result in dismissal in the very near future. For defendants, with the TRO no longer in force, it is game on as far as activation fees are concerned. I intend to start raising the issue tomorrow…(or at least at my next hearing with a pre-1/1/13 lien claim).

On a side note, a similar case in state court, Chorn v Brown, was also recently decided in an unpublished decision. In that case, a lien claimant had challenged the lien statutes on both activation and lien filing fees. The case has been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the superior court. As a practical matter, the dismissal is really more of a procedural issue than a substantive one. The court of appeal noted the proper remedy for Chorn was to pursue a petition for writ of mandamus in the court of appeal, a step Chorn has actually initiated. However, a petition for writ of mandamus requires an appellate court to decide the issue has merit, a rather dubious proposition at this point. However, it is one more step to finally clearing up the DIR/DWC/W.C.A.B.’s authority to deal with the lien morass that, while somewhat abated in the past couple of years, continues to plague the system.

A Key Ruling on Workers’ Comp in California—and What It Means

The workers' compensation community watched anxiously for months as the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California considered a constitutional challenge to the lien activation fee — an important component of the 2012 reforms in Senate Bill 863. In the case (Angelotti Chiropractic, et al. v. Christine Baker, et al.), Judge George Wu ruled on Nov. 12 that the fee is indeed unconstitutional based on the Equal Protection provisions of the U.S. Constitution. His reasoning was that there was no rational basis for exempting large institutional lien holders (health care plans, union trusts, etc.) from the activation fee and that all lien claimants should either be in or out when it comes to filing fees.

The injunction against enforcing the lien activation fee took effect on Nov. 19. In anticipation, the Division of Workers’ Compensation notified the community Nov. 15 that it would no longer be requiring the fee be paid for liens filed prior to Jan. 1, 2013.

It is important to note that there are two filing fees enacted in SB 863. The one that applies to liens filed prior to Jan. 1, 2013, is the lien activation fee and is the subject of the federal lawsuit. The other is the lien filing fee, which is not affected by this litigation. In addition, statutory and regulatory changes made in SB 863 and the regulations adopted by the Division of Workers’ Compensation eliminate liens for most service providers that are subject to a fee schedule for dates of service on and after Jan. 1, 2013.

That is not to say that the injunction against enforcement of the activation fee is inconsequential, for it most certainly is not. In the last two calendar quarters of 2012 alone, more than 800,000 liens were filed. Of those, almost two-thirds are in Los Angeles County. Most of these have not moved through the system, undoubtedly because some lien claimants were waiting to see whether the activation fee was going to be upheld. It is assumed that many of these liens were never going to be filed because of the activation fee. As such, many liens would have expired by operation of law on Jan. 1, 2014. That, too, is now part of the unknown that comes from the Court’s decision.

Obviously, the Department of Industrial Relations and claims administrators are not happy with this ruling. To a certain extent, neither are the plaintiffs in the case, who saw two of their three claims summarily dismissed by the court. Whether these issue now go up to the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals remains to be seen. Plaintiffs, and indeed all lien claimants regardless of whether they were parties, have secured the relief they sought – enjoining the activation fee—but that could be put at risk if there is an appeal. Conversely, while the Department of Industrial Relations disagrees with the finding that the activation fee is unconstitutional, the fact that Judge Wu dismissed the claim that the activation fee constituting a “taking” of private property is a big win for proponents of SB 863 – for the taking argument has much broader implications than does the Equal Protection argument that Judge Wu found persuasive.

Because the Jan. 1, 2014, dismissal by operation of law date on old liens has been enjoined, it is not automatic that there will be a flood of activity on liens filed before Jan. 1, 2013, at the Appeals Board before year end. It is a fair observation, however, that liens many in the community thought would be extinguished by operation law won’t be. Whether those liens are going to be the subject of Appeals Board hearings and ultimately paid, however, remains uncertain. And uncertainty is a chronic symptom of our oft-ill but rarely cured workers’ compensation system.

And in case no one noticed, on Nov. 14 a new federal lawsuit was filed challenging both the lien activation fee and the lien filing fee. The plaintiff, who is seeking class action certification, is also demanding disgorgement of fees paid and reinstatement of any lien dismissed for failure to pay the appropriate fee. That case is Kancilia v. Brown, et al. and was filed in a different federal district court than Angelotti.

