In this video, Tom Searcy — an expert in large account sales and the founder of Big Hunt Sales — shares with agents and brokers three keys to maximizing their influence when first meeting with potential clients.
Recent research has revealed these three baseline concepts:
- Information = Confidence. At your first meeting, your level of confidence will rise with the amount of information you have about the people with whom you are meeting. Doing your research before the meeting (through LinkedIn, Google, their website, etc.). Knowing background information on your potential client's representatives will give you something to talk or ask about.
- Body Language. Eye contact, smiling, and handshake are common elements of the first meeting. But do you know which of the three should last the longest?
- Say Something Specific.Use your research to introduce a question or comment that will help you frame future conversations.
Watch Tom's video above to learn more.
I found myself arguing an extremely silly point with an agency owner at a conference. Everyone but the agent saw the silliness of his argument. I explained the point every way imaginable, to no avail. I could see from the looks on others’ faces, they were tiring of him not getting the point either. If he had been one of the audience members watching someone else argue, he probably would have seen the errors in his thinking, too. But, sometimes you just have to be outside looking in to see a point.
As a consultant, I very often find myself facing this type of situation. The four points below are the most common positions held by agency owners that create immovable and serious roadblocks to their agencies’ success. If any of these sound familiar to you, take a step outside of the situation and look back in. You might see your position in a different light.
1. We must write small accounts because you never know which one will turn into a large account. This commonly expressed position presumes an inability to identify clients with great potential versus those with no potential. This means agencies believing in this philosophy should write absolutely as many small accounts as possible.
An average agency abiding by this philosophy has at least 1,000 small accounts and maybe one, over 10 years has grown big. But let’s say there are two accounts that grow big. So out of 10,000 renewals, two get big. Can the agency write enough large accounts to cover the 1,000+ small accounts that soak up huge amounts of time, effort and expense? If so, this may be a great strategy. If not, it is time to rethink the agency’s strategy.
2. We do not use coverage checklists because we might leave something off. The belief here is that if you don’t have a list, you can’t leave coverages off. This presumes nothing is left off when a checklist is not used. So if an insured does not get the correct coverage because the producer does not use a list and the absence of a list means the coverage wasn’t necessary to offer, then by default, the customer could not have needed the coverage and therefore, the uncovered claim is just a figment of their imagination. Right? If you believe this, then keep on going without using coverage checklists.
Another perspective is that if the agent does not use a coverage checklist, there is no need to recommend coverages a customer needs. In other words, if I don’t know the customer needs a coverage, I don’t have a responsibility to offer the coverage. For a peddler of insurance, this makes perfect sense because peddlers only take orders. Why pay commissions to peddlers? Web sites are quite capable of taking orders and issuing policies.
3. We do not need to hold our producers accountable. The reasons given for not holding producers accountable are numerous and include that accountability might make them angry. What is the price of an angry producer? In some cases, say $500,000 commission producers, not making them angry might be a good strategy. But is the price reasonable for not making $100,000 producers angry? An incompetent producer may leave the agency or become a good producer through accountability. Either way, the agency may find itself way ahead by enforcing accountability.
Other common reasons given are that they are nice guys and that they have never been held accountable so it is unfair to do so now. That is fair enough. But to be really fair, if the producers are not held accountable, why hold anyone accountable? Why hold the customer service representatives (CSRs) accountable? Why hold new producers accountable?
Another reason given is that by holding them accountable, the ultimate outcome is that they would be fired and the emotional trauma of firing a producer is too much. That makes sense. Of course, if you are not going to fire a producer, how can you fire a CSR? Is their trauma any less?
Then there are the producers that should hold themselves accountable negating the need for management to do so. How well is that working in your agency?
4. All agencies have the same value as a multiple of sales or EBITDA. I am often asked, “How much are agencies worth today?” This presumes that all agencies are alike, all agencies are commodities and nothing is special about any agency. Is this correct? Is there nothing special about your agency?