The transition from one set of rules to another on the heels of major legislative changes is never easy, regardless of the subject matter. In time, because of the other changes wrought by SB 863, the disruption caused by these suits will work its way through the system. Relief from the costs associated with the lien process will be delayed, and the income the fees provide to the Division of Workers’ Compensation will be less than anticipated, but ultimately the lien problem will be solved – just later than most had hoped.

SB 863 Update: Is the California Workers’ Compensation System Better Than it Was One Year Ago?

The passage of SB 863 in California came with a promise of higher benefits for injured workers and lower costs for employers.  Just over one year later, where does this promise stand?There has been improvement, but there is still a long way to go.

I recently attended and spoke at the California Workers’ Compensation & Risk Conference in Dana Point, California, where, as expected, the major focus was SB 863.  Just over one year ago, employers and labor came together at the end of the legislative term to pass a bill designed to improve benefits for workers and reduce costs for employers.

I moderated the opening session, which was a diverse panel featuring representatives from employers, carriers, injured workers, and medical providers. My first question to the panel set the tone for the rest of the session, and for the rest of the conference. That question was: “From your viewpoint, is the California workers’ compensation system better off now than it was a year ago?”

Before you can gauge the success of SB 863, you must remember where we started.  Permanent disability (PD) benefits to injured workers had been cut significantly under prior reforms, so injured workers were unhappy with the system. Employers were equally unhappy, as workers’ compensation costs in California had been increasing steadily for years.

With a system that both injured workers and employers were very dissatisfied with, something had to be done.

SB 863 provided an immediate increase in permanent disability benefits for accidents occurring after 10/10/2013.  PD is being increased by a total of 30%, phased in over two years. There is also a $120 million fund to compensate certain workers who are unable to return to their pre-injury job because of physical restrictions.

The savings for employers are to come over time.  The largest of the savings under SB 863 are to come from changing the processes for liens and medical disputes. Thus far, these changes are receiving mixed reviews.

On the plus side, liens have fallen significantly since a fee for filing them was implemented Jan. 1. Some of the drop can be attributed to the fact that medical providers filed all the liens they could before the fee took effect. However, there clearly has been a significant drop in new liens filed.

The filing fee is being challenged, though, by a lawsuit that seeks to have it declared unconstitutional, and some of the anticipated savings from SB 863 are likely to be eroded if the courts don’t uphold the fee.

The bill also restructured the medical dispute resolution process, with the introduction of the Independent Medical Review (IMR). The IMR process was modeled after successful programs in states such as Texas. It is designed to have physicians, not judges, deciding disputed medical issues. It is also designed to expedite resolution so appropriate treatment is provided to injured workers in a timely manner. The IMR process clearly remains a work in progress. First, 10 months after implementation, the process is still operating under emergency rules. Until the final rules are in place, those participating in the process will face uncertainty. Second, it appears there is significant gaming of the IMR process. Approximately 16,000 requests were filed in both August and September of this year alone, significantly more than anticipated.  In one month, there were more disputes filed than in an entire year for the same process under group health.  Employers alone bear the costs of the IMR process, so those filing all these requests may be attempting to cripple the system at absolutely no cost to themselves.

The issues facing the IMR and lien processes illustrate what many see as the major impediment to delivering cost savings for employers in California: There are special interest groups that do not want the system to become more efficient and self-executing, because they make a great deal of money off the chaos.

In her speech at the conference, Christine Baker, director of the California Department of Industrial Relations, expressed concern about “significant gaming.” While this gaming is not unique to California, from my national viewpoint its impact on the workers’ compensation system is more profound in California than in other states.

The biggest challenge is that the workers’ comp system in California is flawed by design. No other state has issues with medical liens in workers’ compensation. Bills are reduced to fee schedule with no further disputes seeking additional payment. Treatment that is not authorized is subject to litigation over necessity. If the employer prevails, “no” means “no.”  In California, “no” means “file a lien and litigate further.”

Another issue facing California employers is continuous trauma (CT) claims, which can be filed for a 1% aggravation of a pre-existing condition. The legislature recently fixed this problem for the National Football League by passing a bill specifically limiting CT claims by professional athletes, but CT claims in California continue to be a significant cost driver for other employers, and their frequency has more than doubled over the last 10 years.  It is common in California for injured workers to file both CT and specific injury claims for the same body part.  In no other state are CT claims as prevalent and embedded into the workers’ compensation system as they are in California.

In addition, allocated loss adjustment expenses (ALAE) covering items such as bill review, utilization review, and litigation costs are higher in California than other states, and these costs are increasing at an alarming rate.

The gaming of the system significantly increases the costs for employers and delays the delivery of benefits to injured workers.  The main stakeholders in workers’ compensation, the employers and workers, need to work together so that benefits can be delivered faster and at lower cost.  SB 863 was a step in this direction, but there is more work to be done. The people who worked together to make SB 863 a reality need to continue to work together to preserve the savings elements designed into the bill.  If they can do this, perhaps California can finally achieve some stability in its workers’ compensation marketplace, which would benefit both employers and injured workers.

On Hand-Eating Clams And Independent Contractors

Is that guy you have doing that work you need done an independent contractor or an employee? Why does it matter? Well, aside from a whole host of other issues, liability for industrial injuries may hinge on whether that worker was an employee or an independent contractor.

Your humble author recently had occasion to visit his uncle Olaf. For those familiar with the exciting sport of competitive clam-breeding, you’ll no-doubt have heard of Olaf the Clamtastic, world-famous for his exceedingly rare clam-breeding abilities. He also has a business which sells the Giant Clams he raises, “Olaf’s World of Clams.” “Uncle Olaf,” I said, “who is that nice young man cleaning your prize-winning clams?” Uncle Olaf looked up from his magazine, Clams and Claims, and peered at his Olympic-sized swimming pool, the one where his giant clams ruled and all others feared to tread.

There, scrubbing the giant clams, was a young gentleman with a nervous look concealed by goggles and a breath mask.

“Oh,” said Uncle Olaf, “That’s Jim — he’s my independent contractor helping me keep the Clams clean.” As Uncle Olaf turned the page with one of his two hook-hands, I remarked “it’s a good thing he’s a contract worker and not an employee, those clams can be vicious!” But, the workers’ compensation defense attorney in me felt something was amiss. So, being the good nephew that I am, I asked Uncle Olaf, “how do you know he’s a contractor and not an employee?”

Uncle Olaf smiled, as if his silly nephew couldn’t be any sillier, and said “because I didn’t buy workers’ compensation insurance for him, of course!”

Poor Uncle Olaf …

The State of California does not require independent contractors to be covered by workers’ compensation insurance. In theory, one could have a thriving business using nothing but independent contractors and saving untold fortunes on workers’ compensation policy payments.

But, the law requires employers to either self-insure or obtain workers’ compensation insurance for their employees. And, much to Uncle Olaf’s surprise, the nature of a relationship, with respect to employer or contractor, is not determined by the possible employer’s purchase or failure to purchase workers’ compensation insurance. There is another test out there …

But, let’s start with the basics.

California Labor Code section 3353 defines an independent contractor as “any person who renders service for a specified recompense for a specified result, under the control of his principal as to the result of his work only and not as to the means by which such result is accomplished.” Section 3353 was enacted in 1930, codifying the common law distinction between employees and independent contractors. But, this distinction wasn’t concerned with workers’ compensation, but rather with tort law. Whereas an employee could make his employer liable for injuries caused to third parties (imagine an employee-bartender accidentally dropping a crate of fine whiskey on a poor bar patron — an unbearably cruel thought, I know, but one necessary to shock and make the point), the liability buck stopped with an independent contractor.

But, as California Labor Code section 3357 specifically excludes independent contractors from the presumption of employment (and therefore the presumed requirement for the employer to insure or self-insure against those workers’ industrial injuries), the issue is an important one — and case-law expanded the test. So, poor Uncle Olaf can’t put his checkbook away just because he never took it out to insure against a worker’s injuries. Uncle Olaf can’t even put his checkbook away just because he doesn’t micromanage the work or “control the means by which such result is accomplished.”

After all, Uncle Olaf thought that, so long as he doesn’t stand over the young gentleman’s shoulder … hovering … judging … making little comments and directing his every move (“you missed a spot, scrub that clam harder, put your hand inside the clam to get a better grip …”) the young gentleman could remain an independent contractor and Uncle Olaf could laugh at the competitor Clam stores paying insurance premiums every month.

So, dear readers, there I sat in my beloved Uncle Olaf’s kitchen as he ground his hooks into his wooden table, nervously watching the man he hired to clean his prize-winning clams for his Clam sale business, who he thought was his independent contractor but was actually allegedly (your humble author is a zealous defense attorney, after all) an employee, place his hands inside the snappiest of Uncle Olaf’s prize-winning clams. “Scrub from the outside!” he shouted, but the young gentleman cleaning the clams couldn’t hear him …

The California Supreme Court issued its opinion in the case of S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989), outlining the proper analysis for determination of the question of employment or independent contractor status. S. G. Borello & Sons owned farmland near Gilroy (a place with a wonderful Garlic Festival). Although they kept regular employees for the various crops grown on these farms, for cucumbers, the nature of the market dictated another approach. Cucumber harvesting was contracted out to various migrant farm-worker families.