Let’s assume some common multiple applied to all agencies. If one agency is losing 10 percent of its commissions annually and another agency is growing by 10 percent, then they should have the same multiple. The same goes for the agency that has a 25 percent profit margin versus the agency that has a -5 percent profit margin. Even the agency that has $1,000,000 of extra cash on its balance sheet versus the agency that has spent $500,000 of trust monies will have the same value.
The question presupposes such material differences do not exist. It’s like someone is asking, “What’s the value of a 2005 Ford F-150?” They expect I can look up the blue book, ask how many miles the agency has on it, the condition of the body, and whether it has any extra features.
Quite often, the agency owners who ask this question have problematic agencies and the reason they ask the question this way is because they do not want their problems taken into consideration in the valuation.
I do not believe any reader likes the logical result of these incredibly common beliefs and practices. I’m not going to argue these ideas are wrong. If you share these beliefs, take a step outside and look back in. Think through the complete concept and if you still believe in it, then go for it 100 percent!
Success in the medical device business is a team sport. One crucial member of a device firm's team is often an insurance broker. The right insurance brokers can help you get the most affordable coverage at the broadest terms. They can help guide you through the insurance maze and help you build a financial bulwark against various risks. If you face a crisis or a claim, they can partner with you and offer resources to come to your aid. In short, they can be invaluable business partners. Thus, a key part of any medical device firm's risk management program should be wise broker selection.
For starters, let's differentiate between an insurance agent and a broker. An insurance agent typically represents the insurance seller, i.e., the insurance company. An agent may have exclusive or non-exclusive contracts with certain insurance companies, and can place coverage only with those insurers.
An insurance broker brings buyers and sellers of insurance together, but represents you, the buyer. A broker can survey the entire insurance marketplace to find the best deal for you — assessing price, service and scope of coverage. For many medical device companies, an insurance broker will be their chief insurance advisor.
What should medical device companies look for in an insurance broker, or when evaluating their current one? Recently, I queried several insurance brokers who work in the medical device and life science space. Here, in no particular order, is a shopping list of fifteen qualities to look for when selecting this key business partner:
1. A broker who can grow with you and evolve with your insurance needs. Mike Tanghe of Falcon West Insurance Brokers, Inc. (Twin Cities, Minnesota area) says, “Make sure brokers can help not only with present needs, but insist they also have the expertise and capabilities to adapt as your firm grows and changes. Insurance needs for early-stage R&D firms differ from those of mature companies with several products on the market.”
2. Look for low staff turnover and high longevity. Tanghe also recommends focusing on the individuals with whom you'll be working. Ask the broker, “What is your historical staff turnover ratio?” He urges that firms look beyond “dog and pony shows,” and focus on a broker's customer service role. This should not only protect the client from exposures, Tanghe maintains, but also make a client's job easier as it navigates the complexities of insurance.
3. Device industry specialization. Byron Yankou, a broker with AVID Insurance and Risk Management in Toronto, notes that the device area is highly specialized. Take one small area, he says, such as an early-stage company. A new insurance broker isn't likely to build an insurance program that addresses Directors and Officers risk, or anticipate a seamless transition to a public listing.
4. Global perspective and resources. Yankou notes that with clinical trials occurring throughout the world — where even large international underwriters have limited resources — it's imperative that brokers have global connections to place international coverage.
5. Deep bench to provide a range of risk management/mitigation services. One can't be all things to all people, Yankou notes. “A good broker should have contacts to contract out certain aspects to outside specialists,” he says. Specifically, he cites post-loss claims management or business interruption settlements. As a company emerges from an early stage into a growth stage or mature stage, determine if the broker has other value-adds like global capabilities and/or in-house claims advocacy.