The families were provided with the opportunity to lay claim to a certain amount of plots of cucumbers, were provided with crates into which to harvest the cucumbers, but were otherwise left to their own devices. The cucumbers were sold to a pickle company in the area, and the profits were shared between the land-owners and the harvesters.

For the multi-week cucumber harvesting season, the harvesters were responsible for taking care of the cucumbers, picking only those ripe and ready for picking, and generally seeing about maximizing profits. The most aggressive task-masters in S.G. Borello & Sons employ found themselves absolutely powerless at the edge of the cucumber plots, for no employees dwelt there — only independent contractors.

That is, until, the Department of Industrial Relations issued a stop-work order. Finding that the independent-contractors were actually employees, and uninsured employees at that, the Department of Industrial Relations went on the war path against poor Mr. Borello and his sons (as well, effectively, against all other farmers in the Gilroy area that adopted the same practices).

Borello’s argument before the Supreme Court was simple — unlike other crops, cucumbers required a degree of knowledge and skill for harvesting, and the harvest workers were compensated for the final product and not the means of rendering service. But the Supreme Court found that other factors, primarily found in the Restatement Second of Agency, play into the analysis as well, among them:

  1. The right to discharge at will, without cause;
  2. Whether the worker is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
  3. Whether the occupation, in that locality, is typically performed by a specialist without supervision;
  4. The skill required in the particular occupation;
  5. Whether the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place for doing the work;
  6. The length of time for which services are performed;
  7. The method of payment (hourly or by task);
  8. Whether the work is part of the regular business of the principal; and
  9. The intent of the parties.

The Borello Court noted that “under the [Workers’ Compensation] Act, the “control-of-work-details” test for determining whether a person rendering service to another is an ’employee’ or an excluded ‘independent contractor’ must be applied with deference to the purposes of the protective legislation.”

The Court also noted that the workers made minimal investment in their work — no heavy equipment but just basic tools.

Other cases followed too.

In the case of Jose Luis Lara v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (2010), for example, the Court of Appeal examined whether a garden-variety handy-man could be an independent contractor. Lara sustained a pretty serious injury while doing work for a small shop called Metro Diner. Metro Diner didn’t have Lara covered by its workers’ compensation policy because he had no regular employment — he was called up to do odd work such as trimming bushes along Metro Diner’s roofline.

Lara provided his own equipment, paid his own taxes, and, although he was paid by the hour, was hired by the job rather than on a general basis. Nor did Metro Diner set Lara’s hours — he was just told to come early or late to avoid interfering with the operation of the Diner.

The workers’ compensation Judge found that Lara was an employee, and the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board reversed. In affirming the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board’s finding that Lara was a contract employee, the Court of Appeal cited Borello. Specifically, the Court noted that gardening was Lara’s line of work (and not the Diner’s), that Diner could not control the manner of Lara’s work, Lara had his own clients (other than Diner), and Lara had a substantial investment in his business (lots of tools, equipment, etc.).

As Uncle Olaf scratched his head (very carefully, mind you, as those razor sharp hooks hurt!), I could see that he wasn’t convinced. His prize-winning, hand-eating, giant-clam-raising mind was working. What else did Uncle Olaf think he had up his sleeve?

Uncle Olaf was beginning to get worried — what if his upstart nephew was right and, even though Uncle Olaf didn’t get insurance for the Clam Cleaner, an employment relationship was formed. After all, if Mr. Clam Cleaner was an employee, Uncle Olaf would be liable for any injuries sustained by Mr. Clam Cleaner, and, having lost both hands to giant Clam Bites before, was very much aware of the risks involved.

“I’m pretty sure he is an independent contractor,” said Olaf. Just then we heard a loud *SNAP* as a clam slapped shut, and the young gentleman in the Clam tank yanked his hand away just in time. Uncle Olaf breathed a sigh of relief and said “but he signed a contract … the contract says ‘I am not an employee; I am an independent contractor. I will clean Olaf’s clams. And if I should lose a hand or two, I will only sue the clam or clams that got me, and not poor Uncle Olaf.'”