6. Trade show/conference visibility. According to Russ Jones, a broker with Summers Thompson Lowry (North Carolina), brokers must “be visible at life science conferences so that prospects know they are serious about the business. Do you see the brokers attending industry trade shows? Do they read the trade journals in your industry niche? This is a sign they are steeped in your business.
7. Brokers must understand the science. They should have a basic grasp of the science the client is working on. If the broker does not understand your product — whether it is a drug-eluting stent, a retractor or an ophthalmic implant — he or she cannot “sell” you as a sound risk to an insurance underwriter.
8. A broker steeped in life science, who can view the business from an investor's perspective. Sam Fairley, Senior Vice President at RT Specialty in New York City, suggests finding a broker actively involved with life science accounts and who has assembled programs for start-ups and early-stage investment companies. This includes a broker who has used venture capital and private equity investment, right up through IPO and beyond. Get a broker, he says, that understands loss exposures from the investor side, from a regulatory angle and who has negotiated coverage at each stage, up through Phase III trials and product approval.
9. Passion and interest in the medical device sector! Shane Aiken, Account Director at Indemnity Corporation (Sydney, Australia) believes that a good broker is passionate about the science, the thrill of the ride from a capital and discovery standpoint, and wholeheartedly embraces their role in the business network. Andrew Tamworth, a life science underwriter with CFC Underwriting (UK), says a good broker has an interest in, and understanding of, the medical device sector.
10. An understanding of lifecycle risk. Medical device firms strive to build shareholder value. Procuring insurance is not as thrilling as buying that sexy new BMW you've been eyeing. Device firms face cost pressures. A good broker breaks through this, understanding the full discovery lifecycle — from capital raising to registration — and articulates to management the true nature of complex risk exposures that threaten balance sheets throughout the lifecycle, providing best practice solutions that provide protection.
Matt Heinzelmann, Executive Vice President at Higginbotham & Associates (Dallas) notes that, from early to mature stages, each insurance buyer is focused on different objectives. Part of a broker's value-add is understanding client's financial objectives, then (and only then) articulating specific insurance coverages with unique strategies that dovetail with short- and long-term goals. For example, early stage companies, focused on R&D, he notes aren't typically preoccupied with product liability, but might want a specialized insurance product that covers them for complications arising from human clinical trials.
11. A perspective that goes beyond insurance-buying, encompassing risk management and strategy. Michael Cremeans, who leads the life science practice at the Oswald Companies (Cleveland) says, “It's really not about insurance. A good broker truly acts as a business advisor and not as an 'insurance person.'” Any insurance placement results from hard work and analysis. Weaving insurance and risk management into a strategic plan, along with experience in dealing with contractual liability, are key components to adding value, Cremeans states.
12. A broker that breaks out of “insurance product” silos. Cremeans observes that the insurance industry often organizes itself into product-type silos, but many device firms dislike that approach. A broker that can apply knowledge across multi-insurance disciplines to the medical device industry has great value.
13. Ability to offer bespoke solutions. “Medical device companies are not cookie-cutter risks,” Cremeans insists, “and may need something other than cookie-cutter insurance solutions and products.” He cites as key success traits for brokers the ability to think laterally and design an insurance program around the client's needs rather than pushing off-the-shelf products.
14. Accessibility and pro-activity. A good broker stays in touch with the client — not just at policy renewal time — and communicates with you proactively as a device firm's risk profile changes. This, Cremeans says, enables the firm to re-calibrate the structure of the insurance program as needed. Crises and problems for device firms do not always conform to 9-to-5, Monday-through-Friday schedules. A good broker comes through in a pinch, even if a problem arises during “off hours.”
15. Opens strategic alliances, resources and partnerships. Bruce Ball, Chairman of Britton Gallagher (Cleveland) says, “A good broker is steeped in the tangible and regulatory risks that a device company faces and offers substantive dialogue with senior management about risk and dealing with its consequences.” He stresses, though, that a good broker doesn't stop there. An A-player, he adds, helps clients grow their businesses by opening up relationships with other clients, VC contacts/strategic consolidators and makes strategic introductions to their spheres of influence. “Being a CEO of a life science company can make you feel like you are on an island,” Ball states, adding, “it doesn't have to be that way.”
“Dream Teams” are monikers more often associated with US Olympic basketball squads than with med-tech enterprises. Device firms can help build gold medal caliber businesses, though, by incorporating savvy insurance brokers as part of their own risk management Dream Team!
This article originally appeared in the April 2013 issue of Medical Product Outsourcing Magazine.
Most ceding companies avail themselves of catastrophe reinsurance, a product that pays anywhere from 90 to 100% of aggregated event loss after the ceding company’s retention up to the limits obtained. Generally the retention is determined as some fraction of the company’s surplus and the exposure profile of the company from any one catastrophe. The ceding company wants that retention high enough to not merely be swapping dollars with the reinsurer for frequency events, but low enough that the “shock” of the sudden demand for cash to pay claims does not impair the company.When a broker tells a ceding company what the rate-on-line is for a catastrophe treaty … (the rate for a limit of coverage) or the inverse of a payback period, that number is not assuming any reinstatement of limits occurring. The reinsurers have now worked it that the reinstatement premium will in effect accelerate the payback period and increase the actual rate-on-line by requiring 100% as to time in reinstatement calculations. This was not always the case — at one time the reinsurer only charged for the reinstatement limits at a pro rated factor of the time remaining on the treaty.
Catastrophe reinsurance is somewhat unique in that its limits must be reinstated, but reinstating those limits now generally comes at a price higher than the original limits costs. This is so because the reinstated limits are only good for the remainder of the treaty period, not for the entire annual contract period as were the original limits. For example, suppose a Texas ceding company had a catastrophe treaty for the period from Jan 1, 2012 to December 31, 2012 and a hurricane came through Houston on October 1, 2012, exhausting the cedant’s treaty limit. The cost to reinstate that entire limit is the same dollars as it was to initially secure the original limit, but the second limit is good only from October 1, 2012 to December 31, 2012. Thus, the limits costs are the same for a three-month period reinstatement as they were for a twelve-month original limit of the same amount.
Reinsurers may tell ceding companies at renewal time that they are renewing at the expiring rate, but what the ceding company must be aware of is that a reinsurer’s practice is not unlike the federal government saying it will not raise tax rates, but then taking away some deductions so that the net effect is to increase the tax owed. At renewal, the ceding company may find that because of some change in the treaty definitions initiated by the reinsurer, it will have to pay more for the treaty even thought the “rate” stayed the same. The net effect may be that while the rate did not change, the measurement against that rate did change, making the actual treaty costs increase or coverage decrease.
Consider also that if the ceding company had been carrying its original limits equal to the one in one hundred year storm, and such limits were appropriate, the reinstatement limit is now being carried for a second one in one hundred year event occurring in the same year, but happening again in the next three months, a highly unlikely scenario. The reinsurer is actually making the ceding company reinstate the catastrophe limit at a higher cost for an event that is even less likely to occur … but never fear, the reinsurer will offer to sell the ceding company yet another product that will cover the reinstatement costs … a treaty now for a charge slightly below the reinstatement costs that will pay the reinstatement premiums for the catastrophe treaty so that the ceding company will have reinstatement limits available in the event a second one in one hundred year catastrophe strikes within the next three months. (A pre loss, pre pay option treaty so to speak, where the ceding company can prepay the reinstatements now at a discounted rate!)
One of the primary attributes making for sound-rating analysis is the law of large numbers. That is, enough units are insured providing that sufficient losses are experienced in order to provide predictability to an event. By its very nature, catastrophes are generally unusual events as far as the individual ceding company is concerned. Regional ceding companies may experience an event that exceeds its retention only once every several years. Reinsurers thus, by in large, do not price catastrophe treaties for ceding companies on the individual cedant’s catastrophe experience.