I shook my head and told poor Uncle Olaf of the panel decision in the case of Leonard Key v. Los Angeles County Office Education. Leonard Key had signed a contract stating that he was an independent contractor paid to teach music lessons at one of the Los Angeles County schools. However, the Workers’ Compensation Judge found that Mr. Key was, in fact an employee, and his injury was compensable. Workers’ Compensation in California is compulsory, after all, and Mr. Key was simply an employee by any other name. And, after all, the farmers in the Borello case had signed a contract as well.

The most important thing for Uncle Olaf to remember is the guiding policy of workers’ compensation — to shift the costs of industrial injuries to the producers and not the consumers/public. Even the Legislature might make efforts to amend the law, defining a contractor vs. an employee based on a long list of factors.

So, dear readers, what should Uncle Olaf do? Before the young gentleman sticks his hand into another one of Uncle Olaf’s clams, should Olaf pull him out of the tank and cease operations until he can get a workers’ compensation policy?

California Workers' Compensation Self-Insurance Update

Under the new requirements of SB 863, California private (non-public entity) workers’ comp self-insured employers and self-insured groups (SIGs) starting this year are required to submit an actuarial study and an actuarial summary form to the Department of Industrial Relation’s Office of Self-Insured Plans (OSIP). Private self-insured employers’ actuarial submissions are due on May 1 and SIGs are due on April 15. The new actuarial study and summary form must both be prepared by a qualified actuary, as defined by OSIP.

Under SB 863, the method for calculating OSIP’s required security deposits has changed from the old method involving the Estimated Future Liabilities (EFL) formula (multiplied by a factor of 1.35 – 2.00) to the new actuarial methodology. This is considered the “gold standard” by insurers, captives, and other state Guaranty Funds as well. Self insurers are still required to submit their self-insured employers’ annual reports to OSIP as they have always done. This annual report covers the self-insured entity’s open workers’ comp claims by calendar year.

Those 340+ self-insured entities in the Alternative Security Program (ASP) of the Self-Insurers’ Security Fund (SISF) are part of the annual composite deposit program wherein SISF provides OSIP with their security deposit guarantee. They post nothing. Therefore, their security deposits are “notional” since SISF covers them. SISF’s ASP member assessments in July, 2013 will be adjusted (i.e. rebalanced) to reflect the new actuarial standard. Some ASP entities may experience increases or decreases in their annual assessments as a result of their restated open claim liabilities using a uniform actuarial standard. Currently, SISF member security deposits are based on factors of 135% to over 200% of their total EFL.

SISF's excluded entities are those that are required to post collateral (cash, LOC, securities, or security bonds) with OSIP. The 25 active California SIG's already post security deposits based upon an actuarial figure, but in 2013 SIG security deposits — like individual self-insureds — is at the undiscounted “expected level” versus the previous standard of an 80% confidence level.

Each self-insured's actuarial report must include: Incurred But Not Reported (IBNR) liabilities, Allocated Loss Adjustment Expense (ALAE), and Unallocated Loss Adjusted Expense (ULAE), less any credit for applicable excess insurance. Each of these amounts will be reported on the actuarial summary form. There are currently 55 single-entity self-insureds that will now be required to post their OSIP security deposit based upon their 2012 actuarial report submittal.

The new OSIP self-insured actuarial summary form was just placed on the OSIP website on February 14, 2013. (Note: These new requirements do not apply to government entities and JPA's).

The actuarial valuation report of the self-insured's open workers' comp claims must be as of December 31 of the previous year (i.e. 12/31/2012). Actuaries may roll forward liabilities to the December 31 date instead of having a separate study performed if the self-insured already has actuarial studies that use a different valuation date.

It's important to note that with nearly 500 self-insured entities being impacted in 2013 by SB 863 changes, exceptions to the requirement to file an actuarial summary are being developed and will be contained in a regular rulemaking package that should be publically announced within the next four to six weeks. The proposed exceptions will most likely only pertain to self-insurers that have a few open claims or a very low total ELF.

David Axene, a healthcare actuary and an Insurance Thought Leadership author and advisory board member, recommends Jeffrey R. Jordan and Frederick W. Kilbourne as actuaries who would be able to help you with the actuarial study and actuarial summary form now required as a result of the passage of SB 863:

Jeffrey R. Jordan, FCAS, MAAA
Phone: 818.879.1299
Send Jeffrey an Email

Frederick W. Kilbourne, FCAS, MAAA, FSA
Phone: 858.793.1300
Website: www.thekilbournecompany.com
Send Frederick an Email

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