Rates for catastrophe insurance are based on “cat models.” Cat models are used against the ceding company’s risk locations and dollars of exposure at those locations. That is, all other things being equal, having 5 billion dollars of insurance exposure along the coast where the models predict a hurricane will strike will cost the ceding company more to reinsure than 5 billion dollars of inland exposure, where the models show the effects of a hurricane are less intense.
During any catastrophe, claims are filed in multiples of what the ceding company may be used to dealing with on a normal basis, and the ceding company may be required to utilize the services of independent adjusters to augment their own claims personnel services. The combination of high volume, tyranny of the urgent, and utilization of temporary staff provides ample opportunity for mistakes in coding, reinsurance reinstatement premium calculations, and event identification.
Event identification is simply the realization that the loss may not be correctly identified to the named event covered. Not all policyholders may immediately turn in a claim, and a claim that is turned in months after the event may be miscoded and missed in reinsurance recovery. Additionally, not all reinsurance recovery is utilized because the cedant did not realize that certain subsequent events are covered.
For example, suppose a claim is paid and closed, and a recovery is made from the reinsurer for the event. Two years later the ceding company receives a suit alleging bad faith and deceptive practices and other allegations that the claim was mishandled. Many insurance companies will put its Errors and Omissions carrier on notice of the allegation being made. However, not all will notify the reinsurer of possible additional development under the treaty for the catastrophe under the ECO/XPL* portion of the cat treaty, which treaty has already been tapped. The ceding company will likely have a per claim retention under its Errors and Omissions policy, plus it is responsible for the stated limits of the policy it issued to the insured before its Errors and Omissions coverage kicks in. Whereas the cat treaty retention has already been met, meaning the ECO/XPL coverage of the cat contract will essentially provide Errors and Omissions coverage sooner to the cedant.
Additionally, depending on the definition of net retained loss under the treaty, it is possible under given circumstances that the ceding company could collect twice for the same Errors and Omissions loss, once under the treaty’s ECO/XPL and if large enough, additionally under its Errors and Omissions policy. An argument by the reinsurer that a collection under the Errors and Omissions policy inures to the treaty should be challenged with a claim that then the premium of the Errors and Omissions policy must similarly reduce the measure (earned premium) against the rate the reinsurer is charging. In other words the reinsurer does not get the inuring benefit of the Errors and Omissions without a corresponding allowance for its costs to the cedant. However, the cedant may be better off arguing the definition of retained loss under the treaty than to argue for the inuring costs.
During the turmoil of a catastrophic event, it is entirely likely that other reinsurance treaties will be overlooked or receive lesser attention. Most per risk treaties have a single occurrence limit, so that the per risk treaty is not used for catastrophic events. However, in many instances the per risk treaty inures to the cat treaty, so that the costs of the per risk treaty reduces the measure against which the cat rate is multiplied. In other words the costs of the per risk treaty reduces the costs of the cat treaty, because technically, the per risk treaty is supposed to be used up to the measure of its occurrence limit before the cat treaty is utilized; the recovery paid by the per risk treaty reduces the catastrophe loss.
As well, premiums may be missed or double paid, inuring contracts overlooked, or checks directed to the wrong reinsurer. I have seen the case during a catastrophe where a premium payment check was directed to the wrong Lloyds Syndicate, and such Syndicate was either so disorganized or so unethical, that it did not return the misdirected funds until after a formal request was made by the ceding company for the return over a year later. You can’t tell me the Syndicate thought that it was entitled to the money or did not realize it was not in the ceding company’s program.
The reinsurers are not your “friends.” They are not in the business to watch out for the interests of the ceding company — reinsurers are in business to make money, just as ceding companies are in business to make money. In 2010, just the top five reinsurers wrote over 98 billion dollars in premiums.
In a brokered market, the intermediaries do not only work for the interests of the ceding companies — they are in many cases dual agents. The word “intermediary” means go between, and for purposes of finances, intermediaries are the agent of the reinsurer, as provided in a standard intermediary clause ever since the federal case of 673 F.2d 1301; The Matter of Pritchard & Baird, Inc., which held that for purposes of money transfer, the broker is the agent of the reinsurer. Money received by the intermediary from the ceding company is considered money to the reinsurer, but money received by the intermediary from the reinsurer is not considered money to the ceding company.
Even all these years after Pritchard and Baird, I have recently witnessed where an unscrupulous reinsurer told the ceding company that it must collect from the intermediary the refund funds portion representing the intermediary brokerage fees. I have also witnessed where this same ceding company signed and agreed to placement slip terms but some 9 months later when the contract wording was finally provided, change the minimum premiums to equal the deposit premiums within the contract, successfully slipping this change by the cancer chemo patient general manager of the small ceding company and then arguing that it had no record of any change. Such behavior is inexcusable and would never have been caught without an independent reinsurance recovery review.
If reinsurers did things right, then the National Association of Insurance Commissioners would not have needed to adopt a rule requiring that final contract wordings must be signed within 9 months of the contract’s effective date to allow for accounting treatment as prospective, as opposed to retroactive, reinsurance.
It’s absurd to think that this type of rule should be necessary in the first place. The 9-month rule, which really comes out of Part 23 of SSAP 62, requires that the reinsurance contract be finalized — reduced to written form and signed within 9 months after commencement of the policy period. In effect the reinsurers being remiss in generating a timely reinsurance contract punishes the ceding company. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners also found it necessary to adopt the so-called 90-day rule. This rule requires the US ceding companies to take a penalty to surplus in an amount equal to 20% of reinsurance recoverables on paid losses 90 days past due. The rule also requires a 20% penalty to surplus for all recoverables due from so-called “slow payers.”
In effect reinsurers have been so remiss in generating timely contracts and paying bills in a timely manner that the National Association of Insurance Commissioners had to create rules to prod them into doing the right thing by punishing the ceding company if they don’t.
It also never ceases to amaze me the attitude of ceding companies in their thrill of receiving a 25% ceding commission from the reinsurer in a proportional treaty for business that costs the ceding company 33% to generate. Or how the reinsurer now “did them a favor” by allowing a 27% ceding commission in the renewal. Or how that so called quota share treaty that the reinsurer is supposedly a “partner” in has a catastrophe cap included for the benefit of the reinsurer. If this represents what it is like to partner and be the “friend” of ceding companies, then the plaintiff’s bar should certainly also be considered a friend of ceding companies.
Reinsurance intermediaries are required to be licensed in most states. Penalties are imposed on unlicensed intermediaries. In some states, led by New York through its Rule & Regulation 98, reinsurance intermediaries must have written authorization from a reinsured before procuring reinsurance for the reinsured. The reinsurance intermediary must provide the reinsured with written proof that a reinsurer has agreed to assume the risk. The reinsurance intermediary also must inquire into the financial condition of the reinsurer and disclose its findings to the reinsured and disclose every material fact that is known regarding the reinsured to the reinsurer.
Record keeping requirements also exist, mandating that the reinsurance intermediary keep a complete record of the reinsurance transaction for at least 10 years after the expiration of the reinsurance contract. Reinsurance intermediaries under these regulations are now responsible as fiduciaries for funds received as reinsurance intermediaries. Funds on reinsurance contracts must be kept in separate, identifiable accounts and may not be comingled with the reinsurance intermediaries’ own funds.
Most of the time the intermediary’s sales pitch to the ceding company emphasizes how it has a great relationship with the reinsurers, the inference being that such a relationship will ultimately provide for a better price for the ceding company in the negotiation process, as if the reinsurer will do a “favor” for the intermediary which will directly benefit the ceding company. Such fairy tale thinking is best left to children’s books and not in the board rooms of ceding companies. The truth is the intermediary is more dependent for its success on the relationship it has with the reinsurer than it is on the ceding company, and the intermediary is not about to alienate the reinsurer for the sake of a ceding company.
In the brokered market, the ceding company typically has no say in the treaty terms. What most small to medium ceding companies fail to realize is that just as an insurance policy that it issues is subject to being a contract of adhesion by virtue of the legal maxim of contra proferentem, so too is the reinsurance treaty to the reinsurer.
The Latin phrase “contra proferentem” is a standard in contract law, which provides that if a clause in a contract appears to be ambiguous, it should be interpreted against the interests of the person who insisted that the clause be included. In other words, if you speak ambiguously in a contract, your words can literally be used against you. This is designed to discourage people from including ambiguous or vague wording in contracts because it would run against their interests. This is a decisive advantage for many ceding companies in what are often ambiguously defined treaties produced by reinsurers.
All too often the ceding company simply falls in line with what the reinsurer says is the proper interpretation of the treaty language. Whether such complicity is reflective of the incorrect notion that the reinsurer is their “friend” and operates in its best interests or just ignorance, the fact is that ceding companies are often not fully utilizing the product for which they have dearly paid.
The services offered by such entities as Boomerang Recoveries, LLC provide for the ceding company a second look at the treaties it purchased and how it structured its recoveries from its various treaties. Every “touch point” along the recovery process provides for possible missed opportunity. An expressed reluctance by a ceding company to have its recoveries reviewed by an independent reinsurance professional represents misplaced loyalties. The loyalty of a ceding company is to its policyholders or its stockholders, not to its reinsurers.
Good faith and fair dealing owed by a ceding company to the reinsurer does not include foregoing rightful reinsurance recoveries or agreeing with every position of the reinsurer. In this day of increased litigation for Errors and Omissions and Directors and Officers issues, ceding companies should be more concerned with demonstrating their due diligence and exhibiting fiduciary responsiveness by trying to recover every dollar that they are entitled to receive under the treaty contracts, than in worrying about what reinsurers may think about an independent review of its reinsurance recovery process.
Think of it this way, if the ceding company obtained some tax advice on a return it had filed which showed that by refiling, it would be refunded $1,000,000 on the taxes it paid to Uncle Sam, will the officers of that company argue that filing an 1120X (Corporate Amended Tax Return) is a bad idea because it might look like an admission that the company had not taken every deduction entitled to it when it was originally filed or that the IRS might think poorly of the company? That would be absurd, but so too are the arguments that recasting and review of past reinsurance recoveries is a bad idea.
As we have seen:
- Every touch point in the recovery process is a potential to miss recovery … its just human nature to make more mistakes at the time of crisis than otherwise.
- Catastrophe treaties are not priced for individual company experience, but by models, so that additional recoveries will not directly impact the future rate charged the ceding company.
- Reinsurers are not in business to be your friend. Ceding companies pay sufficient premiums to collect all that they are entitled to collect under the treaty.
- Reinsurers will not tell ceding companies when a mistake is made or that it owes a ceding company more money.
- Intermediaries do not make a commission and are not paid to assure that the ceding company appropriately and fully utilizes the treaties that are placed.
- Reinsurance treaties are esoteric and a ceding company cannot rely on an intermediary to watch out for its best interests or interpret contracts in its favor.
- Increasing Directors and Officers exposures demand that officers and managers demonstrate their due diligence and the full filling of fiduciary duties. Even if no additional funds are shown as recoverable after a review, the effort is demonstrative of duties fulfilled.
- Intermediaries are dual agents and primarily “sell” their services to ceding companies by emphasizing the great relationship they have with reinsurers. Ceding companies need to understand that great reinsurer relationships do not mean better terms for ceding companies or that the intermediary is willing to sacrifice that relationship for the sake of the ceding company. Indeed, intermediary relationships with reinsurers are an extension of and built upon their loyalty to those reinsurers, not the ceding companies.
- Reinsurance treaties follow the legal maxim that ambiguities are construed against the drafter of the contract. Ceding companies need a truly independent expert that is not tied to the reinsurer, as is the intermediary, to argue for them and review recoveries on their behalf.
Cronyism has no place in today’s economy. Insurance managers are not reinsurance recovery experts, and utilizing the services of independent reinsurance recovery experts should be thought of as no different than utilizing the services of legal or tax experts to maximize the financial position of the ceding company. The deference ordinarily given to a reinsurer by a ceding company is substantially more than it would ever give to say, an insurer that carried its fleet auto coverage or its Directors and Officers coverage. Ceding companies should stop thinking of reinsurance as some sort of friendship pact and start considering it as they would any other insurance protection it purchased for its financial stability.
* Excess of policy limits, extra contractual obligations
This is Part 1 in a two-part series about what employers should expect from their insurance brokers. Part 2 in the series will be forthcoming soon.
Setting The Stage
The world of health care finance is changing and the role of the health insurance broker is changing just as rapidly. The role of a trusted advisor is more important than ever. Health benefits for any size employer demand a benefits professional who has the client’s best interests at heart. Employers must explore current benefits offerings and demand a package best suited to their needs.
Voluntary benefits, self funding, and Consumer Directed Health Care are just a few of the many options every employer must discuss with their broker. Many employers are also demanding that their brokers account for their income.
The days where brokers were paid a commission by the carrier and counted on a regular double digit raise simply by telling the employer to re-enroll are gone. Some carriers are changing their compensation model. Instead of paying a percentage commission they are paying per head, also known as a capitation model. This model eliminates the automatic pay raise brokers have been experiencing and forces brokers to explore other options to replace lost revenue.
Employers should insist on a written agreement outlining the broker’s commissions and the services they will receive. A good broker will help an employer design a plan, market the plan to carriers, and analyze the costs and benefits of suitable plans. Beyond that, some brokers may handle open enrollment, resolve billing and claim issues, and help communicate with employees, but it’s essential to clarify such expectations up front.
If your company is self-insured or experienced-rated, retain a competitive broker group to periodically conduct an independent market pricing comparison. You will pay a consulting fee for such services, but the initiative may result in significant savings.
Discussions regarding containing health care costs have traditionally focused on educating and influencing the employee consumer of health insurance. But now, as soaring costs and growing complexity have become the norm, employers too need to educate themselves in order to understand how brokers are compensated and how they can reap the most value from the employer-broker relationship.
Technology As Differentiator
Just as the Internet has empowered consumers, so has it empowered health insurance brokers. While once the task of acting as conduit between insurance company and policyholder required long administrative hours, computers now allow broker and insurance company to instantly transfer information.
Still, time saved by computer must be made up by competing for a limited and educated client base. The new technology has in part driven a trend towards specialization: brokers are marketing themselves as specialists in a given industry. One might be the specialist in non-profit health insurance while another may specialize in the travel industry. This allows brokers to be aware not just of policy options but also of the typical wants, needs and budgets of a given industry.
What directions technology will propel the industry will be revealed only with time. One thing that remains clear is that Americans do not want to worry about their health coverage and will look to experts for help securing the best service at the right price.
Every broker has the best service and every broker offers the best products, just ask them. What differentiates a broker is their technology. Not only the technology a broker uses in their office but more importantly the technology the broker provides to the employer groups. Most brokers are very reactionary. They provide technology to their clients only when the client demands it. All parties — employers, employees, Third Party Administrators, carriers, and brokers — must utilize technology tools.
Benefits administration software, COBRA administration tools, HRIS, and consolidated billing services are just a few of of the technology tools used by brokers and their clients. The days of brokers providing quotes and enrollments are over.
In the next article in this series, we will explore in more detail how top brokers are using these technologies to run their business.